

97-84166-8

Sandford, Thomas J.

Lex fori

New York

1895

97-84166-8
MASTER NEGATIVE #

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
PRESERVATION DIVISION

BIBLIOGRAPHIC MICROFORM TARGET

ORIGINAL MATERIAL AS FILMED - EXISTING BIBLIOGRAPHIC RECORD

308
Z
Box 740 Sandford, Thomas J.
Lex fori; or, How to prevent vote selling, tax dodging
and money cornering. By Thomas J. Sandford. New
York, 1895.
72 p. 20^{cm}.

1. Corruption (in politics)-U.S.I. Title. 9-228337/3
Library of Congress JK246.S22 8-28
(Copyright 1895: 9082) only ed.

RESTRICTIONS ON USE: Reproductions may not be made without permission from Columbia University Libraries.

TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA

FILM SIZE: 35mm REDUCTION RATIO: 9:1 IMAGE PLACEMENT: IA (IIA) IB IIB

DATE FILMED: 8-25-97 INITIALS: PB

TRACKING #: 26974

FILMED BY PRESERVATION RESOURCES, BETHLEHEM, PA.

258
700/32

PRICE 25 CENTS.

LEX ~
~ FORI

OR

HOW TO PREVENT VOTE SELLING, TAX
DODGING AND MONEY CORNERING.

308

Z

BY

Box 740

THOMAS J. SANDFORD.

NEW YORK.

1895.

LEX ~

~ FORI

OR

HOW TO PREVENT VOTE SELLING, TAX
DODGING AND MONEY CORNERING.

308

2

BY

Box 740

THOMAS J. SANDFORD.

NEW YORK.
1895.

Copyright 1894 by
THOMAS J. SANDFORD.

1841 PCR / PCR
9

PREFACE.

NEW YORK CITY, Jan. 1st, 1895.

In the city of Troy, N. Y., eight years ago, I met a civil engineer who talked political economy to me at every opportunity. I had some experience as a public speaker, and took an unusual interest in the "dismal science."

At that time, I thought my ability to answer satisfactorily questions pertaining to the science of government, was more than ordinary.

I had frequently met the gentleman referred to in public discussions. He invariably opposed my views, yet I seemed to win the approval of the audiences.

Time and again the majority of a large organization rejected his views and indorsed mine. Yet the civil engineer never lost heart. He frequently visited me while in Troy, and argued that his ideas were indispensable to the material improvement of this government.

In 1889 I regularly attended the meetings of the various debating societies in this city, and there met representatives of every school of political economy, including the individualist socialist, nationalist, communist, single-taxer, greenbacker, etc. While each of these schools advocates ideas more or less good they all recommend much that is impracticable. I flatter myself that this fact was made clear to the audiences by me, if their plaudits meant anything.

At a "reformers'" meeting in this city I renewed discussion with my Trojan antagonist, and received from him a question pertaining to the science of governments which confounded me. The point was so cogent that I immediately dismounted my "high horse" and became an humble pupil of my Trojan adversary.

In teaching me political economy he passed nights by the year. Finally I saw the connection between this government and his

theories. As a consequence I am an earnest disciple of the civil engineer, and believe in all his remedies. To give my readers what I have learned from my preceptor, David Reeves Smith, is the purpose of this publication.

I requested Mr. Smith to write this preface, but he declined in the following letter, which with his permission I herewith publish.

NEW YORK CITY, June 5th, 1894.

T. J. SANDFORD, ESQ.,

DEAR FRIEND:—In reply to your flattering note of the 1st inst. asking me to write a preface to your book, I have reluctantly made up my mind to decline, as I feel that I have no talent in that direction. I will say, however, that I am very much pleased with my success in converting you to the true democratic-republican theory of government.

The development of the science of government has been moving on definite lines since the beginning.

There is only one right way to do anything, all other ways are necessarily wrong in some degree. Fortunately for mankind, reason, observation and experience have been steadily improving political theories and practices throughout the past.

In every generation some measure of advancement is discernible, until now it is possible to specify of what the general framework of a perfect form of government must consist.

In discussing these matters with you so persistently I have been led on from year to year by your evidently sincere desire to ascertain the truth, and I am abundantly repaid for any efforts I have made by the satisfaction I experience in recognizing that you understandingly agree with me in all the most essential points.

I earnestly hope that your little book will be widely read for the good it may do, and that you may have many readers to cheer you with the evidences of their appreciation.

Sincerely your friend,

DAVID R. SMITH.

AXIOMS.

1. *All men have an equal right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.*
2. *All men should be equal before the law.*
3. *The sovereignty of this government should be vested in the whole people, to whom it of natural right belongs.*
4. *The government, as an agent of the whole people, should exercise its powers only with the consent of the governed.*
5. *In production we should strive to exercise as much economy of time and labor as possible.*
6. *Every person should have the right to pursue whatever vocation he pleases, provided that in so doing he affects no person unjustly.*
7. *Public officials should be public servants.*
8. *The income a citizen receives should be in direct proportion to the service he renders the community.*
9. *Every person engaged in any legal vocation is supposed to render the community a service.*
10. *Every man should pay tax or public rent to the community, for the wealth he is using, in proportion to the quantity of value he uses.*

11. *The man who economizes should be permitted to enjoy the fruits of his economy.*

12. *The persons best qualified for doing specific work are the persons who should do such work.*

13. *Every competent person should be required to produce at least as much as he consumes.*

14. *All men should be considered innocent until proved guilty by the law of the land.*

15. *The welfare of the individual should be subordinate to that of the community, limited by the inalienable natural rights of individuals.*

16. *The higher ownership is vested, by natural right, in the whole people.*

17. *That act only should be done which results in the greatest good to the greatest number, without invading individual natural rights.*

18. *The views of the majority should always prevail when individual natural rights are not invaded.*

19. *No man should be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.*

The foregoing sentences are axioms. Some of them are known to the law as principles of equity. They are generally recognized as self-evident truths, and with the exception of one or two they have but to be stated in order to insure their recognition as such. The wisdom embodied in them is the result of the world's experience, and they constitute substantially the theory of this government. Any statute law which conflicts with these axioms will invariably become a

dead letter in the course of time. A law adverse to some of these axioms may be placed on our statute books, but it will ultimately be repealed or ignored.

Although the axioms are the theory of this government, our laws do not conform to them. This theory aligns the drift or tendency of our present form of government. Time and experience will ultimately teach our people how to improve our present social structure; but the adoption of a few ideas herein contained will save our people much bitter and unnecessary experience. Nystrom, who developed the final, and therefore correct, theory of the form of the least resistance for ships, taught the world at once what it might have taken generations to learn, groping along in the dim light of observation and experience. The writer hopes to do for governments what Nystrom did for ship building.

The ideal republic will have on its statute books laws which will conform to this theory, and the only method by which they can be carried into effect is by the adoption of the three principles advocated in "Ownership and Sovereignty." These are called PERPETUAL VOTING, THE DEATH RATE TAX and JUST MONEY, and they will be found more technically treated in that work.

To elucidate them, as viewed by the writer, is the object of this book. The same conclusion set forth in "Ownership and Sovereignty" will be reached in this work, but by a different line of argument.

I am indebted to David Reeves Smith for my conception of the future republic and a view of the lines of its future development.

The theory of this government, as embodied in the

axioms, is the result of the accumulated wisdom of our people. We have found by actual experience, extending back into the feudal ages and beyond the era of the Roman Empire's supremacy, that these axioms must not be ignored, and yet we are all familiar with the fact that they are continually and notoriously disregarded. Could we, in the present age, carry out this theory, I question the ability of any reformer or economist to invent, or conceive, of any law or system of laws under which a government could be organized that would even equal this government.

The question that now arises in the mind of the reader is, "How can we carry this theory into practice?"

Before undertaking to answer, each of the axioms must be explained in detail; if not, some of my readers will claim that the axioms, which constitute the theory, contain error, and that therefore all the reasoning founded upon them is necessarily fallacious.

The first axiom—*All men have an equal right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness*, I never knew to be denied, and shall therefore waste no time on any reader who questions its truth.

The second—*All men should be equal before the law*, is self-evident, even though all men are not equal before the law under our present government.

The third—*The sovereignty of this government should be vested in the whole people, to whom it of natural right belongs*, will be questioned by some, and in refutation it will be affirmed that the sovereignty should be vested in the majority. It is true that under our present government the sovereignty is vested in a particular majority. This is not conducive to the greatest justice to

all our people, on account of the fact that a particular majority on any single question may band together and become the majority on all other questions. If men would honestly and conscientiously express their opinions on all public matters, the majority deciding the question of taxation would be composed of different men from the majority deciding the question of prohibition; but as matters are now adjusted, the majority who obtain possession of public office are the majority who dispose of the questions of taxation, judiciary, finance, religion and everything else, irrespective of the views of other citizens.

The sovereignty should be so managed that the people could easily arrange themselves in different majorities, whenever they felt so inclined; but this arrangement can never be effected under our present system of voting. Our present method of voting should permit our electors to divide up as much as they please on our various public issues. If this were the case the majority on one question, probably, would not be the same persons composing the majority on another question. It would then be very difficult for a legally qualified voter to find himself in the minority on every public question; on the contrary, he would find the majority on some occasions voting with him, and in this manner he would be enabled to exercise his sovereignty, which, as defined by Smith, is "The right to define the right and enforce the decision."

Fourth—*The government, as an agent of the whole people, should exercise its powers only with the consent of the governed*. This evidently is true, and yet our public officials under this government do not concern themselves much about the consent of the governed; they

very frequently act without any reference whatever to public opinion.

The cause of the general indifference of our public officials is traceable to defects in our electoral laws, which are fully explained under the head of "Perpetual Voting." The inability of our people to clearly and effectively exercise their authority, under our present ballot system, partly explains why public officials care so little about the will of the people. If each constituency could readily call its public servants to an account, our public servants would invariably consult the people when about to introduce a new law or policy, or repeal or modify an old one.

Fifth—*In production we should strive to effect as much economy of time and labor as possible.* This is simply another way of expressing the well-recognized truism: "We gratify our desires with the least exertion." In reaching any destination we should use the shortest route. This axiom requires no additional explanation.

Sixth — *Every person should have the right to pursue whatever vocation he pleases, provided that in so doing he affects no person unjustly.* This axiom guarantees to every man the right to determine for what trade, profession or business he is best qualified, without any restraint on the part of any organization, provided he keeps within the laws established for the general protection. That some arbitrary laws or customs make it difficult under our present government for men to engage in certain legal trades or professions is unquestionable, but such laws and customs are contrary to the spirit of republican institutions and should not be tolerated. The right enjoyed under this axiom invests

the individual with the duty to discover what his particular qualifications are, and to apply them accordingly. If he selects a business for which he is unfit, he will soon find out his mistake by the indifference or disapproval of the public. A community manifest their appreciation of an individual's service by increasing or decreasing their demand for his services through the distribution of their patronage.

Seventh — *Public officials should be public servants.* Nobody will hesitate about admitting that public officials ought to be public servants, and yet under our present social structure public officials are frequently public despots. To our elective system can be attributed the insolence and indifference of the great body of our public officials, and under the head of "Perpetual Voting" the truth of this will also be shown.

Eighth — *The income a citizen receives should be in direct proportion to the service he renders the community.* This axiom may require somewhat more explanation than many of the others; but it is true, nevertheless. With the exception of those persons whose wages are fixed by law, the amount of money a man is legally earning or receiving (when the field is fair and open and no monopoly inserts its tentacles) measures the estimate placed on that man's services by the public at large.

To illustrate: If by selling shoes I can acquire ten thousand dollars a year and another man engaged in the same business realizes only one thousand dollars, (time, capital, locality and all other things being equal), I render ten times as much valuable service, *judged by the consumers themselves*, as my competitor.

Examine the case of a man selling milk to the public

and that of a man selling beer. The milk seller, in the estimation of either the reader or writer, may render much better service, do the lesser injury, etc., and consequently be entitled to the larger remuneration; but owing to the fact that you and I are enormously outnumbered by the beer drinkers, the latter can afford to pay the beer seller ten thousand dollars per year, and each beer-drinker pay his part with more ease than we milk-drinkers can pay our milk seller one thousand dollars per year.

On this account, when we consider the views of the whole community, the beer-seller, measured by the revenue he receives, would be missed more by the community than the milk-dealer. This reasoning applies with equal force to everybody, no matter what his trade, profession or vocation.

The case of the successful prize-fighter running a saloon on the Bowery is another example. His revenue is probably two thousand dollars per year, while an average tailor receives in wages less than three hundred dollars per year. Measured by the public's estimation, the prize-fighter, by the single act of disfiguring a fellow-being in the prize ring, is enabled to gratify the curiosity of so many thoughtless people that thousands and thousands of them enter his saloon each year and, by spending five cents or more for beer, are permitted to obtain a glimpse of a rare man, who has deliberately risked his life or has professionally disfigured another human being and yet has not directly increased the comfort, one particle, of a single individual on earth; while the tailor receives only three hundred dollars or less per year, notwithstanding that he has made many suits of comfortable clothing for his fellow beings,

and, so far as utility to humanity is concerned, greatly surpasses the prize-fighter.

However unjust this axiom may seem, it is the theory of this government and will be a principle in the most improved republican form of government of which humanity can now conceive.

Ninth — *Every person engaged in any legal productive industry or vocation is supposed to render the community a service.* The use of the word *productive* implies increasing our store of useful things or administering to our tastes or pleasures.

When a great cantatrice renders an audience a service by singing a few verses and receives as payment probably a thousand dollars or more per night, the thousand dollars is the audience's combined estimate of the service she renders. There is no question that the more things of utility to humanity are produced by an individual, the better it is for the people, provided there is no tax dodging on the part of some persons of great wealth, who are permitted to monopolize more than their share of such articles of utility to the injury of others.

Tenth — *Every man should pay tax or public rent to the community for the wealth he is using in proportion to the value of the wealth.* That is, if his possession of value is large, his taxes (or public rent) ought to be large, and if his possession of value is small, his taxes (or public rent) ought to be small.

Eleventh — *The man who economizes should be permitted to enjoy the fruits of his economy.* This axiom expresses, only differently, what is contained in the common proverb, "He who eats his cake cannot also have it." If a man saves his cake, another ought not

to eat it without the owner's consent. The man who is careful and avoids extravagance, should be protected in his right to enjoy that which he has accumulated as the result of his care and economy.

Twelfth—*Those persons best qualified for doing specific work are the persons who should do such work.* This axiom will merge with the eighth, but is nevertheless, by itself, a separate axiom. To carry it into practice we must have the man who can make the best boots, make boots; the man who can paint the best pictures, paint pictures; the man who can make the best laws, make laws, etc. This axiom is a postulate.

Thirteenth—*Every competent person should be required to produce at least as much as he consumes.* In other words, and as generally expressed, "No able-bodied person should be a burden on society." Under a government conducted strictly in accordance with the theory of this government, no incentive to indolence or vagabondage would exist, because progress could always be made by the industrious and talented. Nothing so disheartens mankind as to be unable to hope for improvement in the future. This axiom applies with especial force to the parasite and non-producer of modern society. To have a little poverty with us is a good thing, for the purpose of enlivening the efforts of those who are naturally disposed to be indolent and without ambition. The sting of poverty is good for some human beings. All poverty in our country will never be eliminated, because wealth and poverty are relative conditions. A ham sandwich might be poverty to one of the coal syndicate and yet be riches to a Bowery tramp. Poverty ought to be so mitigated by righteous laws that even if a man is lazy

for a month or two he shall not be compelled to pay the penalty of death from starvation on account of his temporary laziness. It is penalty enough that he should be compelled to satisfy himself with cheap or coarse food, instead of delicacies, which ought to be the reward of the enterprising and of those rendering society a great service, as measured by the revenue they receive.

Fourteenth—*All men are innocent until proved guilty by the law of the land.* This axiom reposes the power of judging the guilty or innocent in a proper tribunal, and prohibits every person from assuming the functions of a judge or jury.

Fifteenth—*The welfare of an individual should be subordinate to that of the community.* By this axiom is meant that the welfare of the community is of more importance than that of the individual, and that when the welfare of the community conflicts with that of the individual the welfare of the latter must give way, to the extent consistent with the inalienable rights of the individual, which are, compensation for property taken under the law of Eminent Domain, trial by the law of the land, etc.

Sixteenth—*The higher ownership is vested by natural right in the whole people.* This is demonstrated when boards of appraisement, representing the people, fix the price of a citizen's property, when required for public use. The individual or owner can fix the price only when dealing with private individuals; he cannot fix it when dealing with the community. The community fixes the price, when condemning private property, no matter how much "red tape" is employed in so doing. Whoever has the right to fix the price of an

article and the right to use it, *owns* it. The law of Eminent Domain, as far as it goes, enforces the higher ownership of the people.

Seventeenth — *That act should be done which results in the greatest good to the greatest number, without invading individual natural rights.* No majority can rightly abridge the individual natural rights of the minority. It is very difficult to enact a law that does not work some hardship to somebody. Legislators should always strive to do the greatest good to the greatest number.

Eighteenth — *The views of the majority should always prevail, when individual natural rights are not invaded.* If this axiom is ignored in legislating, trouble will be the consequence. The majority ultimately enforce their wishes. They may be fooled for a long time, but their will is finally carried into effect, even though blood must be shed to do it. Minorities rule for intervals only. The people ultimately triumph; yet before a truly democratic republican government can be established, the majority must be enabled to decide and maintain the right of any and every citizen, to divide and split up any public issue or issues, however minute, independent of any party lines.

Nineteenth — *No man should be deprived of life or property without due process of law.* Under this axiom every citizen is guaranteed a fair trial, and no property can be taken from him without giving adequate compensation in exchange.

As this government lives or is reconstructed by statute law or evolution, new axioms will develop. It may be that in the remote future these axioms will be reduced to a few general rules which will cover or in

clude every principle involved in the theory of this government.

The question then is, if the theory is right and just, "*How can the theory of this government be carried into practice?*"

The answer is, by preventing *vote selling, tax dodging and money cornering.*

Now naturally follows another question, viz: "*How can vote selling, tax dodging and money cornering be prevented?*"

The reply is: that the adoption of David Reeves Smith's system of PERPETUAL VOTING, his system of taxation called the DEATH RATE TAX, and his system of JUST MONEY will make vote selling, tax dodging and money cornering impossible.

Let us first consider PERPETUAL VOTING.

PERPETUAL VOTING.

Before attempting to demonstrate the importance of Perpetual Voting, what kind of a system of voting it is and that it alone would effect a prodigious step in the progress of this government, we will undertake to show that every system of voting whose chief purpose is *secrecy* is theoretically wrong, and in the course of time, as a result of a people's experience, it will be discovered that under the pall of secrecy the greatest frauds and outrages are perpetrated at the ballot box, and ever will be. We all realize that good acts seek the light, while bad acts seek darkness. When a man is guilty of some act for which his conscience reproaches him, he does not strive to have the act published; but when he has done a good or creditable act

he frequently seeks the utmost notoriety, and rarely fears it.

The community are naturally disposed to approve good acts and condemn bad ones, because of the fact that righteous laws are those which will best promote the welfare of mankind, and that the misery which is the result of bad laws teaches men, by experience, to distinguish between right and wrong.

Because of secrecy at the ballot box, credit cannot always be given where it is merited or censure always administered where deserved. Under the cover of secrecy the good man can hide himself, and the bad man invariably will. Turn the light of publicity on all our acts and we will immediately strive to avoid public censure by committing fewer bad acts. The secrecy of the ballot box enables the briber and bribed each to perform his part of the unlawful contract; the briber to buy the unfortunate elector, and the bribed to sell his birthright, without the public learning who either the buyer or seller is. A greater blow could not be given to the business of vote buying or selling than that of making all voting open to the public.

While voting is secret some men will not only sell their votes, but will have the effrontery to deplore and condemn vote selling when expressing their views publicly. It is by the means of secrecy at the ballot box that some of our electors are enabled to talk for right and justice three hundred and sixty-four days in the year and on the three hundred and sixty-fifth, viz., election day, vote against right and justice. Were it not for secrecy in voting, such electors would vote as they talked, or else cease to advocate the cause of right and

justice. Make voting public, let the sunlight of honesty fall on the act, and men will no longer inconsistently vote one way and talk another; if they do, and the voting is public, their neighbors will take them to task for their mendacity and inconsistency.

Those who have had experience in secret lodges or organizations must have observed, when candidates for admission are voted on secretly, how frequently evil minded members of the lodge will avail themselves of the secret vote to prevent the admission of an applicant against whom but little can be said to justify his non-admission. The evil minded member, desirous of gratifying his personal spite, invariably insists upon the secret ballot, while the fair minded man does not care for secrecy when he thinks a bad man ought not to be admitted into the organization.

Secret organizations would not exist in this country if we enjoyed genuine freedom at the ballot box, and real freedom of speech. Men do in secret organizations what they fear to do outside of such bodies. The very existence of a secret organization proves some restraint of freedom.

Many will claim that if it were not for secrecy the employer would bulldoze and intimidate his employee. On the contrary, it is by the means of secrecy that the boss or employer accomplishes the most of his intimidation. It is the custom in this country at the present time for many corporations to compel their employes to vote a certain ticket; yet because of the secret ballot but few are aware of it, save the corporation and the employes. If every elector in the United States were forced to vote openly, so that any citizen could learn how everybody else is voting, it would soon be

known by the public what employer or corporation required their help to vote a certain ticket. The public would then prevent the intimidation by withholding patronage or exposing the employer or corporation to public scorn. Even if the public does not come to the assistance of the employees, the workman will learn that a few proprietors are dominating hundreds of their employees.

When the intimidation of help by employers is disclosed, our citizens will realize that a bulldozed workman is not enjoying his rights as a citizen, and that his liberty of thought or freedom of speech is restrained. Under such conditions, if a handful of bosses can successfully and unjustly impose on their thousands of employees, then most assuredly is our liberty only a farce. One man cannot ordinarily control and intimidate a hundred. As soon as the pall of secrecy is thrust aside, the hundred perceive the intimidation, realize their strength of numbers, see their employer's paucity, and then organize to prevent the bulldozing.

The elevated railroads in this city may be taken as an illustration of this idea. Under cover of the secret ballot box (secret to the public but not to the professional politicians) the officers of the Manhattan Elevated Railway may be compelling every workman on the roads to vote a certain ticket. With a system of public voting we could soon ascertain whether the officers were or not, and if they were it would soon be known to the public that, in order to obtain employment on the elevated roads, a man must vote in accordance with the officers' instructions. As soon as public attention became riveted on the railway officials'

intimidation of their employees, it would require but little time for the officers to learn that if they did not cease to bulldoze their help the public would resent such outrageous intimidation by opposing at elections the very men for whom the Manhattan Railway officers compelled their employees to vote.

Under the cover of secrecy the boss takes his help one by one and directs their voting, while at the same time many of the employees who vote as the boss directs do not realize that all the help are voting the same ticket at the instigation of their boss.

If all voting was openly and publicly recorded, and we could determine by looking at the record how everybody voted, it would be readily discovered that a comparatively few persons of great wealth were exercising a disproportionate influence over a large number of their fellow citizens.

Many times in the history of the world have a people discovered that a handful of wealthy personages were dominating them, and in a fit of temporary rage have thrown off the iron heel of monarchy, plutocracy or aristocracy; but because of their lack of intelligence or the inability to establish a fair system of managing the wealth of a nation, the heel of despotism has been again placed on such peoples' necks, only in a different form.

Intelligence will always prevail in the end. A good illustration of the efficacy of open voting, compared with secret balloting, was exemplified in the experience of the "Know Nothing" movement in this country.

The Know Nothing party made uninterrupted progress in those States in which voting was secret, but when Virginia voted, a State whose electors voted by

proclaiming their candidates openly, the party met with its first repulse, because it had little or no argument to give the public justifying a vote for the Know Nothing ticket. In Greece the beginning of the decline of the republic was coeval with the adoption of secret voting. Cicero, Rome's greatest statesman, condemned the secret vote on account of the corruption it covered.

At one time in the history of this republic our electors did not hesitate to express their opinions on any public question, because they then enjoyed freedom of speech in practice as well as in theory and had no fear of an employer, but now our people are more guarded in their statements concerning public matters, and this is especially true of large cities. In our great cities the average American fears to claim his soul as his own.

We have very little honest expression of opinion among our people in this age, because the environments and self interests of the majority of our citizens are such that they are helplessly dependent on their employers and fear the loss of employment. The liability of citizens to discharge by their employers makes the former very careful in uttering an opinion which might reach their employers' ears and thereby affect their interests in some manner. If such is the condition in which we find ourselves after the noble sacrifices made by the colonial heroes, why not let us know and realize it as soon as possible, by tearing off the mask of secrecy and disclosing the fact that we are subservient slaves to plutocracy instead of freemen.

Under our secret system of voting much instruction is wasted and great quantities of educational ammuni-

tion thrown around indiscriminately, where it can do but little good. Had we a system of voting by which we could determine exactly by whom a certain vote was made, we could direct our arguments and literature at those who require the most education and not squander them on those who already vote intelligently.

Secrecy is not only bad at the ballot-box, but it is injurious to the family. If every family were to announce to the public its miseries, economies and privations, the community would soon discover that a large percentage of our people are in distress, and that something radical must shortly be done to mitigate their sufferings; yet when every family conceals its woes as much as possible, every other family concludes that matters are in a much better condition than they actually are, and as a result of the apparent contentment, submission to the suffering continues indefinitely.

"If every pain and care we felt,
Could burn upon our brow;
How many hearts would move to heal,
That try to crush us now."

Tear off the mask of secrecy and the golden light of truth will cause the evaporation of many a cesspool of squalor and corruption that now is a public stench.

When a man has a grievance against another and remains silent about it, the probability of having it redressed is not so great as when he walks up to the aggressor, in an open, manly way, and explains his grievance. If he continues without a complaint his hardship continues. If the party against whom the grievance is held is not disposed to be fair and just, the sooner the sufferer explains his grievance the

sooner the matter is forced to an issue, and if it must ultimately be settled by force, the sooner the fight begins the better it is for all engaged. So it is with the people. To-day they have a grievance against monopoly, corruption, wealth, centralization, etc., but they cannot announce their grievance candidly and forcibly by the means of our present system of secret voting. They go on voting secretly, year in and year out, dissatisfied with the governing class, but unable to elect any candidate except those nominated by the professional politician.

If our electors must precipitate a political revolution before justice reigns, why not join issue with our oppressors as soon as possible and not waste time skulking about a secret ballot box.

Our present electoral laws invest the inspectors of elections with too much power. An inspector ought to be the simplest and least important of public servants, as his work is only clerical. The principle underlying our present election law (although this may be awkwardly expressed), is that secrecy is better secured under a law that makes provision for but ten inspectors, than under a law that makes provision for twenty, and almost absolutely secured under a law making provision for but one or two inspectors, instead of four.

While this kind of reasoning is logical, is it not evident that as the number of inspectors is decreased and absolute secrecy is more closely approached, the power and importance of the inspectors increase as their number decreases, until they are reduced to the one inspector, who can learn what nobody else in the community can learn, namely, how nearly everybody in the community has voted

and at the same time (in order to secure this greatest secrecy of which we can conceive) we place ourselves at the mercy of one inspector, who can change the result to suit himself or his bosses by changing ballot boxes or employing some other trick and thereby thwart the intention of a whole community.

When another officer is employed to watch or inspect the ballots, the secrecy becomes less, and so continues as the number of watchers is increased. It is frequently the case, under our present system of voting, that the majority of electors in an election precinct (in order to expose a trick of election inspectors) are required to testify under oath as to their voting. This testifying under oath destroys all secrecy and evinces beyond cavil that absolute secrecy at the ballot box is wholly impracticable.

The latest effort in the line of secret balloting is the introduction of a secret voting machine, which counts, adds, etc., but is perfectly useless when an attempt to prevent repeating is required. It counts repeated votes as well as those of honest electors. How much better it would be to require each elector to write his name on a public book, and then have properly qualified inspectors count the names only that were entitled to a vote, and at the same time invest in any member of a particular election district the right to examine and inspect the public book at any time.

It may be contended that open voting will expose electors to the retaliation of their employers when the employer is dissatisfied with the vote. The answer to this is, that when every elector is exposed, nobody will be punished, as it is too great a task to punish a

whole community. The public, when permitted to freely express their views, can be trusted to ultimately do what is right.

To illustrate: The audience in a theatre invariably applaud the good acts of the hero, and hiss the vicious acts of the villain. I cite this as proof that people are naturally disposed to conform to that which is right and just, and if permitted to discuss and understand all public matters, we need have no fear that they will fail to exercise right reason in manifesting their approval or disapproval in public affairs, provided they have the proper system of voting.

It is our circumstances that are responsible for our numerous misdeeds and not "pure cussedness." If the principle of secrecy underlying our electoral laws is right, why are we not consistent by adhering to the principle all through our social structure? If the sovereigns, as we term our electors, must vote secretly, why should not our public servants also enjoy the protection of secrecy? If the sovereign elector is permitted to shirk the responsibility of his vote, by the means of a secret ballot, why should we not permit our Assemblymen, our Congressmen, our Senators to vote under cover of secrecy, and also shirk their responsibility?

Having shown in some measure that secret voting of any kind (no matter how effectually the voter can conceal his views) is wrong, the description of PERPETUAL VOTING is now in order.

In each election precinct in a properly located and equipped office, must be kept a large book called the *Vote Record*. Each properly qualified elector is to have a page in this *Vote Record*, assigned to him for

his especial voting. The face of each page is to present an appearance something similar to the following:

JOHN DOE.

PRESIDENT	SENATOR	REPRESENTATIVE	GOVERNOR	ASSEMBLYMAN
John Brown			Henry Moor	
Peter Jones			John Grey	

The above is the page assigned to John Doe. On it must be columns enough to represent all the public offices for which John Doe has the right to vote. At the head of each column is the name of the office. The book must be wide enough for the purpose and about the length of an ordinary ledger. The *Vote Record* must be in charge of a single clerk, whose duty it shall be to take charge of the office, keep the book in proper condition during the year, and report the vote, when required, to a central office, from which shall be issued, at least every month, bulletins containing tabulated accounts of the vote in the various election districts.

John Doe shall have the right to walk into the *Vote Record* Office, any day except Sunday, between the hours of nine o'clock in the morning and four o'clock in the afternoon, and write in the *Vote Record* on his particular page and in the proper column, the name of any man he chooses, and that name shall be his choice for the office printed at the top of the column. The last name written by John Doe in a column supersedes the preceding name and is his choice for said office, until he writes another name under the last.

Supposing that John Doe wishes to vote for Presi-

dent and his choice is John Brown, he will write the name of John Brown in the Presidential column and John Brown thereby becomes his choice for President. If Doe concludes that Brown does not suit him and that Peter Jones is a better man for the office, he will write the name of Peter Jones under that of John Brown and Peter Jones thereby becomes his choice for President. When Peter Jones has a majority or plurality (whichever the people shall decide) of the electors supporting him, he takes possession of the Presidency and John Brown vacates the office.

To prevent Doe from changing his vote too frequently, it shall be the law that when an elector fills up his column with names, he cannot vote any more for that office until a new page is assigned him at the beginning of the year, when a new page is assigned to every properly qualified elector. Doe is to have the right to change his choice for any office on any day in the year, Sundays excepted, by writing in the last name in the proper column.

The Vote Record clerk shall report to a central office every week or month (whichever the people decide necessary) the result of the vote, and when a candidate obtains a majority or plurality, he is to take possession of the office and the preceding incumbent vacates it.

Every elector must have the right to examine the Vote Record at any time, count the votes, inspect the signatures of the electors, and compare his account of the vote with the returns as made by the Vote Record clerk.

This system of Perpetual Voting is the only system under which money will exercise no powerful influence. Under it the vocation of the vote buyer will be

destroyed. To illustrate: Suppose that John Doe is a vote-seller and a Henry Moor heeler desires to buy his vote for Henry Moor who is a candidate for governor. The Moor heeler is paying five dollars for a vote. The heeler agrees to pay Doe five dollars, provided he writes the name of Henry Moor in the governmental column of the Vote Record. Doe writes the name of Moor in the proper column and receives the five dollars from the Henry Moor heeler. Within a week John Doe has spent his money and wants more. An idea enters his mind, and he immediately changes his choice by writing under the name of Henry Moor that of John Grey or some other person, in order to induce the Moor healer to buy his vote over again. To avoid this natural tendency of the vote seller, the Moor heeler, in order to keep the vote seller in line, would be forced to constantly supply the vote seller with money. As there is not enough money in office holding to keep the vote-sellers constantly supplied with money, vote buyers and Henry Moor heeler, would be forced to abandon their business of vote buying.

Under Perpetual Voting every man who professes to be in favor of principle would be forced to vote accordingly; because his neighbors and acquaintances would not tolerate his talking for principle and then recording himself on the Vote Record as in favor of the classes. Under Perpetual Voting we could discover who were the men who voted for currency contraction, and if they were not bankers or large income collectors, undertake to show them the injury they did themselves by their vote.

Another beneficial feature of this system of open

voting would be that of making our public officials truly representative and compelling them to do the bidding of their constituencies.

The ability of an elector, under Perpetual Voting, to change his choice for any office would enable him to withdraw his support from any public official at any time, and thereby exercise permanent control over his public servants. Under our present system we elect a man to office for a definite term, one, two, three, four or more years. During his term it is almost impossible to remove him, no matter how much his constituents may desire his removal.

A whole constituency may be convinced that one of their public officials is a tool of monopoly, but on account of their inability to furnish positive proof of the official's perfidy, the constituency must await the expiration of his term before the voters of the constituency can have an opportunity, at the ballot-box, to rebuke him by defeat.

Under Perpetual Voting the people could remove a man almost instantly. The exercise of this removal power by the people would compel a public official to respect the views of his constituency or be quickly retired from office. Good men would be kept in office under this system, and bad men quickly removed.

Every master has the right to discharge his servant when the latter acts improperly or contrary to the interests of the master. Why should not our electors in this country, who are the masters in theory, exercise the same right over their public servants?

Perpetual Voting provides for all that is desirable or achievable in the way of election or voting reforms. It will provide for all that is desired by the advocates

of the Swiss forms of initiative and referendum and also for effective minority representation.

Perpetual Voting will secure as representatives and legislators men who have studied the laws of all nations—men who are familiar with the laws of the past, their beneficial features and their special defects. Such men will naturally be better qualified for law-making because of their innate taste for history, statistics, public finances, etc., than a much more numerous class who have an excessive fondness for ball playing, horse-racing, circus attending, theatre-going, etc., which precludes their studying social economics. Many persons would sooner work hard one week than think hard one hour. Too many prefer to have some trustworthy representative dig and delve in the musty, dismal laws of the past and afterward give the result to the people in the shape of condensed laws. Such persons will never investigate a law, or reason out its effects; they simply measure all laws by the number of comforts they enjoy under them. A law under which they have many comforts they deem a good law, and a law under which they have few comforts they consider a bad law.

When I want a suit of clothing, I cannot forsake my business of carpentry or of shoe making, etc., in order to acquire sufficient knowledge to enable me to select a first-class piece of woollen cloth, that will neither fade nor shrink, out of which to make my suit. I cannot afford to waste my time or destroy my cloth in experimenting with the different methods of cutting a suit of clothes. In other words, I cannot become a tailor; I am already something else, which has cost me a great deal of time and labor. What must I do?

I select a tailor in whom I have confidence and tell him the kind of a suit I want. Because of his better qualifications for the tailor business, I obtain the style and quality of a suit desired, at less cost and more advantage than I could, as a rule, make it myself. What I do in the case of procuring a suit of clothing the people will generally do in making their laws. The people and I are governed by the same principle.

There is another reason why Perpetual Voting (which enables those best qualified for doing certain work to do such work) is better than any other known system of voting.

Most people are too susceptible to personal influence. If they were to vote directly for every law and office it would be discovered that the most popular man would be too often the successful candidate, and not the most talented or best qualified man.

Suppose that a switchman were to be elected by popular vote for a position at a neighboring crossing and that there were two candidates, one a jovial, good-natured fellow, ever ready to tell a comical story, and so free hearted that he would at any time part with his shirt in order to render a fellow being a service, but who could never charge his mind with anything serious, the other candidate, a crank who could not speak civilly to anyone, yet was never known to be irregular in his habits, was always attentive to his business, never drank intoxicants, and was eminently fitted for properly signaling trains. Which of these two candidates does the reader think would be elected to the position as switchman? The jovial fellow would win on a popular vote with a majority of ten to one.

Because of this tendency of humanity in general, to

act in accordance with their tastes and passions, laws should not as a rule be made by the people directly although the law-makers should be voted for directly. Laws should usually be made by the people, through their representatives, in order to enable them to exercise their best and coolest judgment. But ample provision should be made for direct legislation and for securing the initiative to every voter, otherwise the provision for the complete sovereignty of the people would be insufficient. Perpetual Voting is the only system that combines the people's ability to exercise a substantial judgment on all public laws (without going into detail) with the power to delegate their privileges to some trustworthy legislator, who will investigate all the technicalities of law, past and present.

Another commendable feature of Perpetual Voting is that which enables the elector to change his vote given in support of any law or person. Progress consists of changes, and the thing which does not change does not develop. Objects may appear to us in a different light to-day from that in which they appeared yesterday. We may learn something about a law or public official to-day of which we had no knowledge yesterday, and any electoral system which prevents us from acting in accordance with our latest knowledge does not permit us to use our best and latest judgment.

If any citizen has believed that a certain public official is a model of all the virtues, but within five seconds after voting for him discovers that he is not a fit person to hold the position, it is not compatible with right and justice that the elector should be compelled to wait one whole year before he can manifest his disapproval of such officer.

The voting apparatus should change gradually in accordance with the gradual change in the views of the electors, and should reflect our views of to-day and not those of yesterday.

A very important objection to our present system of voting and of counting the vote in this State, and to which Perpetual Voting is not exposed, is that the counting of the vote under the existing electoral laws is manipulated in the interest of either one or the other of the old political parties. When a third or fourth party has cast its vote on election day, it matters not how many votes have been cast by the new parties the number credited to the new party by the inspectors at the ballot-box is always larger than the vote as announced by the Board of State Canvassers at Albany. Where the figures are changed the writer does not pretend to know, but any observer can easily discover that the vote of third parties grows smaller and smaller as the report of the vote is taken, first from the ballot inspectors, then to the various Boards of County Supervisors, and finally to the State Canvassing Board. The aggregate vote of a vigorous reform party, when added up from the inspector's report on election night at the ballot-box, is invariably much larger than the number credited to the reform parties as announced by the State Canvassing Board. When the result is proclaimed by the Canvassing Board the ballots have been so manipulated that no evidence of the fraud can be adduced from their production.

Under Perpetual Voting the true result could be learned by any voter at any time, because the Vote Record would furnish evidence in each elector's handwriting as to the actual vote, which could not be dis-

puted, and each elector could watch his own and his neighbors' votes and see that the votes were properly counted. Under the present system of voting, when the result is made out in figures, the traces of fraud are invariably removed and little or no documentary or circumstantial evidence stares in the face the unscrupulous officials, who have tampered with the vote, as would be the case were the system of Perpetual Voting in vogue.

The present electoral system resembles that of a corporation which burns up its minutes or written account of its proceedings, and then invests the President or Executive Board with the power to announce what were the acts and proceedings of the corporation. What is necessary to a fair vote and count is a journal [the Vote Record is such a journal] on which is recorded the people's voting, just as the Congressional journal records the voting of the members of Congress.

Perpetual Voting requires the preservation of the minutes of the people's voting, and under it each constituency can judge for itself what is the actual result in its voting precinct, and by comparing the vote as recorded in the Vote Record with the result as announced by the central office or Canvassing Board, learn whether or not any fraud has been perpetrated by unscrupulous officials.

Some readers will claim that any system of voting which permits an elector to change his vote so easily will keep the people in a perpetual "stew." This is the identical argument used by the monarchists against this republic when it was first formed and it was proposed to give the people a voice in its management.

Monarchists always contended that our government

would not last fifty years, that the people were not capable of governing themselves by a representative government, and that they would keep themselves in continual turmoil.

If Perpetual Voting keeps the people in a perpetual "stew" then we must admit that the people are incapable of governing themselves and that the monarchists were right in their argument against popular voting. But Perpetual Voting will cause no turmoil; changes in public sentiment will be gradual under it, and after the novelty of Perpetual Voting has worn off, many people will seldom change their vote after writing in the Vote Record the name of the man they wish to place in office.

Many students of electoral laws believe that the Australian system is the proper system to employ, because, as they think, votes cannot be bought and sold under it; that the buyer will be required to trust wholly to the seller's word for the delivery of the vote. Such is not the case, as the buyer has only to request the seller to write a particular name on the ticket voted, and if that particular name is found on a ticket by the buyer or his agents when the votes are counted the price agreed upon is then paid to the seller.

If the elector is prohibited from writing his choice for office on any ticket, his constitutional right to name any candidate independent of any party is abridged. If an elector is permitted to write even one name on his ticket, under the Australian system, the most genteel kind of traffic in votes can be carried on under this so-called secret method of voting without any pulling or hauling of the vote seller.

In another manner can money be used under the

Australian system. If A is a candidate for office against B and wishes to buy votes, he can do it indirectly by betting through his agents two dollars to ten cents with each purchasable voter that B will be elected. The purchasable voter, in order to win the two dollars, will almost invariably vote for A.

The name "Perpetual" is applied to this system of voting because the man who writes the name of his candidate on the Vote Record and leaves that candidate's name as the last in the proper column, is continually and perpetually voting for that candidate, until he records the name of a later candidate. In changing the names of candidates, as little time elapses, the voting is practically perpetual.

The power to withdraw a public official from office at any time, guaranteed under Perpetual Voting, is in conformity with the idea of the framers of Article Five of the Articles of Confederation, who inserted "with a power reserved to each State to recall its delegates or any of them at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year."

This same feature is observed by the British Government, under which a ministry opposed by parliament has the right to appeal to the country at any time for support or approval.

Whenever the members of a corporation, holding the majority of stock, wish to remove officers who are not working for the best interests of the corporation, they are not compelled to wait for the expiration of the officers' terms of office. They simply call a meeting of the stockholders at any time and the inefficient officers are immediately removed.

Why should not the people of this country adopt

the same principle and remove their officers at any time the officers are found working against the interests of the people.

The voting system which will enable our people to make public servants out of their public officials in fact, as well as in theory, is unquestionably Perpetual Voting. This system of voting has been first treated in this work because the adoption of a proper method of expressing the people's wishes, with regard to public matters, is the most important step we can take in remedying the prevalent social distress.

It is useless to reason out a panacea and have no method of carrying it into practice. Of what avail is any law or policy which, if adopted, will produce ineffable good unless we have a proper method of using the law or policy?

On account of the foregoing reasons, the writer has deemed it most important to show that Perpetual Voting will enable our people to agree upon the proper policy, when they have found such policy, and to carry it into practice with greater facility than by any other known system of voting. Under Perpetual Voting we can compel those whom we have placed in power to do exactly what we desire them to do, and under it there will be no necessity for party organization.

After elucidating Perpetual Voting we are now prepared to examine the question of taxation, which may be deemed next in order to that of voting and equally essential to the proper development of a truly republican form of government.

TAXATION.

Tax dodging is without doubt one of the most prevalent and pernicious practices, on the part of the rich. To tax dodging and money cornering may be attributed the principal wrongs with which the majority of our communities are afflicted. Find a ring of any kind of important rascals, men who prey upon the public and revel in illegotten wealth, and within that ring will be found the principal tax dodgers and money cornerers. If every possessor of great wealth was compelled to pay taxes on the full value of his possessions he could not so readily grow rich. When a man possesses a large quantity of value, for instance, one hundred thousand dollars' worth or more, no matter whether the value is of land, houses, railroads, steamboats, wheat, meat or any other commodity, the tendency of these things to decay, their destruction by use, the necessity of employing more help in order to manage most profitably such value and to obtain therefrom the greatest possible income, all serve or tend to decrease the rate with which the hundred thousand dollars of value accumulates; and if a two per cent. rate of taxation on full value were collected from the owner, he would soon learn that he could not own advantageously much over one hundred thousand dollars, worth of value (probably much less) in any other form than in that of money, unless he was an unusually bright man and rendered the public a great service.

When taxes are collected on full value and a citizen owns great quantities of wealth the possession of such riches will be creditable to him, because it will be indisputable evidence that he is employing his value to

the greatest advantage and rendering the community the greatest service in the use of his wealth. It is by entering into collusion with or by exerting their influence upon assessors that our rich citizens amass the greatest bulk of their wealth, or by preventing the enactment of any law which would effectively end tax dodging.

As an illustration, of the success of the wealthy under our government in preventing the enactment of laws against tax dodging, consider the case of mortgages. The mortgagee evades the payment of taxes on the mortgages he holds (notwithstanding that they are one of the most stable and secure investments of value known) solely on account of the ability of the rich to prevent the passage of any law which would effectively require the payment of taxes on all value.

It may not be to the advantage of one State to tax mortgages while in other States they are *not* taxed; but if the general government were to frame a law which would result in the taxation of mortgages to their full value in every State, all of the States would be on equal footing so far as mortgage taxation is concerned.

Probably no one will attempt to controvert the assertion that great injury is done a community by tax dodgers, but many of them will ask "How can it be prevented?"

The enactment of three simple subordinate laws, in accordance with the plan of David Reeves Smith and in conformity with the lines of development on which this government is now moving, will make tax dodging impossible. These subordinate laws are called the

Homestead Exemption Law, the Ownership Record Law and the Self Assessment Law.

The enactment of the Homestead Exemption Law would guarantee to every family the possession of a residence worth two thousand dollars; the residence to be exempt from taxation and free from confiscation for debt. All value in the possession of the family over and above the two thousand dollar home to be subject to taxation and confiscation for debt, as is the case now. By exempting the homestead in this manner the grocer, baker, or money lender would not be inclined to trust the head of the family for any amount of money or commodity with the expectation of taking possession of the homestead or a part of it some time, in satisfaction of the claim or debt. Credit would then be based on value over and above the two thousand dollar homestead.

The object of the second of these laws, viz., the Ownership Record Law, is to compel every person to acknowledge publicly the ownership of his property. In the State of Vermont every person owning anything of value is required to write its name, with the number of such things possessed, on a tax list especially prepared for the purpose. Beside the name, in another column, the tax payer sets the aggregate valuation of the things owned, as estimated by the owner himself. After each property holder has filled out his tax list the assessors take the list, examine it, and if they find any property on the list undervalued, the law requires the assessors to double the tax imposed on each property holder. The fear of having their taxes doubled has a tendency to induce the tax-

payers to correctly record and value their property on the list.

The adoption of the Vermont law is not recommended by the writer, but the principle (*viz.*, to use the owner's judgment in determining the value of taxable property) is.

Under the Ownership Record Law nobody would be permitted to own any property not recorded (in a suitable office in each Assembly district) on a public list of easy access to the people.

With such a law on our statute books, if a person had property of value and it was not recorded on the public list, the first person who discovered the unrecorded property would have the right to take possession of it, and the legal title would vest in the discoverer on his recording it on the public list.

When a law requiring a person to record his property in order to complete his title to it, under the penalty of forfeiting it to some other person who could prove it was not recorded, is enacted, every owner would record all property to which he attached much importance.

By giving the unrecorded property to those who discovered it unrecorded, it would be almost impossible to find any property in the community of any value unrecorded except that exempt under the Homestead Exemption Law.

The ownership of property would then be dependent on the recording of the property in the public list, and to neglect recording it would be very expensive negligence to the owner. In fact, the possessor of valuable property could not expose it to view if it were not recorded, because the instant he did so somebody else

would notice it and, after recording it, become the legal owner.

After providing for the proper recording of property we must consider the plan to compel the owners of property to tell the truth about its value and not undervalue it for the purpose of tax-dodging. The law termed the Self-Assessment law will accomplish all we desire.

This law requires every owner of property to write in an adjoining column his own valuation of his property as recorded in the Ownership Record. It also invests any other person in the community with the right to buy the property with cash, at the price placed on it in the Ownership Record (and on which the owner is paying taxes), and then the buyer's valuation is placed on the property, subject to purchase at the Ownership Record price by any other person in the community.

When such a law is placed on our statute books all the holders of great wealth, the land monopolizers, the coal barons, the railway kings, the oil-well proprietors and other rich men would be compelled to pay taxes on the full value of their property or part with it at a great sacrifice to persons who needed the valuable property more and could well afford to pay for it the price in money at which it is assessed on the Ownership Record.

The clerk in the Ownership Record office could issue a certificate containing the name of the cash buyer and he would then become the lawful owner of the property. Many will claim that under this system of collecting taxes, property would continuously change from hand to hand and that the rich would bid on or

buy away the property of the poor. Let us examine this claim.

Suppose that Brown owned a thousand dollar piece of property over and above the two thousand dollars exempted under the Homestead Exemption law. How would he act under such a law? He would reason in this manner: "I wish to retain possession of my property and, in order to prevent any one from buying it, I'll raise the valuation on the Ownership Record to twelve hundred dollars. Two per cent. (which is the average rate of taxation) on two hundred dollars extra valuation will amount to only four dollars per year. This four dollars is of little consequence to me, but it will compel another man to go down in his pocket for two hundred dollars more than my property is actually worth in order to gain possession of it."

When the Ownership Record and Self-Assessment laws are applied to the whole country there will be no more successful monopolizers, because each man will then be engaged in looking after his own property, and the value of all wealth within the United States will fall as the result of the destruction of all monopoly of wealth. The natural disposition of all mankind is to prefer his own home or wealth to that of another. The insatiable greed for superfluous wealth in our people is engendered by the unjust distribution of wealth possible under our present system of collecting taxes.

The Self-Assessment plan of determining value for assessment would force the payment of taxes on full value, and the collection of taxes on full value invariably falls heaviest on the inactive rich, because in a competition for the possession of wealth the hard

worker (who is generally the poor man when he has an incentive to work) can afford to pay taxes on a higher valuation than the inactive rich man, on account of the fact that the latter cannot generally manage a special quantity of wealth with as great advantage as the poor man (who has always carried the extra burden of excessive rent). The rich man has so many other things to engross his attention that he cannot devote as much time and attention to a given quantity of wealth (which is adapted to the employment of one man) as a poor man who is prepared to devote all his time and attention to the given quantity of wealth.

The idea to be conveyed may be grasped through the following illustration: When a rich man owning ten hundred acres of soil and a poor man owning one hundred acres (each acre of both men's land being equal in all things) enter into competition with each other, the poor man can afford to pay taxes on a higher valuation per acre than the rich man, because the poor man can obtain more products from each acre than the rich man, if both pay taxes on the full value of the machinery used.

Nothing is so annoying to monopolists as the imposition of taxes on the full value of all wealth. The adoption of the Homestead Exemption, the Ownership Record and the Self-Assessment laws would equalize taxation, destroy monopoly and compel the big corporations and millionaire tax-dodgers to pay the taxes due the people.

By taxing all value to the full amount by means of the Ownership Record and the Self-Assessment laws, the company or individual obtaining a franchise from a legislature could do the community no serious

or permanent injury, because the value of the franchise would be displayed on the tax list or Ownership Record, and the corporation would thereby be compelled to contribute toward the public support in proportion to the value of its property, including the franchise obtained from the legislature.

Some will offer as an objection to this Self-Assessment plan the assertion that people will under it be constantly struggling for each other's property. Is this not the case under our present system? Besides, the advantage to the people of making large value holders pay their full share of taxation would be more than ample compensation for any annoyance to the public as the result of transferring titles to property very frequently.

People would require but little experience to teach them that it is better to avoid quibbling about small differences in the estimation of value than to expose each other to the attempts of their neighbors to obtain certain property because of its undervaluation on the Ownership Record. The tendency would be to slightly overvalue so as to keep off the speculator.

An unanswerable argument in favor of the Self-Assessment plan is the fact that when watching the tax list is made the business of everybody who has an interest in the tax list, the public eye is always riveted on the Ownership Record, and as a natural consequence a class of tax list examiners would develop who would be very skillful in stopping tax-dodging by seeking for property undervalued on the tax list or the Ownership Record.

On some of our horse cars is employed the principle of using the public eye to prevent the perpetration of

fraud or negligence. A dial which registers the number of fares collected by the conductor is exposed to public view, and as a consequence the conductor is forced to register almost every fare. Turn the public gaze on the tax-dodger by means of the Ownership Record and Self-Assessment laws, and he will cease to dodge his taxes.

Were this government to adopt these three laws, Homestead Exemption, Ownership Record and Self-Assessment laws, and impose taxation at an honest rate there would be little necessity of the government operating the railroads, telegraph lines, telephone wires etc., because under such laws the railroads and other corporations would contribute more and more to the public revenue as they became more and more profitable, for the simple reason that the value of a railroad is in proportion to the income it pays its owners.

Under these laws corporate property would be in the possession of a larger number of owners than is now the case and would not develop into the gigantic systems of monopoly which now cover our land.

Some will affirm that all personal taxes whatsoever ought to be abolished. If those who believe in the abolition of personal taxes were able to logically define value they would perceive the inconsistency of recommending the enactment of any law that would exempt personal property from taxation.

While it is unquestionably difficult, under our present system of taxation, to collect taxes on the full value of chattels, it is also difficult to collect taxes on the full value of realty. If all taxes ought to be abolished on personal property because of the difficulty of collecting them or because of the tendency to degenerate the morals of the

owners, all taxes on realty ought to be abolished because of the same reasons. Nothing can be said of personal property taxation that cannot be said of realty taxation in some degree. If the owners of personal property evade their taxes by charging their debts against it, do not the mortgagees, who are the owners of the realty next to the State, evade the taxes which ought to fall on them?

As soon as a man learns exactly what value is, he abandons the tax "vagaries" so common in these times of political reformers.

Value is an important *institution* (I can think of no term that will convey the idea more clearly) which is only slightly understood by our economists.

Here is a definition which fits all value: *The value of a thing is the purchasing power it confers on the owner of the thing.* Sometimes the value of a thing increases as its utility increases. Sometimes it decreases as the utility increases. If the utility of shoes is increased tenfold and at the same time (the demand remaining the same) their number is multiplied fifty-fold, we have an instance which demonstrates that the increase of the utility of a single pair of shoes tenfold has not prevented the decrease in their value. Scarcity has much to do with the increase in the value of things.

Supply and demand are the important agencies which increase or decrease value, or, as frequently expressed "Value depends on the difficulty to obtain and the desire to possess." Value is the name of the largest generalization of which we have any knowledge in the world of exchanges.

When we enact a law taxing *value* it is altogether different from a law taxing realty or personal property.

Realty and personal property have value alike; the difference is only in the quantity of value possessed by each.

When taxes are imposed according to the value of a thing we have no concern about its material, shape, quality or color. We only seek to compel the owner to pay in proportion to the *purchasing power* exercised through the ownership of the thing of value.

Value enables us to measure the ability of persons by the demand for their labor and talent, the scarcity of any article, the comfort of the people, etc.

If the value of useful things is high, measured in money and commodity, it is very evident that the people can enjoy only less comfort (because it is more difficult to procure the useful things) than if the value of such useful things is low. When the value of things of utility is low the people can more easily administer to their want of the useful things and thereby enjoy more comforts. The greater the supply of things the less is their value, provided the demand does not increase. Things of value may become so abundant as to have no value but still possess great utility.

Whenever a person talks about "intrinsic value," "rental value," "market value," "exchange value," "commodity value," "land value" or of any qualified kind of value, we may safely conclude that such person does not understand very clearly just what value is. Value is without exception *purchasing power*, and it makes no difference what adjective is placed before the word "value" it is *purchasing power* only, and the idea will be as well conveyed by using the word value alone, without the assistance of any adjective, as by using any number of qualifying words.

The man who talks about the "intrinsic value of a hat" conveys no more idea of an additional property of value than the man who talks simply of the "value of a hat."

Value is simply *purchasing power* the whole world over, and there is only one kind of *purchasing power*. Value and utility are very frequently confounded, but they are decidedly different from each other.

When the over-zealous "one idea" man attempts to distinguish the "land" value from the "rental" value of an acre of soil he undertakes an impossibility. When talking of "rental" value he refers to the value of an acre of soil by the year, and when of "land" value to the present value of the rent of an acre for all future years. In both instances the "rental" value or "land" value is simply *value*, or, in other words, the "one idea" man has reference to different quantities of *purchasing power*. What would the reader think of a man who talked about "rental *purchasing power*," "land *purchasing power*," "intrinsic *purchasing power*," "exchange *purchasing power*," etc.

The writer once believed that the value of land alone ought to bear the burden of taxation, and that the value of everything else ought to be exempt from taxation, because of his inability to observe the distinct difference between value and utility. Air has much utility, but in the world of exchanges has no value whatsoever. No quantity of air can be used to convey *purchasing power*. The supply is too abundant.

The value of one acre of soil for one year may be ten dollars, and for twenty years two hundred dollars. If a purchaser desires to buy outright

the acre of soil the owner will ask him something not much more or less than two or three hundred dollars, because buyer and seller generally figure the future rent or utility of an acre of soil for no longer term than that of twenty or thirty years. Consequently, when a person talks about "rental" value of land as something different from "land" value he makes the mistake of imagining that one year's value of an acre of soil is different in quality from all future years' value, while the only actual difference between the "rental" value of an acre of soil and the "land" value of an acre of soil is the difference in the quantity or number of future rents or future utility figured upon.

Of course the advocate of exempting personal property from taxation will affirm that personal property ownership cannot be discovered as easily as realty ownership; that realty is "all out doors" and cannot be concealed. This may be partly true under the present method of collecting taxes, but when the Homestead Exemption, the Ownership Record, and the Self-Assessment laws are carried into practice, the tax dodger, whether he is the owner of personal property or real property (provided either has value), will find himself so closely watched by his neighbors or the tax dodger detective (a class which will develop) that he will pay his tax on full value without any attempt at "dodging."

Against this system of taxation could not be brought the charge that now stands to the discredit of the present system viz: Under the present tax laws of our government provision is made for the relief of the citizen on whom taxes have been imposed unjustly,

but no provision is made to guard against the payment of too little taxation by some wealthy owners; that is, the citizen who has been taxed too heavily can appeal to the courts, but the wealthy citizen who is taxed too lightly always avoids paying his just share as long as possible, and there is no law that imposes on him any penalty for so doing.

My next task is to determine what rate of taxation ought to be imposed. The fixing of a specific rate involves the explanation of Smith's Death Rate tax. The rate of taxation ought to be approximately *two* per cent.

The average death rate throughout the world, when conditions are normal, is approximately twenty persons to the thousand. In the course of fifty years the whole thousand will be dead on the average (counting a number of fifty-year periods) and a new thousand of persons will be on earth ready to use the wealth left by the old thousand. If two per cent. of all value is collected from the possessors of all value each year, in the course of fifty years all the value originally possessed by the tax-payers at the time of the imposition of the first year's tax, will have been gradually taken away from the original possessors, and in this manner returned to the government at the rate of two per cent. each year without producing a perceptible jar in public affairs.

Two per cent. on the full value of everything would yield the Government all the revenue necessary to enable the construction of all the requisite improvements and to properly conduct public affairs without a deficit.

Another reason for making the rate two per cent. is that the experience of governments, no matter what the form, has shown that when the centralization of wealth commences, in a period not much longer or shorter than fifty years, the saving, scheming, insatiable and unscrupulous persons own or possess almost everything worth owning unless they are restrained by society.

Moses, the great law-giver, probably recognized this tendency when he ordered the return of all property to the original owners once in every fifty years. [See Leviticus, chapter xxv.]

Still another reason may be assigned for fixing the rate at two per cent.: If a government or an individual attempts to take, annually, more than two per cent. of full value from the users of wealth, it is only a question of time when the users will be bankrupt and discover that it is unprofitable to use the wealth (take out their living) and pay annually more than two per cent. on full value. If the persons owning great quantities of wealth, desire to obtain the greatest net revenue from their possessions of wealth, they could not devise any better method for so doing than to let it out to the persons best qualified for using or managing such wealth at a two per cent. rent on the full value, provided the Ownership Record and the Self-Assessment laws are employed in estimating the value of the wealth.

In the preceding pages it has been demonstrated that a proper method of voting is indispensable to carrying into practice any policy. The necessity also of collecting taxes on full value and permitting no tax dodging, has been emphasized. It is now in order to

explain how value can be properly and fairly measured.

When any person or persons in a community have the power of increasing or decreasing the money price of wealth by increasing or decreasing the supply of money when they please, it is impossible to collect taxes on the full value of the wealth with any justice, because such money would be an unjust measurer of value. Such a juggled currency would unjustly measure the value of a house as higher or lower next year, when in fact the value might be unchanged. This would be the case with all property possessing value.

With Smith's "Just Money" it is possible to measure value accurately. Under it the value or price juggler can be prevented from increasing or decreasing prices in accordance with his desire to buy or sell, or lend or borrow.

It is only by the means of an honest currency, such as Just Money, that the interests of buyer and seller, lender and borrower, can be treated without any injustice to either party to the contract measured by money.

JUST MONEY.

At present our country is engaged in a general discussion of the financial problem. So-called financiers of various schools, "free-silverism," "bi-metallism," "honest moneyism," "monometallism," "greenbackism," etc., advocate much truth and much not truth; yet the greatest confusion would be created in all of these schools, except that of "greenbackism," by simply asking the question "Can any of you logically define a dollar?"

Only the greenbacker could make any successful attempt, and he is thrown into confusion when asked the two following questions: "How much money *per capita* do you consider necessary for circulation among the people?" and when he answers (if he does) by mentioning a specific amount, he should be asked "What is your reason for fixing it at a specific amount?"

Some greenbackers will fix the amount *per capita* necessary for circulation, at fifty dollars, sixty dollars, one hundred dollars, &c.; but they can give no good reason for fixing upon such specific amount. They will tell you that France has sixty dollars *per capita* and enjoys more prosperity than any other nation; that the United States was not afflicted with business stagnation and industrial depression, when it had fifty dollars or more *per capita* in circulation.

These answers of the greenbacker are acceptable as proof that *more* currency would relieve the debtor class and impart an incentive to industry, by advancing prices; but they will not suffice in replying to the question as to the *specific* amount. The greenbacker can give no sensible reason for fixing the amount *per capita* at a definite figure. If his reasons for increasing the circulation are his only reasons, he is forced into a "corner" by the following argument; if increasing the currency in the United States from its present *per capita* circulation to fifty, sixty or one hundred dollars *per capita*, effects the country much good, (by increasing prices, reducing debts, &c.) it follows, as a natural consequence, that increasing it to one hundred and fifty dollars, two hundred, three

hundred, five hundred, or one thousand dollars *per capita*, will effect an extra amount of good.

If the greenbacker admits the truth of this argument, he will sooner or later discover the disastrous consequence of a constantly increasing money. The inflation of any currency so far used, by any nation, has invariably resulted in a contraction of the currency at some time. This is because an increase of the currency, causes all things measured by the currency to increase in price in proportion to the increase of the currency.

When prices are at the *highest* and the volume of currency is *largest*, a money stringency is inevitable (unless the volume of money is continually increased) because the increase in the volume of the money will be invariably foreseen and calculated by most persons having anything to sell or having control of other value than that of money, and an increase in the money price of all value will follow, the effects of which will be equivalent to a contraction of the currency.

As soon as the greenbacker perceives this point, he is forced to admit that the only way to avoid such a money stringency is to increase the supply of money more or less gradually, but the increase must be continued forever, and such increase will be beyond the calculation of any party to a contract.

The greenbacker must also admit that the effects of money cornering or hoarding, cannot be counteracted only by constantly increasing the supply of money. If he admits that his paper money must be continually increased in volume, he cannot avoid conceding that under his system of money, the prices of all

commodities will at some time or another become ridiculously large in this country, as compared with the prices of the same commodities in other countries, and that contracts, extending over a long or short period of time, will invariably result in an injury to the receiver of money, because the *purchasing power* of the dollar will be continually decreasing and no party to a contract will be able to accurately calculate the quantity of the decrease.

The "gold bug" and his theory is eliminated when asked "Why do you select a specific number of grains of gold for the composition of the gold dollar? Why do you select twenty-five and eight-tenths grains of gold 900 fine, in preference to twenty and eight-tenths grs. 900 fine or ten and eight-tenths grs. 900 fine? Why are gold coins in this country only nine-tenths pure gold while in England they are eleven-twelfths pure gold?"

He may reply that the English pound is the basis of our dollar and that the English put 123.27447 grains of gold in their unit, which is approximately five times the number of grains put in our gold dollar. But there is no better reason for fixing at a specific number of grains of gold for the English pound than there is for fixing at a specific number of grains for our gold dollar.

Ask the silver advocate why he prefers to have exactly $412\frac{1}{2}$ grains of silver standard fine, in the silver dollar to $212\frac{1}{2}$ or $312\frac{1}{2}$ grains of silver.

He may answer that $412\frac{1}{2}$ grains in the silver dollar are in conformity with the number of grains put in the coins of most countries of the world.

Then ask him why the ratio of 10 of silver to 1 of gold or 5 of silver to 1 of gold in making silver dollars, will not answer the purpose of money in this country better than 15 or 16 of silver to 1 of gold.

The silver man has no more reason for fixing at a specific number of silver grains, in the silver dollar, than has the gold advocate for fixing at a specific number of gold grains in the gold dollar, or the greenbacker for fixing at a specific number of paper dollars for his *per capita* circulation.

Having shown that the most important of money schools, viz: "greenbackism," "goldism" and "silverism" can offer no good reason for fixing at a definite number of gold grains for the gold dollar, or a definite number of silver grains for the silver dollar, or a definite number of paper dollars *per capita* as the basis of the greenback money, my next task is to logically define a dollar in accordance with the evolution of money up to the present time.

A DOLLAR.

1. *A dollar is a money unit established by a government.*
2. *Its most important function is that of measuring value.*
3. *It has other functions, viz: those of discharging debt and facilitating exchange.*
4. *It should be a full legal tender.*
5. *It should fluctuate as little as possible in PURCHASING POWER.*

6. *It should be composed of material having the least value as a commodity.*

7. *It should have as a basis the LABOR UNIT.*

Parts of this definition will not be questioned. The first three sentences are in the indicative mood because dollars already exist which possess the attributes mentioned. The last four sentences are in the potential mood, because a fully developed dollar has not yet been issued by any government. They align the path on which the American dollar must evolve.

All greenbackers are familiar with this definition, excepting the sentence referring to the Labor Unit. Concerning this they will invariably ask for explanation.

While the financiers of all schools recognize that there must be some unit employed as a basis of all money—that we must have something with which to measure value, bearing the same relation to value that a surveyor's chain does to land measurement, or the relation of an ounce weight to the weight of a ham—none of them has yet devised a unit which satisfactorily answers the purpose.

The gold jugglers in this country have tried 24.75 grains, 23.20 grains and 23.22 grains pure gold in their yellow dollars; the silver men have used 412½ grains, 416 grains, 420 grains and 384 grains standard silver in their silver dollars; but the varying *purchasing power* of these quantities of either gold or silver has worked great injury to the great body of our citizens, either as creditors or debtors, or buyers or sellers.

Some financiers believe that *labor* ought to have some connection with the unit of money, but they are not

very clear in their idea of what that connection ought to be.

The Westerner or Southerner, because of his being principally in the debtor class as well as an intelligent American, has learned more about money than any other class of people on earth. While he knows that money ought to be issued by the government only, composed of nothing but paper, and while he believes it ought to be issued at a fixed number of dollars *per capita*, he has no very definite idea of the exact number of dollars *per capita* that ought to be issued, nor has the Westerner or Southerner any clear idea of how the "schemes" of the money-cornerer can be thwarted or how every dollar can be made to retain approximately the same unfluctuating *purchasing power*.

Too much importance cannot be attached to the proper understanding of the definition of a dollar already given in italics.

Nearly all students of finance will have no hesitation about approving of this definition with the exception of the last two sentences.

The sentence, "*It should be composed of material having the least value as a commodity,*" is justified on the ground that a dollar composed of a dollar's worth of commodity would be used for general purposes when the supply of such commodity became scarce enough. For example: If the United States made a dollar by putting in it a dollar's worth of iron, when iron became scarce in any foreign country, the speculators would melt up our iron dollars (because they contained as much iron as could be bought for a dol-

lar in a junk shop) for use as a commodity in those countries in which the supply of iron was comparatively scarce; whereas if our government made a dollar out of one cent's worth of iron, such dollar would pass in this country for a dollar and enable the possessor to procure for it in the junk shop probably ten or more pounds of iron, and consequently no foreign speculator could afford to melt up a dollar containing a cent's worth of iron on account of the quantity of iron contained in such dollar.

Putting the least amount of commodity having value in a dollar would increase the tendency of the dollar's remaining at home in this country; putting the most amount of commodity having value in the dollar would induce speculators to send such a dollar wherever the commodity composing it is scarcest and most valuable.

The dollar having the least value as a commodity would stay at home and run the American financial machine, and not become scarce whenever there is a little excitement abroad in financial circles. Such a dollar would make every man having possession of it, take an interest in the preservation and perpetuation of the government in order to preserve the value of his dollar.

With all nations doing business on a gold basis, a panic in one of them produces a disastrous jar in all; but if each nation did business with different kinds of money having the least value as a commodity and depending on the stamp of each nation for ninety-nine per cent. or more of its value, no such disastrous jar would be felt by all nations when some large financial institution in any nation became bankrupt.

Paper is the commodity that has the least value as a material with which to make money, and with the assistance of the government decree makes the best money. It would not be utilized in the arts or industries, as gold and silver now are, and its supply required for money purposes would remain undisturbed.

The sentence "*It should be based on the Labor Unit*" is explained as follows:

The advocate of the "per capita" currency cannot tell how his per capita money can be employed and not be subject to the manipulations of the money cornerer. In explaining the system of money under which there can be no money-cornering, the ultimate lines of all currency development is plainly shown.

Human labor is, on the average, the same to-day, relatively, as it was in any past generation, and ever will be relatively the same. That is, if a professional man's labor has increased or decreased in *purchasing power* to-day, as compared with its *purchasing power* of any past generation, the unskilled laborer bears the same relation to the professional man (whatever the increase or decrease), in this generation that he did in any past generation.

Labor can distribute itself in conformity with natural law with greater ease than any commodity can be distributed throughout the social world, and consequently, as a uniform basis of a non-fluctuating currency, is better than gold, silver, or any other commodity, because commodities can be more easily cornered than any kind of labor. An extraordinarily rich man possessed of great intelligence, provided he could live for several centuries, might obtain control of all the gold, sil-

ver or copper in the world; but he never could hope to obtain control of all the labor.

These are some of the reasons for using labor as the basis of Just Money.

Now arises the question, "How can labor be made the basis of a currency that cannot be cornered and which will vary the least in *purchasing power* as compared with any other currency in the world?"

By employing a system of book-keeping governed by the condition of labor, is the answer. The system is explained as follows: The Secretary of the Treasury of the United States is to be the book-keeper. It shall be his duty, by the means of daily gathered statistics, to learn what are the average wages of the non-capitalists (a class of men whose debts equal their assets, or who possess only the clothes on their back and live from hand to mouth) in the chief commercial centers of the United States; that is, in all cities with a population of one hundred thousand or more.

Should the Secretary of the Treasury discover that the average wages of the non-capitalists, in such cities throughout the United States, is two dollars per day, it shall be his duty to keep the average wages of the non-capitalists at two dollars per day in the following manner: As soon as the Secretary perceives the wages of the non-capitalists falling below two dollars per day, it shall be his duty to issue paper money in payment for labor on public schools, public highways, public parks etc., ordered by the Secretary, until he has added to the currency sufficient money to increase the wages of the non-capitalists until they again amount to, on the average, two dollars per day. When the Secre-

tary finds the wages of the non-capitalists rising above two dollars per day, it should be his duty to contract the currency by retaining the money that comes into the treasury by the way of taxation, and by discontinuing his public works.

In this manner the Secretary can thwart the schemes of the money cornerer; because shortly after the money cornerer commences to hoard money for the purpose of increasing its *purchasing power*, his contraction or locking up of the currency will be reflected in the wages of the non-capitalists, which will fall below two dollars per day as shown by the average wages of the non-capitalists recorded in the Secretary's books; then it shall be the duty of the Secretary to start more public improvements and pay for the work in fresh paper money, until the average wages of the non-capitalists goes up again to two dollars per day. In this manner the Secretary can keep the average wages of the non-capitalists at two dollars per day approximately, not going but a few cents above or below two dollars per day at any time. It is immaterial how many dollars is fixed upon by the Secretary as the average daily wages of the non-capitalists. Whether the wages daily is three, four, or five dollars per day is of no account, provided the amount selected remains the average wages of the non-capitalists per day.

The point to be emphasized is that the non-capitalist's wages must be kept at the sum fixed upon as his average daily wages ever after; so that men may enter into contracts and not have any injury done either party to a contract, as the result of a change in the *purchasing power* of money.

Keeping the average wages of the non-capitalists at a particular figure per day (whether the amount is one or five dollars per day) does not imply either high or low wages to the non-capitalists, as one dollar per day would be exactly the same in effect and as good as five dollars per day, because the *purchasing power* of one dollar in the former case would be exactly equal to that of five dollars in the latter case.

When the daily wages of the non-capitalist is fixed at a particular sum per day, the value of an average day's labor at any one time is exactly equal to the value of an average day's labor at any other time, and whatever price in money is paid for an average day's labor (that is to say, the average price in *Just Money* at any time) that price per day in money is equal in value to the average price of a day's labor paid at any other time.

In order to compensate the debtor class for the extortion to which they have submitted at the hands of the creditor class for the past thirty years, it would be advisable to have the Secretary of the Treasury issue paper money in the manner described until the average wages of the non-capitalists would rise to five dollars per day, and then ever after keep their average daily wages at that figure.

It is true that the Secretary could not keep the average daily wages of the non-capitalists at a definite, exact sum any better than a steam engineer could keep the steam in his boiler, as shown by a steam gauge, at an exact number of pounds, but he could keep their wages so near a specific sum as to make hardly a perceptible difference to the non-capitalist,

or any other person who was gauging his contracts by the average price paid non-capitalists per day.

The Secretary, being supplied with a sufficient number of paper dollars, and being invested with the authority to make any public improvement, would be prepared to increase or decrease the supply of money when necessary, as reflected in the average wages of the non-capitalist.

The probability is that the Secretary would never be required to contract the circulating medium, as all currency tends to contract itself by the means of money lost, money hoarded, money worn out, etc. This system of currency would relegate money to its proper office as hereinbefore defined, and destroy in it those properties which make it more cogent for evil than any other material on earth.

It is the constantly increasing *purchasing power* of money that enables it (the creature of the people) to dominate its creators, and its owners to exact unjust and outrageous tribute from the enterprising and energetic.

With such a currency as Just Money, which would show the distress of the non-capitalistic class, there would be no necessity for making any special provision for the welfare of the capitalist class, as they are invariably (because of their superior ability and foresight) well able to take care of themselves. The non-capitalist class is the large body of people at the base of the social pyramid, and a currency that could do this large body no injury could not be used to hurt the interests of the keen, saving and thoughtful persons, who generally constitute the capitalist class.

There is no currency on earth whose *purchasing power* is not increased by hoarding it, or by the money lost or destroyed every year. By the means of Just Money, based on the Labor Unit, no money could be hoarded, locked up, or destroyed without (population remaining the same) reflecting the decrease in the supply, through a fall in the wages of the non-capitalists; because any decrease in the volume of money (population remaining the same) would leave a smaller amount of money *per capita*, for circulation, and the wages of the non-capitalist could not avoid showing the decrease.

Such a money would enable us to determine the scarcity or abundance of any commodity by its price in Just Money on account of the fact that the supply of money would always be relatively the same, and any variation in the money price of a commodity would be caused by an increase or decrease in the supply of the commodity.

With our present United States money we are unable to tell, when the price of wheat in money goes up or down, whether the supply of wheat is great or small, by the price of wheat in U. S. money, because the U. S. money, by which the wheat is to-day measured by price, is constantly changing in supply and the fluctuation in price, according to U. S. money, may have been caused by a corresponding decrease or increase in the volume of money, and not by a decrease or increase in the supply of wheat.

To illustrate: Suppose that one bushel of wheat is to-day worth two bushels of corn, and one year from to-day one bushel of wheat is worth only one bushel of corn:

from the worth of either, measured by the other, it is impossible to determine whether the corn or the wheat has increased or decreased in supply. By observing the price of either, measured in U. S. dollars, the result is little better, because the supply of the dollars may have been increased or decreased.

Money should be like a looking-glass, which would reflect the supply of any commodity by showing the price of the commodity, which price would be small or large, as the commodity's supply would be large or small, provided the demand remained equal.

Some persons will offer as an objection to Just Money that it will place too much power in the Secretary of the Treasury. It would if the system of Perpetual Voting were not used to control the Secretary.

The Secretary of the Treasury should be elected by the people and controlled by the means of Perpetual Voting, the same as any other officer elected by the people.

A money which would fluctuate so little in *purchasing power* as Just Money, could not cause the buyer or seller, the lender or borrower, or any party to a contract to be adjusted on a money basis, enough injury to be realized. This would be the only kind of money which could not be cornered. With money of this kind it would be impossible for any class of money savers or accumulators to exercise with their money the power which is to-day possessed by the money owners in this country. People would then engage generally in producing the good things of life and aban-

don the practice, now so prevalent in our country, of grabbing wealth and money instead of earning it.

Men who now wax rich by cornering money would under the Just Money system find themselves comparatively powerless, and they would be forced to employ their talents at some vocation more serviceable to humanity.

Many persons will affirm that a paper dollar based on no gold or silver can have little or no value. To such persons the writer would say: We always owe the government taxes (should we pay this year's taxes we owe next year's taxes, and should we pay next year's taxes we owe the following year's taxes, etc.,) and whatever material the government receives in payment of taxes, that material becomes possessed of some of the properties of money and always has value.

Paper money received in payment of taxes is altogether different from a note issued by an individual. The individual must at some time redeem his note with money; but the government redeems its paper money every time it is received in payment of taxes.

Another vital difference between the note of an individual and paper money, issued by a government, is that the government can force an individual to take its paper money; but the individual, who issues his promissory note, cannot force an individual to take his note.

The prevention of vote selling, tax dodging and money cornering has now been explained. PERPETUAL VOTING, DEATH RATE TAX with the subordinate laws, HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION, OWNERSHIP RECORD, and SELF-ASSESSMENT and JUST MONEY must all be

from the worth of either, measured by the other, it is impossible to determine whether the corn or the wheat has increased or decreased in supply. By observing the price of either, measured in U. S. dollars, the result is little better, because the supply of the dollars may have been increased or decreased.

Money should be like a looking-glass, which would reflect the supply of any commodity by showing the price of the commodity, which price would be small or large, as the commodity's supply would be large or small, provided the demand remained equal.

Some persons will offer as an objection to Just Money that it will place too much power in the Secretary of the Treasury. It would if the system of Perpetual Voting were not used to control the Secretary.

The Secretary of the Treasury should be elected by the people and controlled by the means of Perpetual Voting, the same as any other officer elected by the people.

A money which would fluctuate so little in *purchasing power* as Just Money, could not cause the buyer or seller, the lender or borrower, or any party to a contract to be adjusted on a money basis, enough injury to be realized. This would be the only kind of money which could not be cornered. With money of this kind it would be impossible for any class of money savers or accumulators to exercise with their money the power which is to-day possessed by the money owners in this country. People would then engage generally in producing the good things of life and aban-

don the practice, now so prevalent in our country, of grabbing wealth and money instead of earning it.

Men who now wax rich by cornering money would under the Just Money system find themselves comparatively powerless, and they would be forced to employ their talents at some vocation more serviceable to humanity.

Many persons will affirm that a paper dollar based on no gold or silver can have little or no value. To such persons the writer would say: We always owe the government taxes (should we pay this year's taxes we owe next year's taxes, and should we pay next year's taxes we owe the following year's taxes, etc.) and whatever material the government receives in payment of taxes, that material becomes possessed of some of the properties of money and always has value.

Paper money received in payment of taxes is altogether different from a note issued by an individual. The individual must at some time redeem his note with money; but the government redeems its paper money every time it is received in payment of taxes.

Another vital difference between the note of an individual and paper money, issued by a government, is that the government can force an individual to take its paper money; but the individual, who issues his promissory note, cannot force an individual to take his note.

The prevention of vote selling, tax dodging and money cornering has now been explained. PERPETUAL VOTING, DEATH RATE TAX with the subordinate laws, HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION, OWNERSHIP RECORD, and SELF-ASSESSMENT and JUST MONEY must all be

adopted by our people if a substantial cure of the evils now afflicting the country is desired.

By the means of *value* must our lands and other kinds of wealth be sold or rented to our people; because renting and selling the wealth of this country by the means of *value* is the best means of which the human brain has as yet conceived; but value cannot be fairly and properly taxed or fairly and properly measured, without employing the SELF-ASSESSMENT law, the OWNERSHIP RECORD law, the DEATH RATE TAX law and the JUST MONEY system. Nor can any or all of these laws be carried into practice without PERPETUAL VOTING, as such a system of voting is absolutely indispensable when the people desire their public officials to comply fully with any law and enforce it to the letter.

Each one of the laws herein described is essential to the putting into practice of the theory of this government.

PERPETUAL VOTING would make sovereigns of the people in practice as they are now in theory; and force our officers to appeal to the people as now is the case with the British Parliament; the HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION law would make it impossible for the creditor to hound the debtor beyond a certain limit (N. Y. State has a homestead exemption law for fifteen-hundred dollar homes; but such homesteads are subject to sale for non-payment of taxes), as is now the purpose of some of our statute laws; the OWNERSHIP RECORD law would do with all value what we now do with real property, viz., compel the recording of titles in order to perfect the ownership as against all private parties; and the penalty of forfeiture imposed under

this law for not recording property of value would be exactly similar to the present practice of this government in dealing with smugglers when caught in their attempts to dodge import taxes: the SELF-ASSESSMENT law would do, only more effectively, what our assessors now profess (because assessors are now supposed to be influenced, when determining the value of property by what any citizen is willing to give for it) to do. The DEATH RATE TAX on full value would do what we thought we had done in this country when we abolished the laws of entail and primogeniture, viz., prevented the amassing of great estates in the hands of one family; and the system of JUST MONEY would do what the national banks are supposed to do and what the Secretary of the Treasury always has done, viz., relieve the money market by putting out new money; the chief difference being that the Secretary in the past has only attempted to relieve the financial distress of the Wall street speculators, whereas JUST MONEY would relieve the financial distress of the whole people.

Each of these laws would assist in making actual practice what is now the theory of this government. What our government is supposed to strive to do, in part, the adoption of these laws, viz: PERPETUAL VOTING, HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION, OWNERSHIP RECORD, SELF-ASSESSMENT, DEATH RATE TAX and JUST MONEY laws would do in full.

Throughout this country can be found many persons who readily recognize the importance of having an honest method of expressing the people's will, an honest method of taxation, or an honest method of

measuring value; but, when a person who perceives the importance of having all of the three methods and their inseparable relation, is sought he is not so readily found. Persons who can carry one idea at a time are numerous, but those who can carry several are much less so.

But one more point and this work is finished. Currency under the JUST MONEY system is the only thing of value that ought not to be taxed, excepting the value exempt under the Homestead Exemption law. This little book is now concluded with a recapitulation that will keep before the mind of the reader what has been previously explained.

PERPETUAL VOTING, · JUST MONEY,
DEATH RATE TAX.

AUXILIARY LAWS.

HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION, OWNERSHIP RECORD, SELF-
ASSESSMENT.

Address,

THOMAS J. SANDFORD,
No. 120 Broadway,
N. Y. City.

26974

**END OF
TITLE**