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THE MEMOIRS
OP
BARON DE MARBOT
LATE
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL IN THE FRENCH ARMY
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY
ARTHUR JOHN BUTLER
LATE MLLOW OF TRINITY COLLEQI, CAMBRIDGE
WITH PORTRAIT NEW IMPRESSION
IN TWO VOLUMES. VOL. II. , i U * ^
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO,
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON NEW YORK, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA
All rights ruervtd
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.
First Edition, 2 vols., 8vo, March, 1892; Reprinted April, 1892 ; July, 1892 ; New Edition, Slightly Abridged, 1 vol., Crown Svo, March, 1893; Re- printed January, 1894. Silver Library Edition, 2 vols., July, 1897 ; Re- printed April, 1900 ; Ja?iuary, 1903 ; January, 1905 , November, 1907 ; June, 1913.
CHAPTER XLVII.
As the moment approached for crossing the Danube again, the Austrians watched more assiduously the bank of the small arm of the river which lay between us and them. They fortified Enzersdorf, and if a group of French soldiers came too near the part of the island opposite that village their outposts would fire upon them ; but they took no notice of parties of two or three. The Emperor wished to have a near view of the enemy's pre- parations, and it has been said that in order to do so without danger he disguised himself as a private, and did sentry's duty. This report is incorrect ; the real fact was as follows. The Emperor and Marshal Masse'na, wearing sergeants' great-coats, and followed by Sainte-Croix in a private's uniform, went close up to the bank. The colonel stripped himself, and went into the water, while Napoleon and Massena, to still any suspicion on the part of the enemy, took off their coats as though they too proposed to bathe, and then examined at their ease the point where they wished to throw the bridges across. The Austrians were so accustomed to see our soldiers come in little parties to bathe at that place that they remained quietly lying on the grass. This fact shows that in war commanders ought strictly to forbid this kind of truce, and marking off of neutral points, which the troops on either side often establish for their respective convenience.
Having settled to cross the river at this spot, the Emperor decided that several bridges should be constructed there ; but as it was more than probable that on the alarm being given by the outposts the Austrian troops posted at Enzersdorf would hasten up to oppose the construction of the bridges, it was arranged that 2,500 grenadiers should first be transported to the other bank, and should at once attack Enzersdorf to occupy the garrison, and prevent their interfering with our works and hindering our passage. This being settled, the Emperor said to Massena, ' As this leading column will be specially exposed, we must compose it of our best troops, and select a brave and capable colonel to command them.' ' But, sir, that is rrv job,'
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368 MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DR MARBOT
said Sainte-Croix. * How so ? ' replied the Emperor, who pro- bably asked the question only to draw the answer which he got. 'Why,' said the colonel, * because of all the officers on the island \ am the one who has had the most tiring work for six weeks past. I have been on my legs carrying out your orders day and night ; and I beg that your Majesty will be kind enough to give me in return the command of the 2,500 grenadiers who are to make the first landing on the enemy's bank.' ■ Well, you shall have it,' replied Napoleon, much pleased with this noble daring; and the final arrangements for the crossing having been made, the attack was fixed for the night of July 4.
Before that time came two important events happened in our army corps. Lieutenant-General Becker was a good officer, though indolent, but it was his fault to criticise everything, and he allowed himself openly to disapprove Napoleon's plan ot attack. On hearing of it the Emperor sent him back to France. We shall see how he avenged himself in 1815.1 General Fririon became chief of the staff; a capable man, but without the firmness required in one acting under Mass6na. The other event nearly deprived the Emperor of the aid of Masse*na him- self in the coming battle. One day, as he and Napoleon were riding round the island, the marshal's horse put its foot in a hole and fell, injuring its rider's leg so that he could not keep his saddle. This was the more annoying that the battle was to take place on the same ground as that of Essling, which Mass6na of course knew well. He showed, however, his de- termination by asserting that in spite of his pain he would be taken on to the field in a litter, like Marshal Saxe at Fontenoy. A litter was got ready ; but it struck the marshal, upon a remark which I ventured to make, that this mode of trans- port was rather pretentious and not so safe as a light carriage, which, with four good horses, could get him about the ground more quickly than men. It was therefore arranged that he should go thus, accompanied by his surgeon, Dr. Brisset, who changed the compresses every hour with perfect coolness under fire during the two days which the battle of Wagram lasted, and in the subsequent fights.
Knowing that the enemy was expecting him to cross as before between Aspern and Essling, and that it was important to conceal his plan of turning their position by crossing opposite
1 [Unfortunately, General Marbot's Memoirs stop short of 1815. General Becker was directed by the Provisional Government to escort Napoleon tc Rochefort after his second abdication, and discharged the duty so consider- ately, that they parted in the most affectionate manner.]
A SPY DETECTED 3O9
Enzersdorf, Napoleon had a careful watch kept over all who entered the island by the great bridges connecting it with Ebersdorf. Everyone on the island must have learnt the secret towards the end of the time ; but as it seemed certain that none were on it but French soldiers or officers' servants, who were all guarded, no danger was apprehended from inquisitiveness on the enemy's part. This, as it turned out, was a mistake ; for the archduke had contrived to introduce a spy among us. Just when he was about to give information of the point which we were going to attack, an anonymous letter, written in Hungarian, was brought by a little girl to the Emperor's Mameluke, Roustan, with the warning that it was important and urgent. It was at first supposed to be a begging letter ; but the interpreters soon translated it, and informed the Emperor. He came at once to the island, and on arriving, ordered all works to be suspended, and every soul — troops, staffs, commissaries, butchers, bakers, canteen men, even officers' servants — to be drawn up on parade. As soon as everyone was in the ranks, the Emperor announced that a spy had found his way into the island, hoping to escape notice among 30,000 men ; and now that they were all in their places he ordered every man to look at his neighbours to right and left. The success of this plan was instantaneous. In the midst of a dead silence, two soldiers were heard to cry, ■ Here is a man we don't know.' He was arrested and examined, and admitted that he had disguised himself in a French uniform, taken from men killed at Essling. This wretch had been born at Paris, and appeared very well educated. Having ruined himself at play, he had fled to Austria to escape his creditors, and there had offered himself as spy to the Austrian staff. A small boat used to take him across the Danube at night, land- ing him a league below Ebersdorf, and fetch him back the next night on a given signal. He had already been frequently on the island, and had accompanied detachments of our troops going to fetch provisions or materials from Ebersdorf. In order to avoid notice, he always went to places where there was a crowd, and worked with the soldiers at the entrench- ments. He got his meals at the canteen, passed the nights near the camps, and in the morning, armed with a spade as though on his way to join a working party, he would go over all the island, and examine the works, lying down among the osiers to make hurried sketches of them. The next night he would go and make his report to the Austrians, and come back to continue his observations. He was brought before a court martial and condemned to death ; but the bitter regret which
37© MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DE MARBOT
he expressed for having served the enemies of France disposed the Emperor to commute the penalty. When, however, the spy proposed to deceive the archduke by going to make a false report on what he had seen, and coming back to tell the French what the Austrians were doing, the Emperor, disgusted at this new piece of infamy, abandoned him to his fate, and let him be shot.
Meanwhile the day of the great battle was drawing on. Napoleon had assembled round Ebersdorf the Army of Italy, the corps of Davout and Bernadotte with the guard, and transformed the island of Lobau into a vast fortress. Three strong bridges secured the passage of the large arm of the Danube, and everything was ready for throwing several across the small arm. To confirm the archduke in the belief that he intended to cross again between Essling and Aspern, Napoleon had the small bridge by which we had retreated after the battle of Essling reconstructed after the night of July i, and sent across two divisions whose skirmishers might attract the attention of the enemy while all was making ready for our attack on Enzersdorf. It is hard to understand how the arch- duke could have supposed that Napoleon would make a front attack upon the huge fortifications with which he had sur- rounded Essling and Aspern ; this would indeed have been taking the bull by the horns.
The second and third were passed by both sides in prepara- tion. The French army, to the number of 150,000 men, was massed on the isle of Lobau ; the archduke assembled an equal force on the left bank, where his troops, posted in two lines, formed an immense arc, overlapping those parts of the island which were opposite to them. The right-hand end of this arc rested on the Danube at Floridsdorf ; their centre occupied the villages of Essling and Aspern, which were strongly entrenched, and connected by works armed with many guns. Finally, the left of the arc was at Gross- Enzersdorf, with a strong detach- ment at Miihlleiten. The archduke, therefore, was watching all the points of the island by which we could emerge ; but as, for some unexplained reason, he had made up his mind that Napoleon would attack his centre, crossing the little arm of the Danube where he had done in May, the Austrian com- mander had concentrated his whole force in the wide plains which extend from those villages as far as Deutsch-Wagram and Markgrafen-Neusiedel, a large village on the Russbach stream, the steep banks of which, commanded by high ground, offer an excellent defensive position. His right was weak, and his left still weaker, because, though he had ordered his brother
THE FIRS T S TROKE 37 1
the Archduke John, commanding the Army of Hungary, with his 35,000 men, to be by the morning of July 5 at Unter-Sieben- brunn and in touch on the left with the second line of the main army, this order was not carried out.
In pursuance of the Emperor's instructions, the French army began its attack at 9 p.m. on July 5. Just then a tremen- dous storm burst ; the night was of the darkest, the rain fell in torrents and the noise of the thunder mingled with that of our artillery, which, sheltered from the enemy's shot by an epaule- ment, aimed all its fire at Essling and Aspern. Thus confirmed in the belief that we were going to land at that point, the arch- duke turned all his attention thither, without troubling himself about Enzersdorf, upon which the bulk of our force was marching. As soon as the first shots were heard Marshal Mass6na, though still in much pain, was placed in a small open carriage and, surrounded by his aides-de-camp, was driven towards the point where the first attack was to be made. The Emperor soon joined us. He was in good spirits and said to the marshal: 'I am delighted at this storm. What a fine night for us ! The Austrians cannot see our preparations to cross opposite Enzers- dorf, and they will know nothing of them till we have carried that important position ; by which time our bridges will be placed and part of my army formed on the bank which they think we are defending.'
In fact Colonel Sainte-Croix, after having landed his 2,500 grenadiers in silence, took up his ground on the enemy's flank in front of Enzersdorf. A regiment of Croats was bivouacking at this point. Attacked unawares, they defended themselves obstinately with the bayonet ; but our grenadiers, inspirited by the voice of Sainte-Croix, who had thrown himself into the hottest of the scuffle, drove back the enemy, who retreated in disorder upon Enzersdorf. That large village, surrounded by a loopholed wall, having in front of it a dyke cut in the form of a parapet, was full of infantry, while all the entrances were covered by small earthworks. To carry the village was all the more difficult, because the houses had been burnt down and the garrison might any moment be supported by General Nord- mann's brigade posted a little in rear between this village and that of Muhlleiten. But no obstacle checked Sainte-Croix, who at the head of his grenadiers carried the outer works, pursued the enemy at the sword's point, and entered pell-mell with them into the redan which covered the south gate. The gate was closed, Sainte-Croix drove it in under a hail of bullets from the loopholed walls. Once masters of this passage, the colonel
37* MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DB MARBOT
and his soldiers dashed into the village, while the garrison, weakened by its enormous losses, took refuge in the castle. But at sight of the scaling ladders which Sainte-Croix ordered up, the Austrian commander capitulated. Thus Sainte-Croix, to whom this fine feat of arms did the greatest honour, remained master of Enzersdorf, to the great satisfaction of the Emperor, whose plans were admirably served by its capture. He ordered eight bridges to be at once thrown over the small arm between the island and Enzersdorf. The first of these bridges was an inven- tion of the Emperor's own. It was made in four sections, connected by hinges so as to allow it to turn and follow the windings of the bank ; one end was fixed to the trees on the island, while the other was guided towards the opposite bank by the help of a cable carried by a boat. Swinging to the current, this new style of bridge turned on itself, made a complete wheel to the right, and was ready for use in a moment. In a quarter of an hour the other seven were fixed, enabling Napoleon rapidly to bring over to the left bank the corps of Massena, Oudinot, Bernadotte, Davout, and Marmont, Prince Eugene's army, the artillery reserve, all the cavalry, and finally the guard.
While the Emperor was thus profiting by the capture of Enzersdorf, the archduke, still convinced that his enemy in- tended to debouch between Essling and Aspern, was wasting him time and his ammunition in hurling shot and shell on to the part of the island which faced those villages, under the impression that he was causing great loss to the French troops. As, however, we had at that point only a few scouts well protected by earthworks, the projectiles did no damage, and meanwhile the bulk of our troops were traversing the small arm of the river, and forming on the left bank. The Austrian general was astounded when, marching towards the old battle- field on the morning of July 5, with the intention of taking us at a disadvantage the moment we landed, he perceived that his let wing had been turned by the left army, which was marching upon Sachsengang, and shortly occupied that place. Thus surprised, and his rear threatened, the archduke was obliged, in order to face us, to execute a retrograde movement on a vast scale towards the Russbach, always retreating before Napoleon, while our various corps were taking up their order of battle in the great plain which spread before them.
The Emperor sent three strong divisions of cavalry, with several battalions, supported by light artillery, to watch for the Archduke John at Siebenbrunn, these troops being regarded as outside the fighting line, and intended merely to prevent
WAG RAM: THE FIRST DAY 373
a surprise. Of the main army, Davout's corps, resting on the Russbach, formed the right; the centre was composed of Bavarians, Wurtembergers, the corps of Oudinot and Berna- dotte, and the Army of Italy. The left, under Massena, moved along the small arm of the Danube, in the direction of Essling and Aspern. Each of these corps, as it advanced, was to carry the villages on its road. The reserve consisted of Marmont's corps, three divisions of cuirassiers, numerous artillery, and all the imperial guard. Finally, General Reynier, with one division and guns, remained to guard the island of Lobau, the old bridge which we had used at the time of the former battle having been replaced. A splendid day had succeeded the most horrible night. The French army in review order advanced majestically, preceded by an immense force of artillery, which crushed all opposition on the part of the enemy. The regiments compos- ing the Austrian left, with General Nordmann in advance, were the first with whom he came in contact. Driven from Enzersdorfand Muhlleiten, they attempted to defend Raschdorf, but were pushed back, and General Nordmann was killed in the fight. This officer was from Alsace, formerly colonel of the Bercheny Hussars. He deserted to the enemy in 1793 with part of his regiment, at the same time as Dumouriez, and entered the Austrian service. Our march at first meeting no serious resistance, we occupied successively Essling, Aspern, Breitenlee, Raschdorf, and Siissenbrunn. So far Napoleon's plan had succeeded, the troops having crossed the Danube, and occupied the plain on the left bank. But nothing could be considered as decided until we had beaten and thoroughly broken up the enemy. He now made the serious mistake, instead of uniting his whole force on the Russbach, of dividing it, by retreating on two very divergent lines ; one upon Mark- graf and Neusiedel, behind the Russbach ; the other upon the heights of Stamersdorf, where his right wing was obviously too far from the field of battle. The position on the bank of the Russbach is strong, commanding the plain, and covered by the brook, which, though not large, forms a very good obstacle, its banks being too steep for infantry to cross, except with difficulty, while the only way for cavalry and artillery is over the bridges in the villages which the Austrians held. As, however, the Russbach was the key of the position, Napoleon resolved to seize it. He therefore ordered Davout to attack Neusiedel ; Oudinot and Bernadotte, Baumersdorf and Wagram respec- tively ; while Prince Eugene, supported by Macdonald and Lamarque, crossed the stream between the two latter villages.
374 MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DE MARBOT
The light artillery of the guard crushed the Austrian masses with its fire, but Marshal Bernadotte, commanding the Saxons, attacked Wagram so feebly that he did not succeed. Macdonald and Lamarque, crossing the Russbach, placed the enemy's centre for a moment in danger ; but the archduke, flinging him- self upon that point with his reserves, forced our troops back again across the brook. This movement was at first executed in perfect order, but as night had approached, our infantry, who had just resisted a front attack of the Austrian light horse, seeing in their rear a brigade of French cavalry which General Salme was bringing up to their support, thought they were cut ofT, and some disorder ensued, aggravated by the blunder of some Saxon battalions firing on Lamarque's division. This confusion, however, was quickly repaired. Oudinot's attack on Baumersdorf, being made with a lack of cohesion, was also repulsed ; Davout alone had any success ; having forced the Russbach and turned Neusiedel, he was on the point of capturing that village, in spite of an obstinate defence, when night compelled him to suspend the attack, and shortly after the Emperor ordered him to retire, so as not to leave him exposed by being isolated on the further end of the stream.
CHAPTER XLVIII.
July 5, the chief events of which I have recorded, served only as preparation for the decisive battle of the morrow. The night passed quietly ; our army, with its three cavalry divisions detached towards Leopold sdorf, had its true right near Gross- hofen ; our centre was at Aderklaa ; our left somewhat withheld at Breitenlee, giving our line the form of an angle, of which Wagram was the apex. The tents of the Emperor and his guard were a little in advance of Raschdorf. Cognisance of the plan of the battle of Wagram will show that the enemy's right, starting from the environs of Kampendorf and passing along the left bank of the Russbach to Helmhof, whence it reached by Sauring to Stamersdorf, formed thus a re-entering angle, of which the apex was equally at Wagram. This, therefore, was the essential point of which each side wished to get possession. To succeed in this, the object of either was to turn his enemy's left flank ; but the archduke, having extended his army too much, was obliged to send his orders in writing, and these were either misunderstood or ill-executed ; while the Emperor, having his reserves under his hand, could see and superintend the carry-out of his instructions.
At daybreak on the 6th the battle was renewed with more vigour than on the previous day. Much to Napoleon's surprise, the archduke, who had till then confined himself to the defensive, began to attack, and took Aderklaa from us. Soon the artillery fire extended over the whole line ; never in the memory of man had the like been seen, for the number of pieces brought into action by the two armies amounted to 1,200. The Austrian left wing, under the arch- duke in person, crossed the Russbach, and debouched by those columns towards Leopoldsdorf, Glinzendorf, and Grosshofen, but was stoutly resisted, and even checked by Davout and Grouchy's cavalry by the time that Napoleon came up at the head of an enormous reserve. Seeing the extreme right of his line engaged, he had supposed for a moment that the Archduke John had joined the enemy's main army. So far was this, however, from being the case, that, as we afterwards learnt, he
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376 MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DE MARBOT
was at that moment at Pressburg, eight leagues from the field of battle. Deprived of the support from him which they had hoped for, the Austrian left soon repented having attacked us. Overwhelmed by superior forces, more especially of artillery, it was driven back across the Russbach, with heavy loss, by Davout, who then sent a portion of his troops across, and marched by both banks on Neusiedel.
His right thus secured, the Emperor returned with his guard to the centre, and while Bernadotte attacked Wagram, and Oudinot marched on Baumersdorf, he ordered Massena to retake Aderklaa. Taken and retaken this village finally remained in the hands of the Austrian grenadiers, whom the archduke led to a renewed attack, while at the same time he launched a strong column of cavalry against the Saxons, under Bernadotte, routing them completely, and flinging them on Massena' s troops, who were thrown into momentary disorder. The marshal was in his carriage, and the enemy, noticing it with its four white horses in the middle of the line, guessed that its occupant must be a person of importance, and poured a storm of shot upon it. The marshal and those about him were in great danger ; we were surrounded with dead and dying. Captain Barain, an aide-de-camp, lost an arm, and Colonel Sainte-Croix was wounded.
The Emperor, galloping up, became aware that the arch- duke, in order to turn or even surround his left, was bringing forward his own right wing, which already occupied Sussen- brunn, Leopoldau, and Stadlau, and was marching on Aspern, thus threatening the column of Lobau. In order to be better seen by the troops, he got for a moment into the carriage, beside Massena, and at sight of him order was restored. He bade Massena change front to the rear, in order to bring his left to Aspern and front towards Hirschstetten, causing Macdonald, with three divisions, to take up the ground which Massena left. These movements were carried out in good order, under an artillery fire from the enemy. Thus Napoleon, profiting by the concentration of his principal forces, brought up to support Macdonald, not only strong reserves of all arms, but finally the imperial guard, which took up its position in three lines in rear of the other troops.
At this moment the positions of the two armies were very curious, the opposed lines having almost the shape of two letters Z praced side by side. The Austrian left, posted at Neusiedel, was giving way before our right, while the two centres were holding their respective places, and our left wing
HARD FIGHTING 377
ivas retreating along the Danube before the enemy's right. The chances of either side thus seemed to be about equal. Really, however, they were all in favour of Napoleon — in the first place, because it was unlikely that the village of Neusiedel, where the only means of resistance was afforded by an old fortified tower, would hold out long against the attack which Davout was delivering with his usual vigour; and it was easy to see that when this was taken, the Austrian left, being outflanked and without support, would retreat indefinitely and get separated from the centre, while our left wing, though beaten at the moment, was in its retreat coming near to the island of Lobau, the powerful artillery on which would check the Austrians, and prevent them from following up their success. Secondly, Napoleon acting on inner lines, could hold a great part of his troops in reserve, and yet show a front in different directions ; while the archduke, being obliged to extend his army, in order to execute his great movement on an outer line with the view of surrounding us, was not in force at any point. The Emperor, observing this mistake, was perfectly calm, though he could read in the faces of his staff the anxiety caused by the conquering march of the enemy's right, which, always driving Mass6na's corps before it, had already reached the battlefield of May 22, and after crushing Boudet's division by a formidable charge of cavalry, was threatening our rear. But the success of the Austrians was short-lived. The hundred heavy guns with which Napoleon's foresight had armed the island of Lobau opened a scathing fire upon the enemy's right, and it was compelled, under pain of annihilation, to halt in its triumphant course, and retire in its turn. Massena was then able to re- form his divisions, which had lost heavily. We thought that Napoleon would profit by the disorder into which the cannon- ade had thrown the enemy's right wing to attack with his reserves ; Marshal Massena, indeed, sent me to ask for instruc- tions on this point. But the Emperor remained impassible, his eyes ever fixed on the extreme right towards Neusiedel (which lies high and is surmounted by a tall tower, visible from all parts of the field), waiting to hurl himself upon the enemy's centre and right until Davout had beaten the left and flung it back behind that village. A valiant defence was being maintained by the Prince of Hesse-Homburg, who was there wounded ; but at last we suddenly saw the smoke of Davout's guns be- yond the tower. Beyond a doubt the enemy's left was beaten. Then, turning to me, the Emperor said : ' Quick! tell Massdna to
378 MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DE MARBOT
fall upon whatever is in front of him, and the battle is won.' At the same time the aides-de-camp from all the other corps were sent off to their chiefs with an order for a simultane- ous attack. At this supreme moment Napoleon said to General Lauriston, ■ Take a hundred guns, sixty from my guard, and crush the enemy's column.' As soon as their fire had shaken the Austrians, Marshal Bessieres charged them with six regiments of heavy cavalry, supported by part of the cavalry of the guard. In vain did the archduke form squares : they were broken, with the loss of their guns and a great num- ber of men. Our centre advanced in its turn, under Macdonald, and Siissenbrunn, Breitenlee, and Aderklaa were carried after a smart resistance. Meanwhile Masse'na had recovered the ground lost on our left, and was pressing the enemy hard, forcing him beyond Stadlau and Kagran ; and Davout, calling Oudinot to his support, occupied the heights beyond the Russ- bach, and captured Wagram. This decided the defeat of the Austrians : they retreated all along the line, retiring in very good order, along the road to Moravia.
The Emperor has been blamed for not pursuing the defeated army with his usual vigour ; but the criticism is baseless. Na- poleon was hindered by many weighty reasons from launching his troops too promptly on the enemy's track. In the first place, the road to Moravia would bring them into a rough country, divided by wooded hills, ravines and gorges, com- manded by the mountains and forests of Bisamberg, which would offer excellent defensive positions, all the more difficult to carry that the archduke would occupy them with a large force, much of which had not been engaged, while his rear-guard was protected by powerful artillery. We might therefore expect a stubborn resistance, which, if prolonged, would lead to a night battle. Of these the chances are always uncertain, and the Emperor's victory might well be compromised.
In the second place, to ensure the assembling of the French army in the island of Lobau by the 4th, it had been necessary to put some of the corps in movement as early as the 1st. These, in order to reach the meeting place, had had to make forced marches, succeeded without any rest between by a battle extending over two days of very hot weather. Our troops were therefore worn out ; while the Austrians, who had been for more than a month in camp, had had only the fatigues of the battle to endure. Thus, if we had attacked the archduke in the strong position which he had taken up, eveiy advantage would have been on his side.
END OF THE BATTLE 379
But a third and still more powerful argument checked Napoleon's ardour and decided him to allow his troops time to rest on the field of battle. He had just been warned by the generals of his light cavalry placed by him to look out beyond his extreme right that an enemy's force of 35,000 to 40,000, under the command of the Archduke John, had been seen debouching at Unter Siebenbrunn, that is to say, upon what, since our change of front, had become our actual rear. The reserve provided by the Emperor would doubtless have been enough to repulse the archduke ; but one must admit that prudence would lead Napoleon not to engage his troops in the attack of the strong positions which the Archduke Charles appeared determined to defend obstinately, so long as he him- self was open to an attack in rear from the Archduke John at the head of a strong and perfectly fresh force. The Emperor therefore ordered the pursuit to cease, and made his army bivouac in such a way that one part fronted to the side where the Archduke John was, and was ready to receive him if he ventured into the plain. Fearing, however, to come into contact with our victorious troops, he retreated hastily towards Hungary. If Napoleon had pursued with his usual vigour, the trophies from Wagram would probably have been more numerous, but on considering the motives which decided him to halt one can- not but praise his caution. If he had always acted with as much prudence he would have spared both France and himself great calamities.
In order to rest for a few hours after its victory, our army took up its position with its left at Floridsdorf, its centre in front of Gerhardsdorf, and its right beyond the Russbach. The Emperor's tents were pitched between Aderklaa and Raschdorf, and Mass6na,s head-quarters were at Leopoldau*. The replace- ment of the old Spitz bridge put the army in direct communica- tion with Vienna, which favoured the transport of the wounded to the hospitals, and of food and ammunition to the army.
The Austrians have, not without reason, blamed the Arch- duke John for the delays in his march and his carelessness in carrying out the Archduke Charles' orders. Indeed, on the evening of the 4th Charles wrote to his brother to leave Press- burg at once, and form a junction with the Austrian left at Siebenbrunn; but although John received the order by 4 a.m. on the 5th he did not march till eleven in the evening, and moved so slowly that although he had only eight leagues to do, he took twenty hours to reach Siebenbrunn, not coming up till seven o'clock on the 6th, by which time the battle was lost and
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the Austrians were in full retreat. The Archduke Charles never forgave his brother for not carrying out his orders ; John lost his command and was banished to Styria.1
In the absence of pursuit, the Austrian losses were much less considerable than they might have been. Still, they ad- mitted 24,000 killed and wounded, among the former three of their generals. One of them, Wukassowitz, had distinguished himself against Bonaparte in Italy ; the other two, Nordmann and D'Aspre, were Frenchmen in arms against their country. According to the bulletins we made 20,000 prisoners and cap- tured 30 guns ; but I believe this estimate was much exagger- ated. We only took a few colours. Our loss was nearly equal to that of the enemy ; Generals Lacour, Gauthier, and Lasalle, and seven colonels were killed. The enemy had ten generals, including the archduke, wounded ; the number of ours was twenty-one, among them, Marshal Bessieres. Among the twelve colonels wounded three were special favourites with the Emperor — Dumesnil, Corbineau, and Sainte-Croix : the two first, who belonged to the mounted chasseurs of the guard, lost a leg apiece ; the Emperor rewarded them richly. As for Sainte-Croix, who had his skin grazed by a cannon-ball, his wound was not dangerous, at which his friends rejoiced. How- ever, if he had lost a leg he might perhaps have been living now, as well as his brother Robert, one of whose legs remains on the battlefield of Moskwa. Although Sainte-Croix had been only two months colonel, and was not yet twenty-seven, the Emperor made him major-general, Count with 25,000 francs pension, Grand Cross of the Order of Hesse, and Commander of that of Baden. On the evening of the battle the Emperor rewarded the services of Macdonald, Oudinot, and Marmont by giving each of them his marshal's baton. It was not, however, in his power to give them the talents required to command an army ; brave and good divisional generals as they were when in the Emperor's hands they showed them- selves clumsy when they were away from him, either in devising a plan of campaign, or in executing it, or modifying it according to circumstances. It was held in the army that the Emperor, not being able to replace Lannes, wanted to get the small change for him : but we must remember that these three marshals played an unlucky part in the campaigns which ended in the fall of Napoleon and the ruin of the country.
1 [Forty years later he reappeared on the scene. In 1848 the German revolutionists named him Vicar-General of the Germanic Empire. In the meantime he took an active part in the early exploration of the Austrian Alps.]
CHAPTER XLIX.
General Lasalle, who fell at Wagram, was keenly regretted both by the Emperor and the army. He was the best light cavalry officer for outpost duty, and had the surest eye. He could take in a whole district in a moment, and seldom made a mistake, so that his reports on the enemy's position were clear and precise. He was a handsome man, and of a bright wit, but, although well educated, he had adopted the fashion of posing as a swashbuckler. He might always be seen drinking, swearing, singing, smashing everything, and possessed by a passion for play. He was an excellent horseman, and brave to the point of rashness. Although he had fought in the first revolutionary wars, he was little known before the famous campaign of 1796, when, as a captain in the 2nd Hussars, he attracted the notice of General Bonaparte at the battle of Rivoli. This took place, as is well known, on a lofty plateau bounded on one side by steep rocks, at the foot of which flows the Adige, along the road to Rivoli. The Austrians, having been beaten by the French infantry, were leaving the battlefield by every available way. One of their columns hoped to escape by reaching the valley over the rocks ; but Lasalle followed them down this difficult passage with two squadrons. In vain it was represented to him that cavalry cannot be employed on such dangerous ground. He galloped down the descent, followed by his hussars; the astonished enemy retreated headlong. Lasalle overtook them, and made some thousand prisoners under the eyes of General Bonaparte and the army. From this day onwards Lasalle was in high favour with Bonaparte, who promoted him rapidly and took him to Egypt, where he made him colonel. In one of the numerous engagements with the Mamelukes the thong which held Lasalle's sabre to his wrist broke ; he dismounted in the thickest of the melee, and, undis- turbed by danger, picked up his weapon, nimbly remounted, and dashed at the enemy afresh. One must have seen a cavalry combat to appreciate the courage, coolness, and dexterity which such a deed requires, especially in presence of horsemen like the Mamelukes.
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Lasalle had intimate relations with a French lady in high society, and while he was in Egypt their correspondence was seized by the English and insultingly published by order of the Government — an act which even in England was blamed. A divorce followed, and on his return to Europe Lasalle married the lady. As general, Lasalle was placed by the Emperor in command of the advanced guard of the Grand Army. He distinguished himself at Austerlitz and in Prussia ; having the audacity to appear before Stettin and summon the place with two regiments of hussars. The governor lost his head and brought out the keys, instead of using them to lock the gates, in which case all the cavalry in Europe could not have taken it. This feat brought Lasalle much credit, and raised the Emperor's liking for him to a high point. Indeed, he petted him to an incredible degree, laughing at all his freaks, and never letting him pay his own debts. Just as he was on the point of marrying the lady to whom I have referred, Napoleon had given him 200,000 francs out of his privy purse. A week later, meeting him at the Tuileries, the Emperor asked, ■ When is the wedding ? ' * As soon as I have got some money to furnish with, sir.' * Why, I gave you 200,000 francs last week ! What have you done with them ? ' ' Paid my debts with half, and lost the other half at cards.' Such an admission would have ruined any other general. The Emperor laughed, and merely giving a sharp tug to Lasalle' s moustache, ordered Duroc to give him another 200,000.
At the close of the battle of Wagram, Lasalle's division had not been engaged. He came and begged Massena to let him pursue, and the marshal assented, on condition that he would act with prudence. Hardly had Lasalle started, when he saw a brigade of enemy's infantry, which was hastening, closely pressed, to reach the village of Leopoldau, in order to obtain a regular capitulation and escape the fury of the victors in the "open. Lasalle guessed what the Austrian general was after, and, pointing to the setting sun, addressed his men, ' The battle is ending, and we alone have not contributed to the victory. Come on ! ' He dashed forward, sword in hand, followed by his squadrons, and, in order to prevent the enemy from entering the village, made for the narrow space now left between the head of the column and Leopoldau. The others, seeing themselves cut off from the hoped-for shelter, halted and opened a brisk file-fire. A bullet struck Lasalle in the head, killing him on the spot. His division lost a hundred troopers, besides many wounded. The Austrians opened their way to
THE DANGERS OF ' STRA W-F/RE* 383
the village, and when our infantry divisions came up, capitu- lated, the officers declaring that that had been their intention in making for Leopoldau. Thus Lasalle's charge was useless, and he paid dear for a mention in a bulletin.
His death left a great gap in our light cavalry, which he had trained to a high degree of perfection. In other respects, how- ever, he had done it much harm. The eccentricities of a popular and successful leader are always imitated, and his example was long mischievous to the light cavalry. A man did not think himself a chasseur, still less a hussar, if he did not model him- self on Lasalle, and become, like him, a reckless, drinking, swearing rowdy. Many officers copied the fault of this famous outpost leader, but none of them attained to the merits which in him atoned for the faults.
When a battle is fought in summer, it often happens that the ripe corn is set on fire by shells and gun-wadding ; but in no battle of the Empire did this occur on such a scale as at Wagram. The season was early, and the weather hot ; the battlefield was completely covered with crops ready for harvest, which caught quickly and carried the fire with terrific rapidity. The movements of both armies were hampered by the necessity of avoiding it ; for if once troops were overtaken by it, pouches and wagons exploded, carrying destruction through the ranks. Whole regiments might be seen hastening out of the way of the fire, and taking up their position where the corn had been burnt already ; but this means of escape was only open to the able-bodied. Of the soldiers who were severely wounded great numbers perished in the flames ; and of those whom the fire did not reach, many lay for days hidden by the tall corn, living during that time on the ears. The Emperor had the plain searched by bands of cavalry, and vehicles were brought from Vienna to remove the wounded, friends and foes alike. But few of those even whom the fire had passed recovered, and the soldiers had a saying that straw-fire had killed nearly as many as gun-fire.
The two days of the battle were an anxious time for the Viennese, who, from their roofs and towers, could enjoy a full view of all that took place, and who swayed from hope to fear with the progress of the fight. The famous and witty field- marshal Prince de Ligne, now well advanced in years,1 had assembled the best society in Vienna in his country house, on
1[Born 1735. He survived five years longer, dying during the Congress pi Vienna.]
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the highest of the neighbouring hills, whence the eye could take in the whole field of battle. With his experience of war and his keen intelligence, he quickly seized Napoleon's design and the archduke's blunders, and foretold the defeat of the latter. When the Viennese saw the right of their army, on the 6th, rolling back our left, they broke into a frenzy of joy, and through our glasses we could see thousands of men and women waving hats and handkerchiefs to kindle still further the courage of their troops, who were winning at that point, but there only. The Prince de Ligne did not share the joy of the Viennese, and I have it from one who was close by the old soldier that he said to his guests, ' Do not rejoice just yet ; in less than a quarter of an hour the archduke will be beaten. He has no reserves, and you see the plain is crowded with the masses of Napoleon's!' His prediction was justified. As, however, one must do justice even to an enemy, I may say, after criticising the archduke's tactics, that his blunders are vastly excused by the hope, which he was justified in having, of the arrival of his brother with 35,000 or 40,000 men to fall on our right or rear. Moreover, it must be allowed that, having formed his [plan, he carried it out with much vigour, showing great personal courage, with a remarkable gift of keeping up the spirit of his troops. Of this I will cite a striking instance.
As is well known, every regiment has, besides its colonel commanding, a proprietary colonel, whose name it bears ; usually some prince or general.^ At his death the regiment passes to another, so that a corps may often have to abandon a name illustrated on a score of fields, and take some new and unknown designation. In this way Latour's dragoons, so famous throughout Europe in the days of the early Revolution wars, when General Latour died took the name of General Vincent, whereby a fine tradition was destroyed, the self-esteem of the regiment injured, and their zeal materially weakened. Now it happened on the first day of Wagram that the archduke, seeing that his centre was on the point of being broken by Oudinot's corps, decided to attack this with cavalry, and ordered Vincent's dragoons, who were at hand, to charge. They did so, but without vigour ; they were beaten off, and the French ad- vance continued. Again the archduke sent the regiment at them, and again it recoiled before our battalions. The Austrian line was pierced. In this emergency the archduke, hastening to meet the regiment, stopped it in its flight, and, to shame it for its lack of vigour, said in a loud voice, * Vincent's Dragoons, it is easy to see that you are no longer Latour's Dragoons 1 '
BERNADOTTS IN TROUBLE 385
Humiliated by this cutting but deserved reproach, they replied, ' Yes, yes, we are ! ' * Well, then,' cried the archduke, draw- ing his sword, ' show yourselves worthy of your old fame, and follow me ! ' A bullet struck him, but he flew upon the French. Vincent's regiment followed him with ardour ; their charge was terrible, and Oudinot's grenadiers fell back with heavy loss. This is how an able and energetic general contrives to turn everything to account which can restore the shaken courage of his men. The archduke's address kindled the dragoons to such a degree that after stopping Oudinot's grenadiers, they charged Lamarque's division, and recaptured 2,000 prisoners and five stand of colours which it had just taken. In compli- menting the dragoons the archduke said, ' Now you can be proud to bear the name of Vincent, which you have just made no less illustrious than that of Latour.' This regiment was one of those which on the following day contributed most to the rout of Boudet's division of infantry.
Among the multitude of episodes to which the battle of Wagram gave rise, the most important, and one which pro- duced very strong feeling in the army, has not been related by any author. I mean the disgrace of General Bernadotte, who was ordered off the field by the Emperor. Between these two eminent persons no love was ever lost ; and since the con- spiracy of Rennes, got up by Bernadotte against the Consular Government,1 they had been on very bad terms. This notwith- standing, Napoleon had included Bernadotte in the first crea- tion of marshals, and made him Prince of Ponte Corvo at the request of Joseph Bonaparte, whose sister-in-law Bernadotte had married. Nothing, however, could appease Bernadotte's hatred and envy of Napoleon. He flattered him to his face, and afterwards, as the Emperor well knew, criticised and found fault. The ability and courage which he had shown at Auster- litz would have induced the Emperor to overlook his misdeeds had he not aggravated them by his conduct at Jena. In spite of the urgent requests of his generals, he let his three divisions remain wholly inactive, refusing to support Davout, who a league away, at Auerstadt, was withstanding half the Prussian army under the King in person, and ultimately beat them. The army and all France were indignant with Bernadotte ; but the Emperor did no more than reprimand him severely. Stimulated by this, the marshal did well at Hall and Lubeck, but soon fell back into his customary laziness, ill-will possibly, and, in spite
'[Sec chap, xv.] 25
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of orders, was two days late for the battle of Eylau. This luke- warm conduct roused afresh the Emperor's dissatisfaction, which grew more and more during the campaign in Austria. Bernadotte, in command of a corps of Saxons, always came up late, acted without energy, and criticised not only the Emperor's tactics, but the way in which the other marshals handled their troops. The Emperor, however, restrained his irritation until on the first day of the battle of Wagram Bernadotte's lack of vigour and false tactics allowed the Austrians to retake the im- portant position of Deutsch- Wagram. It seems that after this repulse Bernadotte said to some officers that the crossing of the Danube and subsequent action had been mismanaged, and that if he had been in command he could by a scientific manoeuvre have compelled the archduke to surrender almost without a blow. This remark was reported the same evening to the Emperor, who was naturally angry. Such were the terms on which Napoleon and Bernadotte stood when the undecided action was resumed on the 6th.
We have seen that, when the battle was at its height, the Saxons, badly handled by Bernadotte, were repulsed and charged by the enemy's cavalry, being flung in disorder upon Mass^na's corps, which they nearly carried with them. The Saxons are brave, but the best of troops are sometimes routed ; and in such cases it is of no use for the officers to try to rally the men who are within reach of the enemy's sabres and bayonets. Generals and colonels should get as quickly as possible to the head of the flying mass, then face about, and by their presence and their words arrest the movement of retreat, and re-form the battalions. In conformity with this rule, Ber- nadotte, whose personal bravery was unquestioned, galloped oft into the plain at the head of his staff, to get in front of the fugitives and stop them. Hardly was he clear of the throng, when he found himself face to face with the Emperor, who ob- served ironically, * Is that the scientific manoeuvre by which you were going to make the archduke lay down his arms ? ' Berna- dotte's vexation at the rout of his army was heightened by learn- ing that the Emperor knew of his inconsiderate remark of the previous day, and he remained speechless. Presently recover- ing himself, he tried to mutter some words of explanation ; but the Emperor in a severe and haughty tone, said : * I remove you, sir, from the command of the army corps, which you handle so badly. Withdraw at once, and leave the Grand Army within twenty-four hours ; a bungler like you is no good to me.' Therewith he turned his back on the marshal, and,
THE DISGRACED MARSHAL 387
taking command for the moment of the Saxons, restored order in their ranks, and led them again to meet the enemy.
Under any circumstances, Bernadotte would have been in despair at such an outburst ; but as he had been ordered to leave the field at the moment when he was galloping ahead of the fugitives, which might give an opening for slanderous tongues to reflect on his courage, though the object of his retreat was to check that of his soldiers, he understood how much worse it made his position, and it is asserted that in his despair he wished to throw himself on the enemy's bayonets. His aides-de-camp, however, held him back, and took him away from the Saxon troops. All day long he strayed about the battlefield, and stayed towards evening behind our left wing at the village of Leopoldau, where his officers persuaded him to pass the night in the pretty little chateau belonging to that place. Hardly, however, was he established, when Masse'na, who had ordered his head-quarters to be fixed at Leopoldau, came to take possession of the same house. As it is customary for generals to be quartered in the midst of their troops, and not to lodge in villages where their colleagues' regiments are, Bernadotte wished to give way to Mass^na ; the latter, how- ever, not yet knowing of his colleague's mishap, begged him to stay and share the quarters with him, to which Bernadotte agreed. While arrangements were being made for their lodging, an officer who had witnessed the scene between the Emperor and Bernadotte came and told Mass6na of it, where- upon he changed his mind, and discovered that the house was not roomy enough for two marshals and their staffs. Wishing, however, to keep up an appearance of generosity, he said to his aides-de-camp, ' This lodging was mine by rights, but as poor Bernadotte is in trouble I must give it up to him ; find me another place — a barn, or anywhere.' Then he got into his carriage and went off without a word to Bernadotte, who felt this desertion deeply. In his exasperation he committed another and very serious mistake ; for though no longer in command of the Saxon troops, he addressed them in a general order, in which he made the most of their exploits, and consequently of his own, without waiting for the usual assignment of credit on the part of the commander-in-chief. This infringement of regulations increased the Emperor's anger, and Bernadotte was obliged to withdraw from the army and return to France.
Among the remarkable incidents of the battle of Wagram, I may mention the combat between two cavalry regiments, which, though serving in hostile armies, belonged to the same
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proprietary colonel, Prince Albert of Sachs-Teschen. He had married the celebrated Archduchess Christina of Austria, governor of the Low Countries, and, having the title of prince in both states, he possessed a regiment of hussars in Saxony and of cuirassiers in Austria. Both one and the other bore his name, and, as was the custom of both states, he appointed all the officers in each. Austria and Saxony having been at peace for many years, whenever he had an officer to place he would put him indifferently in whichever regiment had a vacancy, so that out of one family there could be found some members in the Saxon hussars, and others in the Austrian cuirassiers. Now, by an accident at once deplorable and extraordinary, these two regi- ments met on the battlefield of Wagram, and, impelled by duty and by the point of honour, they charged each other. Strange to say, the cuirassiers were broken by the hussars, who, in their desire to retrieve under the eyes of Napoleon the repulse of the Saxon infantry, fought with the greatest vigour. Indeed the Saxon infantry, though it has often shown its courage, is far from being either as solidly organised or as well trained as the cavalry, which is rightly held to be one of the best in Europe.
CHAPTER L.
You will probably now like to hear my own adventures in this terrible battle. Though frequently much exposed, especially on the second day, when the enemy's artillery converged its fire on Marshal MassSna's carriage, and we were literally under a hail of cannon-balls, which struck down a good many around me, I was lucky enough not to be wounded. I was also in consider- able danger when the Austrian cavalry had broken and routed Boudet's division, and the marshal sent me to that general in the middle of 10,000 flying soldiers, who were being hewn down by the cavalry. Again I was more than once in danger when, in carrying orders, I had to pass near some of the many spots where the corn was blazing. By frequent detours I managed to escape the flames, but it was impossible to avoid crossing the fields where the ashes of the burnt straw were still hot enough to scorch the horses' feet. Two of mine were rendered useless for some time by the injuries they thus received, and a third was in such pain that he was within an ace of rolling me over in the half-extinguished straw. However, I got through without any serious accident ; but though I escaped personal damage, a disagreeable thing befell me, which had very injurious results. On the second day of the battle I got into almost hopeless trouble with Masse'na. The way of it was this. The marshal sent me with a message to the Emperor ; I had the very greatest difficulty in reaching him, and was coming back after having galloped more than three leagues over the yet burning ashes of the corn. My horse, dead beat, and with his legs half-burnt, could go no further when I got back to Masse'na, and found him in a great difficulty. His corps was retreating before the enemy's right along the Danube, and the infantry of Boudet's division, broken by the Austrian cavalry, which was sabring them mercilessly, were flying pell-mell across the plain. It was the most critical moment of the battle. From his car- riage the marshal could see the imminent danger, and was calmly making his dispositions to maintain order in the three infantry divisions which as yet were unbroken. For this purpose he
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had been obliged to send so many aides-de-camp to his generals that he had none with him except his son, Prosper Masse'na, a young lieutenant. At that moment he saw that the fugitives from Boudet's division were making for the three divisions which were still fighting, and were on the point of flinging themselves upon their ranks, and drawing them along in a general rout. To stop this catastrophe the marshal wished to tell the generals and officers to direct the torrent of fliers to- wards the island of Lobau, where the disordered troops would find a secure shelter behind the powerful artillery. It was a dangerous mission, as there was every probability that the aide-de-camp who went into that disorderly rabble would be attacked by some of the enemy's troopers. The marshal could not make up his mind to expose his son to this danger, but he had no other officer near him, and it was clear that the order must be carried.
I came up just at the right moment to extricate Mass^na from this cruel dilemma, so, without giving me time to take breath, he ordered me to throw myself into the danger which he dreaded for his son ; but observing that my horse could hardly stand, he lent me one of his, which an orderly was leading. I was too well acquainted with military duty not to be aware that a general cannot bind himself to follow the arrangements which his aides-de-camp have made amongst themselves for taking their turn of duty, however great the peril may be ; the chief must be free in a given case to em- ploy whichever officer he thinks best suited to get his orders executed. Thus, although Prosper had not carried a single order all day, and it was his turn to go, I made no remark. I will even say that my self-esteem hindered me from divin- ing the marshal's real motive in sending me on a duty both difficult and dangerous when it ought to have fallen to another, and I was proud of his confidence in me. But Mass^na soon destroyed my illusion by saying, in a wheedling tone, ' You understand, my friend, why I do not send my son, although it's his turn ; I am afraid of getting him killed. You under- stand ? you understand ? ' I should have held my tongue, but, disgusted with such ill-disguised selfishness, I could not refrain from answering, and that in the presence of several generals : 1 Marshal, I was going under the impression that I was about to fulfil a duty ; I am sorry that you have corrected my mistake, for now I understand perfectly that, being obliged to send one of your aides-de-camp to almost certain death, you would rather it should be I than your son, but I think you might have spared
PARENTAL AFFECTION 39 1
me this cruel plain speaking.' And without waiting a reply I went off at full gallop towards Boudet's division, which the enemy's troopers were pitilessly slaughtering. As I left the carriage I heard a discussion begin between the marshal and his son, but the uproar of the battle and the speed at which I was going prevented me from catching their words. Their sense, however, was shortly explained, for hardly had I reached Boudet's division and begun doing my utmost to direct the terrified crowd towards the island of Lobau, when I beheld Prosper Mass6na at my side. The brave lad, indignant at the way in which his father had sent me into danger and wished to reduce him to inactivity, had escaped unawares to follow me. * I wish,' said he, ' at least to share the danger from which I ought to have saved you if my father's blind affection had not made him unjust to you when it was my turn to go.' The young man's noble straightforwardness pleased me ; in his place I should have wished to do the same. Still, I had rather he had been further off at this critical moment, for no one who has not seen it can form an idea of a mass of infantry which has been broken and is being actively pursued by cavalry. Sabres and lances were working terrible execution among this rabble of terrified men, who were flying in disorder instead of taking the equally easy and much safer course of forming them- selves into groups and defending themselves with the bayonet. Prosper Massena was very brave, and in no way dazed by the danger, although we found ourselves every moment in this chaos face to face with the enemy's troopers. My position then became very critical, since I had a threefold task to fulfil. First, to parry the blows aimed at young Massena, who had never learnt the sword exercise and used his weapon clumsily ; secondly, to defend myself, and lastly, to speak to our demora- lised soldiers to make them understand that they were to go towards the island of Lobau and not towards the divisions which were still in line. Neither of us received any wound, for when the Austrian troopers perceived that we were deter- mined to defend ourselves vigorously, they left us, and turned their attention to the unresisting foot-soldiers.
When troops are in disorder, the soldiers fling themselves like sheep in the direction where they see their comrades run- ning, and thus, as soon as I had imparted the marshal's orders to a certain number of officers, and they had shouted to their people to run towards the island, the stream of fugitives made in that direction. I found General BouJet at last, and he succeeded under the fire of our guns in rallying his troops. My task was
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thus at an end, and I returned with Prosper towards the mar- shal. But in my desire to take the shortest road, I imprudently passed near a clump of trees, behind which some hundred Austrian uhlans were posted. They charged upon us unawares, we meanwhile making at full speed for a line of French cavalry which was coming our way. We were none too soon, for the enemy's squadron was on the point of reaching us, and was pressing us so close that I thought for a moment that we were going to be killed or taken prisoners. But at the approach of our men the uhlans wheeled about, all but one officer, who, being admirably mounted, would not leave us without having a shot at us. One bullet pierced the neck of Prosper's horse, and the animal, throwing up his head violently, covered young Massena's face with blood. I thought he was wounded, and was getting ready to defend him against the uhlan officer, when we were met by the advanced files of the French regiment. These, firing their carbines at the Austrian officer, laid him dead on the spot, just as he was turning to gallop off.
Prosper and I then returned to the marshal, who uttered a cry of grief on seeing his son covered with blood. But on finding that he was not wounded he gave free vent to his anger, and in the presence of several generals, his own aides-de-camp, and two orderly officers of the Emperor's, he scolded his son roundly, and ended his lecture with the words, ' Who ordered you to go and stick your head into that row, you young idiot ? ' Prosper's answer was really sublime. ' Who ordered me ? My honour ! This is my first campaign. I am already lieutenant and member of the Legion of Honour ; I have received several foreign decorations, and so far I have done nothing for them. I wished to show my comrades, the army, and France that if I am not destined to have the military talent of my illustrious father, I am at least worthy by my courage to bear the name of Massena.' Seeing that his son's noble statements met with the approbation of all the bystanders, the marshal made no answer ; but his anger fell chiefly on me, whom he accused of having carried his son away, when on the contrary his presence was a great hindrance to me. The two orderly officers having reported at head-quarters the scene between the marshal and his son, Napoleon heard of it, and happening to come that evening to Leopoldau, sent for Prosper, and said to him, taking him in a friendly way by the ear : ' Good, very good, my dear boy ; that is how young people like you ought to start on their career.' Then turning to the marshal, he said in a low tone, but loud enough to be heard by General Bertrand, from whom I have
in pursuit 393
the story, * I love my brother Louis no less than you your son ; but when he was my aide-de-camp in Italy he did his turn of duty like the others, and I should have been afraid of bringing him into discredit if I had sent one of his comrades into danger instead of him.' This reproof from the Emperor, in addition to the answer which I had been foolish enough to make to Masse*na, naturally set him still more against me. From that day forward he never addressed me with tu, and although out- wardly he treated me well, I knew that the grudge would, remain, and as you will see I was not mistaken.
Never again did the Austrians fight with so much vigour as at Wagram ; their retreat was admirable for its coolness and good order. They had, no doubt, the advantage, for the reasons I have stated, of leaving the field without being pursued ; but I am not able to explain the reason for Napoleon's delay in following them up on the ensuing morning. It has been said that as the roads both to Bohemia and to Moravia were in front of him, the Emperor was awaiting the result of recon- noissances in order to know what force the archduke had on each of these roads. Reconnoissances, however, can only give very incomplete information, since the enemy's rear-guard very soon brings them to a halt, and they can see nothing beyond. Precious time was therefore lost uselessly ; we had seen the enemy's columns marching off on both the roads, and should have pursued them at day-break on the 7th by one or the other. However that may be, the Emperor did not commence the pursuit till 2 p.m., and went himself no more than three leagues, staying the night at the chateau of Volkersdorf, from which the Emperor of Austria had on the two previous days watched the battle. General Vandamme was left in command at Vienna, General Reynier in the island of Lobau, Oudinot at Wagram, and Macdonald at Floridsdorf. His rear thus secured, Napo- leon sent Marmont and Davout in pursuit on the road to Moravia, and Mass^na on that to Bohemia. The Army of Italy and the guard marched between the two high roads, ready to give support where it was wanted.
The stronger portion of the Austrian army was on the road to Bohemia. The archduke had made good use of the night of the 6th, and so much of the 7th as Napoleon had allowed him, and his baggage wagons and artillery were well out of our reach. On leaving the field of battle we fell in with the scouts of the enemy's rear-guard in the defile of Langen-Enzersdorf, a long and narrow passage which would have been fatal to the archduke if, on the previous day, we had been able to push him
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back to it. Passing this we entered a wide plain, in the middle of which stands Korn-Neuburg, a small walled town. Here the rear-guard, composed of nine battalions of Croats and Tyrolese Jagers, with a strong body of cavalry and plenty of guns, awaited us in impressive tranquillity. No doubt it is right in war to be enterprising, especially in presence of an already beaten foe ; but this rule must not be followed beyond the limits of prudence. French cavalry generals are often too venturesome. Here they repeated the fault which Montbrun had committed before Raab in the previous June, when he would not wait for the infantry, and, leading his squadrons too near the fortress, suffered heavily from its artillery. In spite of that severe lesson, General Bruyere, who had succeeded Lasalle in the command of the light cavalry of Massena's corps, having the lead when we emerged from the defile, would not wait for the infantry to pass him and form in the plain. Deploying his squadrons, he advanced towards the enemy, who, remaining quite still, let him come within cannon-range, then opened a heavy fire, under which he lost heavily. At sight of this Massena got very angry, and sent me to Bruyere to express his dissatisfaction. I found the general at the head of his division, under a storm of balls, brave enough, but much vexed at having run into this risk, and much perplexed as to his best course. If he charged the Austrian cavalry, of twice his own numbers, he would have his division cut up. On the other hand, if he retreated to get out of range, and await the infantry, it was certain that the enemy's cavalry would be on him as soon as he had faced about, and would drive him back on our battalions, as they issued from the defile. The only other thing was to stay where he was, and wait for the infantry ; and this seemed the least of evils, as I permitted myself to tell General Bruyere, when he did me the honour to ask my advice. When I repeated it to the marshal, he approved, but was still in a high rage with the general, exclaiming every moment : * Can you conceive anyone getting his people killed like that for no good ? ' Meanwhile he hurried up Legrand's division, and, as soon as it was formed, sent the 26th to attack Korn-Neuburg. The place was taken, and the enemy's cavalry driven back by Bruyere's squadrons, who much preferred the danger of a charge to being pounded, as they had been for half-an-hour, by the artillery. The general behaved like a hero in the hand-to-hand fighting, which did not save him from being sharply reprimanded by the marshal. On the 8th Mass6na continued the pursuit, but we only had a slight engagement. We occupied the town of Stockerau,
UNFORTUNATE HOLLABRUNN 395
taking large stores of provisions, especially wine, which delighted the soldiers. Continuing on the 9th, the army was stopped by a strong force, before Hollabrunn. A brisk fight ensued, in which General Bruyere, remembering his mistake, handled his division more prudently, but exposed himself freely, and got severely wounded. The unlucky town of Hollabrunn, hardly rebuilt after the fire in 1805,1 was again reduced to ashes, and again many wounded men were buried in the ruins. The enemy withdrew with loss.
During the night of the 9th the marshal sent me to the Emperor with a report of the action. After a long march, and frequently losing my way in country roads, I reached Napoleon, still at the chateau of Volkersdorf. His Majesty had just learned that a great part of the Austrian army, leaving the road to Moravia, was marching towards Laa, to cross the Taya, and rejoin the archduke at Znaym, and had sent Marmont in haste to follow them. He took the same direction himself on the 10th, while Davout pushed on to Nikolsburg, and took it. I was sent back to Massena with orders to march quickly on Znaym, where the enemy appeared to be concentrating, with the view of again giving battle. All through the 10th the enemy's rear-guard retreated steadily before Masse'na's corps. After its losses at Hollabrunn, some disorder began to show itself, and we made a great many prisoners. The same day, Prince Liechtenstein appeared at our outposts with a flag of truce, to ask for an armistice on the part of the Austrian commander-in-chief. Massena sent him on to Napoleon with one of his officers, but by the time they reached Volkersdorf the Emperor had set out for Laa, and the flag of truce only reached him the next evening at Znaym, a delay which cost a good many lives. The Austrian rear-guard, after retreating all day without fighting, in the evening disputed our entrance into the village of Guntersdorf. There was a brisk artillery engage- ment, in the course of which a ball struck Masse'na's carriage, and another killed one of the horses. Luckily, the marshal had got out five minutes before. We repulsed the enemy at length, and passed the night at Guntersdorf.
In war, spies are indispensable. Mass6na used to employ in this capacity two Jews, brothers, very intelligent men, who, in order to get accurate information, and earn higher pay, used to slip in among the Austrian columns, under guise of selling fruit and wine ; then, falling to the rear, they would wait till the
1 [See p. 153.]
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French came up, and report to the marshal. While he was at Hollabrunn, he had promised a large sum to one of these Jews if he would get him, by the next evening, an approximate * state ' of the forces in front of us. Tempted by this bait, the Israelite travelled all night by country roads, reached the head of the Austrian army, and climbed a leafy tree in a wood, where he was able to command a view of the road without being seen. As the columns filed past, the Jew entered in a note-book the strength of each arm. While he was thus occupied, a sergeant of Jagers entered the wood for a few moments' rest, and lay down just at the foot of the tree in which the Jew was perched. In his alarm the spy probably made some movement in order to hide himself; the note-book fell from his hand, and dropped by the sergeant's side. Looking up, he saw a man amongst the topmost branches, and took aim at him, ordering him to come down. The miserable Jew was forced to obey, and was taken before an Austrian general, who, on seeing the accusing note-book, had him bayonetted. He lay on the road till the French army came up, some hours later. As soon as the second Jew, who was with us at that moment, beheld his brother's corpse, he broke out into fearful shrieks ; then, collecting him- self, he rummaged the dead man's pockets. Finding nothing there, however, he cursed the enemy for, as he said, stealing from him the money which his brother had with him ; and, finally, so that he might at least inherit something from him, he took all his clothes, in order to sell them later on. There you have a good picture of the Jewish character 1
CHAPTER LI.
On July ii, an ill-omened day for me, Mass6na's corps appeared before Znaym about 10 a.m., and half a league to our right we could see Marmont's divisions on the plateau of Teswitz, which they had reached by the road from Laa to Brunn. By mid-day the Emperor and his guard were at Zuckerhandel, and the Army of Italy not far away. The town of Znaym is surrounded by a solid wall, and stands on a vine- clad hill, at the foot of which runs the river Taya and a large brook named Lischen, which joins the Taya below Teswitz. Thus the hill of Znaym forms a position entrenched by nature, for the banks at most points bristle with steep rocks difficult ol access. The ground falls towards the village of Oblass, through which runs the Vienna road, by which we arrived.
Having had no answer to his proposal of an armistice, the archduke resolved to profit by the good position which he occupied, and risk the chance of another battle. Accordingly he formed his army in two lines, the first having its right on the Taya near Klosterbruck, its centre opposite Teswitz, and its left reaching to Kukrowitz. The second line occupied Znaym, the Galgenberg, and Brenditz, with the reserves in rear ; while a swarm of skirmishers defended the vineyards between Znaym and the two streams.
On arriving before Oblass Mass6na occupied that village and the double bridge which crosses the river at the so-called 1 Pheasants' Island.' Legrand's division, after capturing it, went on towards Alt-Schallersdorf and Klosterbruck, a large convent turned into a tobacco factory. Here our troops met with a brisk resistance, and as our artillery were unable to pass through the vines, and had consequently to fire uphill from the bank of the river, it was unable to afford them any support. The marshal regretted that his inability to mount his horse prevented him from going to see for himself what could be done to remedy this state of things ; whereupon I ventured to say that having explored the ground before the attack, I thought that a battery going from Oblass along the right bank of the river, and
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taking up its position above the village of Edelspitz, might do good service. Mass6na, thanking me for the suggestion, ordered me to guide six guns to the spot named ; and these, taking in rear the troops defending Klosterbruck and Alt- Schallersdorf, did so much execution among them that they quickly abandoned those two positions to our troops. As the marshal was congratulating himself on the effect produced by this battery, I went up and suggested taking another to the Kuhberg, the highest ground on the left bank, which could be reached by strengthening the teams. He agreed; and after some trouble I got eight guns on to the Kuhberg, whence they could play full on the Austrians massed in front of Znaym ; so that I have no doubt but that, if the battle had continued, our battery on the Kuhberg would have been of great use by forcing the enemy to retire within the place. It is the best point from which to reduce the fortress of Znaym with artillery.
While this brisk cannonade was going on, a fearful storm burst over the district. In a moment everything was under water ; the Taya overflowed ; not a gun or musket could be fired. General Legrand's troops took shelter in Klosterbruck and Schallersdorf, and most of all in the cellars hollowed out among the vineyards. But while our soldiers, unheeding the enemy, whom they supposed to be under shelter in Znaym, were emptying the casks, the archduke, informed doubtless of this carelessness, and wishing to cutoff the retreat of Legrand's division, sent a column of a thousand men from the town. Marching at the double down the high road, they went through Alt- Schallersdorf, and reached the first bridge at Oblass just as I was coming down the Kuhberg. I had gone up by way of Neu- Schallersdorf, having brought my guns from Oblass ; but when I went back alone it seemed useless to go so far round, as I knew that all the ground between Znaym and the Taya was occupied by our infantry. So, as soon as I reached the little bridge between Edelspitz and Pheasants' Island, I crossed the Taya to reach the large bridges on the high road opposite Oblass, where I had left the marshal. Just as I had got on to the causeway connecting these two bridges, I heard behind me, in spite of the storm, the sound of many feet marching in time. Turning my head I beheld a column of Austrian grenadiers not twenty-five paces away. My first impulse was to go off at full speed to warn the marshal and his troops ; but to my great surprise I found the bridge nearest to Oblass occupied by a brigade of French cuirassiers. General Guiton, who com- manded it, knowing that Legrand was on the other side of
THR SURPR1SRRS SURPRISRD 399
the river, and having received an indistinct order, was quietly advancing at a walk. I had hardly time to say, ' There is the enemy,' when the general saw them, drew his sword, and shouting ' Gallop ! ' flew at the Austrian grenadiers. Having come to attack us unawares, they were so astounded at being thus unexpectedly attacked themselves that the foremost ranks had hardly time to bring their bayonets down. In a moment the three battalions were literally rolled over under the hoofs of the cuirassiers' horses, not one remaining on his legs. One only was killed ; we took all the rest prisoners, with three guns which they had brought to fortify the Pheasants' Island.
Their return to the offensive would have had awkward results for us, if the archduke had carried it out with more troops, and at the same time attacked Legrand's division in the vineyards. Unable to retreat by the bridges, our men would have undergone a severe reverse. But the Austrian general miscalculated when he flattered himself that a thousand of his men on the Pheasants' Island could have held it against three of our divisions, while Legrand's division, when attacked itself, would certainly have tried to force a passage. Thus, caught between two fires, the thousand grenadiers would equally have had to surrender, though General Guiton's unexpected attack doubtless saved much loss of life. Emboldened by their suc- cess, though not knowing the ground, the cuirassiers charged right up to the gates of Znaym, General Legrand's infantry hurrying up to their support, and the town was nearly carried. But superior forces, backed by powerful artillery, forced the French back to Alt-Schallersdorf and Klosterbruck, when Mas- se*na sent Carra-Saint Cyr's infantry division to their support.
At this moment, the Emperor, posted on the heights of Zuckerhandel, ordered Marshal Marmont to debouch from Teswitz and get in touch with Mass^na's right. The battle was spreading gradually, and in order to get nearer to it, Napoleon came to Teswitz. Mass^na sent me to his Majesty to report, and I came back with orders to carry the town at any cost. Our battery on the Kuhberg was hammering it, and Marmont was about to assault by the valley of the Leska. As they beat the charge on all sides, the sound of the drums, muffled by the rain, mingled with the thunder. Our troops, in good spirits, advanced bravely against the battalions which were stoutly awaiting them in their position before Znaym ; only an occasional shot came from the houses. Everything foretold a bloody bayonet fight, when an officer from the Emperor galloped up with an order for Massena to cease firing, as an armistice had
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just been concluded. The marshal at once sent officers with the news to the different points of the line, and appointed me by name to go towards that one of our brigades which was nearest to the town and had the smallest distance to cross in order to reach the enemy. Coming up in the rear of these regiments I vainly tried to speak ; my voice was drowned by cries of ' Vive l'Empereur ! ' which always preceded a fight, and the bayonets were already crossing. A moment longer, one of those terrible infantry tussles would take place, which once started, cannot be checked. I hesitated no longer, and passing through the files I got between the lines, which were on the point of meeting. As I was shouting ' Peace ! peace ! ' and with my left hand giving the sign for a halt, suddenly a bullet from the outskirts of the town struck me on the wrist. Some of our officers, understanding at length that I brought the order to suspend hostilities, halted their companies ; others, seeing the Austrian battalions within a hundred paces, were doubtful. At the same moment, an aide-de-camp from the archduke also came between the two lines, with a view of preventing the attack, and got a bullet through his shoulder, from the same quarter. I hastened towards him, and to make both sides see for what purpose we had been sent, we testified it by embracing each other. At sight of this, the officers on both sides had no more hesitation about ordering a halt. Flocking round us they learned that an armistice had been agreed on. There were mutual congratulations ; the Austrians returned to Znaym, and our troops to their former position.
The blow which I received had been so sharp that I thought my wrist was broken ; luckily it was nothing of the kind, but the bullet had injured the tendon. None of my many wounds have caused me so much pain ; I had to carry my arm in a sling for six months. My wound, however, was far less severe than that of the Austrian aide-de-camp. He was quite a young man, full of pluck, and in spite of what had happened would come with me to Mass^na, quite as much to see the famous old warrior as to carry a message which the archduke had sent by him. As we were going together to Klosterbruck, the Austrian officer, who was losing blood freely, nearly fainted, and I proposed to take him back to Znaym. But he persisted in coming with me to be treated by the French surgeons, who, he said, were much better than those of his own army. His name was Count d'Aspre, and he was the nephew of the general of that name who was killed at Wagram. Mass^na received him kindly, and took every sort of care of him. As for me,
WHO GAVE THE ORDER t 40 1
the marshal, seeing me wounded again, felt bound to agree with all the officers, and even the soldiers of the brigade, who praised my devotion in going between the two armies to pre- vent bloodshed. Napoleon came round the bivouacs in the evening, and expressed his satisfaction with me in lively terms, adding, ' You get wounded very often, but I will reward your zeal.' He had formed a plan of creating a military order of the Three Fleeces, the knights of which were bound to have had at least six wounds, and I learnt afterwards that his Majesty had entered me on the list of officers to receive this decoration, of which I shall have to speak hereafter. He asked to see M. d'Aspre, who had devoted himself as I had, and gave him many complimentary messages for the archduke.
While deeming it fortunate that the cuirassiers had reached the bridges just at the moment when the Austrian grenadiers were going to take possession of them, Napoleon was surprised that heavy cavalry should have been sent across the river on to a hill-side, where the only passage was a high road with steep sides among vineyards. No one, therefore, admitted having given the order ; it came neither from the marshal nor from his chief of staff, and as the general of cuirassiers could not point out the officer who had brought it, the author of this lucky blunder remained unknown.
In the few minutes during which the grenadiers occupied Pheasants' Island, they captured three of our generals, Fririon, chief of Mass^na's staff, Lasouski, and Stabenrath, and relieved them in a trice of their purses and silver spurs. The generals, who had been set free the next moment by our cuirassiers, treated their short captivity as a good joke.
I have mentioned that before I received my wound, and im- mediately after the brilliant charge of the cuirassiers, the marshal had ordered me to report it to the Emperor at Zuckerhandel. As the storm had made it impossible to ford the Taya, I had to cross it in front of Oblass, by the Pheasants' Island bridges, just as Marshal Marmont's troops were debouching from Tes- witz. The enemy's artillery had opened a terrible fire upon them, so that the ground near the river was ploughed up by the balls. But as there was no means of taking another road without going a long way round, I took that line. I had left Oblass with Major de Talleyrand Pe'rigord, who was on the im- perial staff, and was returning after bringing an order to Mass£na. He had already been that way, and offered to guide me. As he was going in front of me along the narrow path beside the right bank of the Taya, the enemy's fire increased, and we quickened
26
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our pace. All of a sudden a confounded soldier of the trans- port corps, his horse laden with plundered chickens and ducks, came out from the willows on the river bank, a few paces from M. de Talleyrand, and went off along the path at full gallop. But his horse being knocked over by a cannon-ball, that of M. Talleyrand, who was just behind him, tumbled over its body, and came down with a crash. Seeing my companion fall, I dismounted to help him up, a difficult job, for one of his feet was entangled in the stirrup under the horse's body. The transport man, instead of helping us, ran and hid among the trees, and I was left alone to perform a task which was made all the more troublesome by the cannon-balls pitching all round us, and by the fact that the enemy's skirmishers were pushing ours back, and might come upon us. I could not, however, leave a com- rade in this awkward position, so I set to work, and after in- credible efforts I was lucky enough to get the horse up, and put M. de Talleyrand back in his saddle, and we resumed our course. I felt all the more deserving because I had never met my com- panion before ; he expressed his gratitude in the warmest terms, and when we had got to Zuckerhandel, and I had delivered my message to the Emperor, I was congratulated by all the officers of the head-quarters staff. M. de Talleyrand had told them what I had done, and kept repeating, ' That's what you may call a first-rate comrade.' Some years afterwards, on my return from the exile to which I was condemned at the Restoration, M. de Talleyrand, then general of the royal guard, received me pretty coldly. However, when I met him twenty years later at Milan, whither I accompanied the Duke of Orleans, I bore him no grudge, and we shook hands. It was on the same journey that I met M. d'Aspre at Cremona ; he was then a general in the Austrian service, having been till 1836 in that of Spain. Later on, he was second in command of the Army of Italy, under the famous Marshal Radetzky.
But to return to Znaym. The Austrians evacuated the town, and Massena fixed his head-quarters there, his army corps encamping in the neighbourhood. By the armistice a third of the Austrian monarchy with eight million inhabitants had been provisionally given up to Napoleon — a powerful guarantee of peace.
M. d'Aspre, being too badly hurt to rejoin his own army, stayed at Znaym. I saw much of him ; he was a quick-witted man, but rather excitable. I too had a good deal of pain from my wound, and could not ride ; therefore, Massena sent me with despatches for the Emperor, bidding me post to Vienna,
TWO BRAVE MEN 403
where he and the staff soon came. Our people and horses remained at Znaym. Peace took a long time to conclude, Napoleon wishing to crush Austria, while the Austrians were encouraged to hold out for better terms by the news that the English had landed in Holland and taken Flushing. Cam- baceres, who governed France during the Emperor's absence, sent all available troops to the Scheldt, putting (much to Napo- leon's displeasure) Bernadotte in command. The English withdrew before long.1 The conferences were resumed, and went on no faster. We continued to occupy the country, and Massena's head-quarters remained at Vienna till November 10. My wound prevented me from taking any part in the amuse- ments of the place, but I was kindly treated by the Countess Stibar, on whom I was quartered. At Vienna I found my friend, General Sainte-Croix, who was kept some months in bed by his wound. He was quartered in the Lobkowitz palace, where Massena was. I passed much time with him every day, and told him about the dislike which the marshal seemed to have conceived for me since the incident at Wagram. As he had great influence with Massena, he used it in my favour, and this, with my conduct at Znaym, restored me to a fairly good place in the marshal's esteem ; but then by overplain speaking I destroyed the good result, and revived the marshal's ill-will towards me.
As I have told you, the injury to his leg caused by the fall from his horse at Lobau had compelled Massena to use a carriage at the battle of Wagram and the subsequent actions. In the first instance, artillery horses were to be harnessed to the carriage, but it was found that they were too long for the pole and not easy enough in their action, so four horses from the marshal's stable were substituted. Two soldiers from the transport train were to drive, and they were just getting into the saddle on the evening of July 4, when the marshal's own coachman and postilion declared that as he was using his own horses it was their business to drive. No representation of the danger into which they were running could deter them from their purpose ; the coachman got on the box and the postilion mounted just as if they were going for a drive in the Bois de Boulogne. The two brave servants were in constant danger for eight days, especially at Wagram, where many hundred men were killed close to the carriage, and at Guntersdorf, where the ball which struck the carriage went through the
J[The unlucky * Walcheren Expedition.']
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coachman's overcoat, and another ball killed the horse under the postilion. Nothing seemed to frighten these two faithful attendants, whose devotion was admired by the whole army. Even the Emperor complimented them, and observed once to Massena : * There are 300,000 combatants on the field ; now do you know who are the two bravest ? Your coachman and your postilion. For all the rest of us are here in pursuance of our duty, while these two men might have excused themselves from being exposed to death. Their merit is therefore greater than that of anyone else.' To the men themselves he called out : * You are two brave fellows ! ' Napoleon would certainly have rewarded them, but he could only give them money, and he probably thought that this might offend Massena, in whose service the danger had been incurred, and, indeed, it was the marshal's business, and all the more so that he had an enor- mous fortune ; 200,000 francs as army leader, another 200,000 as Duke of Rivoli, and 500,000 as Prince of Essling. But for all that he allowed two months to pass without telling the men what he meant to do for them. One day when I and several of the aides-de-camp happened to be by Sainte-Croix's bedside, Mass6na came into the room, and as we chatted over the events of the campaign, he said how fortunate it was that he had followed my advice and gone on to the field in a carriage in- stead of being carried by grenadiers, and thence he naturally went on to speak of the plucky conduct of his coachman and postilion. He ended by saying that he wished to reward them well, and was going to give each of them 400 francs. Then, turning to me, he had the face to ask if the two men would not be pleased ? I had better have held my tongue, or merely suggested a rather higher sum ; but I made the mistake of speaking too ^plainly and mischievously into the bargain. I knew perfectly well that Massena only intended to give them 400 francs down ; but I answered that with a pension of 400 francs added to their savings, the coachman and postilion would be secured from want in their old age. The eyes of a tigress who sees her young attacked by the hunter are not more terrible than were Massena's on hearing me speak thus. He leapt from his chair, exclaiming : ' Wretch ! do you want to ruin me ? What ! an annuity of 400 francs ? No, no, no : 400 francs once for all ! ' Most of my comrades prudently held their peace ; but General Sainte-Croix and Major Ligniville declared plainly that the proposed reward was unworthy of the marshal, and that he ought to make it an annuity. At this Mass6na could restrain himself no longer ; he rushed about the room in a rage,
THE FATE OF STABS 405
upsetting everything in his way, even large furniture, and cried, 1 You want to ruin me ! ' His last words as he left the room were, ' I would sooner see you all shot, and get a bullet through my arm, than bind myself to give an annuity of 400 francs to anyone. Go to the devil the lot of you ! ' Next day he came among us again, very calm outwardly, for no one could play a part better; but from that day forward General Sainte-Croix lost much of his esteem, and he bore a grudge against Ligni- ville which he let him see the next year in Portugal. As for me he was most angry with me of all, because I was the first to mention the annuity. The story travelled from mouth to mouth till it reached the Emperor, and one day when Massena was dining with him, Napoleon kept bantering him about his avarice, and said that he understood he had at any rate given a good pension to the two brave servants who drove his carriage at Wagram. Then the marshal answered that he was going to give them each an annuity of 400 francs ; so he did it without having to be shot through the arm. He was all the more angry with us, and often said to us with a sardonic laugh, 1 Ah ! my fine fellows, if I followed your good advice you would soon have me ruined.'
Seeing that the Austrian plenipotentiaries kept putting off the conclusion of the treaty of peace, the Emperor kept ready for war, bringing up numerous reinforcements, which he in- spected daily at the parade held in the court of the palace at Schonbrunn. The recruits attracted many sightseers, who were allowed to approach too freely ; thus one day a student named Frederick Stabs, son of a bookseller at Naumburg, and member of the secret society called the Tugendbund, or League of Virtue, took advantage of this lack of supervision to slip into the group which surrounded the Emperor. General Rapp had twice told him not to come so near, and on pushing him away for the third time he felt that the young man had arms con- cealed under his clothes. Being arrested, he confessed that he wished to deliver Germany from the Emperor's yoke by killing him. Napoleon would have spared his life and treated him as insane ; but as the doctors declared that he was not mad, and the man himself persisted in saying that if he escaped he should try to accomplish what had been a longstanding purpose, he was tried by court martial and shot.
The treaty of peace was signed on October 4 ; the Emperor left Austria on the 22nd, and it was ten days later before the troops had left the place. Then Massena permitted his officers to return to France. I left Vienna November 10, driving as
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far as Strasburg with my comrade Ligniville. I had left my servant behind to bring one of my horses on to Paris. From Strasburg I was afraid to continue my journey alone, for my arm was much swelled, and I was in great pain. Fortunately, I found at my hotel the surgeon-major of the ioth Chasseurs, who was kind enough to dress my wound and to share my carriage as far as Paris, taking care of me on the way. The doctor left the army, and settled in Chantilly, where I met him, twenty years later, at the table of the Duke of Orleans, as com- mandant of the national guard. I was still very poorly when I reached Paris, but rest and my mother's care soon made me well. Thus ended the year 1809. Now, if you recollect that I began at Astorga, in Spain, during the campaign against the English, and then took part in the siege of Saragossa, where I got a bullet through my body ; if you consider that I had next to cross part of Spain, and the whole of France and Germany ; that I was present at the battle of Eckmuhl ; mounted the walls of Ratisbon ; performed the risky passage of the Danube at Molk ; fought for two days at Essling, where I was wounded in the leg ; then was engaged for sixty hours at the battle of Wagram ; and, lastly, was wounded in the arm at the action at Znaym, you will agree that this year had been very eventful for me, and had seen me pretty frequently in danger.
CHAPTER LII.
Although the Minister of War had assured the marshal that everything was ready for the campaign in the Peninsula, it was nothing of the kind, and the commander-in-chief had to stay a fortnight at Valladolid, looking after the departure of the troops and the transport of stores and ammunition. At last the head- quarters were removed to Salamanca, where my brother and I were quartered with the Count of Montezuma, a lineal descen- dant of the last Emperor of Mexico. The marshal wasted three more weeks at Salamanca waiting for General Reynier's corps. These delays, while hurtful to us, were all in favour of the English.
The last Spanish town towards the Portuguese frontier is Ciudad Rodrigo, a fortress, if the strength of its works alone be considered, of the third class, but having great importance owing to its position between Spain and Portugal, in a district with few roads, and those very difficult for large guns and the apparatus of a siege train. It was, however, absolutely necessary that the French should get possession of the place. With this resolve, Mass^na left Salamanca about the middle of June, and caused Rodrigo to be invested by Ney's corps, while Junot covered the operations from the attacks of an Anglo- Portuguese army, which was encamped a few leagues from us, near the Portuguese fortress of Almeida, under Lord Wellington. Ciudad Rodrigo was defended by a brave old Spanish general of Irish origin, Andrew Herrasti.
The French, unable to believe that the English would have come so near the place just to see it captured under their eyes, expected a battle. None took place; and on July 10, the Spanish guns having been silenced, a part of the town being on fire, and the counterscarp overthrown by the explosion of a powder magazine for a space of thirty-six feet, while the ditch was filled with the ruins and the breach widely opened, Massdna resolved to give the signal for the assault. To this end Marshal Ney formed a column of 1,500 volunteers, who were to mount the breach first. Assembled at the foot of the rampart, these
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408 MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DE MARBOT
brave men were awaiting the signal to attack, when an officer expressed his fear that the breach was not yet practicable. Thereupon three of our soldiers mounted to the top of it, looked into the town, made such examination as was useful, and fired their muskets, rejoining their comrades without being wounded, although this bold feat was performed in broad daylight. Kin- dled by this example, the assaulting column advanced at a run and was on the point of dashing into the town when General Herrasti capitulated. The defence of the garrison had been very fine, but the Spanish troops composing it had good reason to complain of their desertion by the English, who had merely sent reconnoitring parties towards our camp, without attempt- ing any serious diversion. The skirmishes resulting from these nearly always turned out to our advantage. One of them was so creditable to our infantry, that the English historian Napier has been unable to refrain from doing homage to the valour of the men who took part in it. On July n the English General Craufurd, who was operating in the country between Ciudad Rodrigo and Villa de Puerco, at the head of six squadrons, having perceived at day-break a company of French grenadiers, about 120 strong, marching in the open, ordered two squadrons to attack them. But the French had time to form square, and were so cool that the enemy's officers could hear Captain Gouache and his sergeant exhorting their people to take good aim. The cavalry charged with ardour, but received such a terrible volley that they left the ground piled with dead, and had to retire. Seeing two English squadrons repulsed by a handful of French, Colonel Talbot advanced furiously with four squadrons of the 14th Dragoons and attacked Captain Gouache. Firmly awaiting the charge, he ordered a volley at point-blank range, which killed Colonel Talbot and some thirty of his men ; after which the brave Gouache retired in good order towards the French camp without the English general venturing to attack again. This brilliant affair was much talked of in the two armies.1 When the Emperor heard of it he raised Captain Gouache to major, promoted the other officers, and gave eight decorations in the company.
After having mentioned a fact so glorious for the French arms, I ought to report one no less creditable to the Spaniards. The guerrillero Don Julian Sanchez, having voluntarily shut
1 [See Napier, xi. ch. 4. He relates the incident in much the same terms, only making the strength of the French rather greater and the English loss a good deal less.]
ILLNESS 409
himself in Ciudad Rodrigo with his two hundred horsemen, did good service by making frequent attacks on our trenches. At length, when the want of forage caused the presence of 200 horses to be a trouble to the garrison, Sanchez left the town with his men one dark night, and, crossing the bridge over the Agueda,the approaches to which Ney had omitted to block, fell on our outposts, killed several men, pierced our lines, and went off to join the English army.
The siege of Rodrigo nearly cost me my life ; not by the enemy's fire, but by reason of an illness which I contracted in the following manner. The neighbourhood of the town, being infertile, is thickly inhabited, and there had been much difficulty in finding quarters for the marshal near the trenches. Finally he was put into an isolated building situated in a spot com- manding the town and suburbs. As the siege promised to last long, and there was no lodging for the staff close by, we hired, at our own cost, some planks and beams, and erected a large room, where we were sheltered from sun and rain, and slept on boards, which, though rough, kept us clear of the damp rising from the soil. But the marshal was inconvenienced from the outset in his stone building by an intolerable stench, and on inquiry it was found that the building had been used to keep sheep in. Mass^na proceeded to set his affections on our extempore house ; but, not liking to use his authority to eject us, came to see us on some pretext or other, and exclaimed as he entered : ' Well, my lads, you have a nice place here ! May I beg for a corner to put my bed and desk in? ' This, as we saw, was sharing with the lion, and we left our excellent abode in haste, to take up our quarters in the old sheep-stall. It was paved with small stones, their interstices clogged with filth, and highly uncomfortable to lie on, from the want of long straw in Spain.1 Forced thus to lie on the bare ground and inhale the fetid exhalations rising from it, we all became more or less unwell before long. I was much the worst ; for in these warm countries fever always tries most those who have already suffered from it, and my Valladolid attack returned in an aggravated form. Still I resolved to take my share in the siege, and remained on duty. Duty was often pretty laborious, especially when we had to carry orders in the night to our division on the left bank of the Agueda, which was carrying out the necessary works for the reduction of the Franciscan convent, used by the enemy as a bastion. In order to reach this poinU
1 [Cf. p. 85.]
4IO MEMOIRS OP THE BARON DE MARBOT
from the head-quarters without coming under the fire of the place, it was necessary to make a long wind to a bridge which our troops had constructed, or else cross by a ford. One night, when all was ready for the assault, and Ney only awaited Massdna's order to give the signal, it happened to be my turn for duty, and I had to take the order. It was a dark, hot night ; I was in a high fever, and streaming with perspiration when I reached the ford. I had only once crossed it in daylight, but the dragoon orderly who was with me had crossed it several times, and offered to guide me. This he did very well till he got to the middle, where it was not more than two or three feet deep ; but then he went wrong in the darkness, and our horses, stepping on big slippery stones, fell and we were in the water. There was no fear of drowning ; we scrambled on to the bank with ease ; but we were wet through. In any other circum- stances I should only have laughed at this involuntary bath ; but, though not cold, the water checked the perspiration, and I was seized with a shivering fit. I reached the convent and passed the night in the open air beside Marshal Ney. The attacking column was commanded by a major named Lefran- cois, whom I knew well. The day before he had shown me a letter from his sweetheart announcing that her father agreed to their marriage as soon as Lefrancois was lieutenant-colonel. It was with this object that he had asked permission to lead the storming party. The attack was brisk, the defence stubborn. After three hours' fighting our troops remained in possession of the convent, but poor Lefrancois was slain. His loss was much felt in the army, and grieved me deeply.
In hot countries sunrise is usually preceded by piercing cold. I was the more sensitive to it that day for having passed the night in wet clothes, so that when I returned to head-quarters I was much out of sorts. Still I had to report the result of the attack to Massena before getting into dry things. He was at that moment taking his morning walk with General Fririon, his chief of staff. In their interest in my story, or wishing to get a closer view, they gradually drew near the town, and we were not more than a cannon-shot away when the marshal let me go and rest. Hardly had I gone fifty paces from them when a gigantic shell, launched from the ramparts, fell close to them. At the fearful noise of its explosion I turned round, and, seeing nothing of the marshal and the general, who were concealed by a cloud of dust and smoke, I thought they were killed, and ran to the place. To my astonishment I found them alive and none the worse, save for some contusions from the stones which the bursting
A DISABLED SOLDIER 4 1 1
shell had thrown up. They were, however, both covered with earth, especially Massena. He had lost an eye shooting ■ some years before, and his remaining eye was so full of sand that he could not see his way, while the bruises he had received from the stones prevented his walking. It was necessary to get him out of range, however, and, as he was small and thin, I managed, ill as I was, to take him on my shoulders and carry him out of reach of the enemy's shot. I went on and told my comrades, and they brought the marshal in without the men finding out the danger which their commander-in-chief had run.
The fatigue and excitement of the last twenty-four hours increased my fever a good deal ; still I braced myself up, and contrived to hold out till the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo, on July 9.* But as from this day forward the excitement which had kept me up so far had nothing more to feed on, I must needs give in to the fever. This became so alarming that I had to be carried to the one house in the town which the French shells had left intact. It was the only time that I have been seriously ill without being wounded, and this time my life was despaired of, and I was left at Ciudad Rodrigo while the army crossed the Coa and marched on Almeida. This place not being more than four leagues as the crow flies from Ciudad Rodrigo, I could hear from my sick-bed the uproar of the cannon, and every report made me writhe with rage. Often did I try to rise, and the fruit- lessness of the attempts, by showing me how utterly weak I was, increased my wretchedness. My brother and my comrades, kept by their duty at Almeida, were far away, and my solitude was only broken by the short visits of Dr. Blancheton, who, clever as he was, could only treat me very inefficiently for want of medicaments. The air of the town was tainted by the stench of many thousands of corpses which lay unburied among the rubbish of the ruined houses. A temperature of more than eighty-five degrees, aggravating these causes of unhealthiness, soon brought typhus. Both the garrison and such of the in- habitants as had remained in the place to look after what was left of their property suffered terribly. I was left to the care of my servant, and, with all his zeal, he could not get me what I required. My illness increased and I became delirious. I re- member that there were in my room some large pictures repre- senting the four quarters of the earth. Africa, which was right in front of my bed, had at her feet a huge lion, the eyes of which seemed to be fixed on me, while I could not take mine from them.
1 [See p. 484.] ■ [July 11, according to Napier.]
412 MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DE MARBOT
At last one day I thought I saw him move, and, wishing to anticipate his attack, I tottered up, took my sword, and, striking with edge and point, I hewed the lion to pieces. After this truly Quixotic feat I fell half-fainting on the floor, where the doctor found me. He had all the pictures removed from the room, after which I grew quieter. My lucid moments were not less terrible ; it was painful to think of my melancholy situation and utter loneliness. Death on the battlefield seemed sweet to me compared to that which I expected, and I regretted not to have fallen like a soldier. To die in a bed of fever while there was fight- ing near me seemed to me a horrible, almost a shameful thing.
I had been in this dreadful position for a month, when on August 26, towards nightfall, a fearful explosion was heard. The earth trembled till I thought the house was coming down. It was the fortress of Almeida which had just blown up through the explosion of a huge powder magazine, and the disturbance was distinctly felt at Rodrigo, from which one may judge the effects which it had produced in Almeida itself. The unlucky place was destroyed from top to bottom ; not six houses remained standing. Six hundred of the garrison were killed, and many wounded ; some fifty French employed on the siege works were struck by splinters of stone. In pursuit of instructions from his Government, Lord Wellington, with the view of sparing English blood at the cost of that of his allies, after having en- trusted the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo to the Spanish troops, who had just surrendered, had left that of Almeida to the Portuguese, Colonel Cox, the governor, being the only Englishman in the place. That brave officer, not suffering himself to be intimi- dated by the horrible disaster which had just destroyed almost all his means of resistance, proposed to the garrison to continue their defence behind the ruins of the city. But the Portuguese troops, terrified, and led away by their officers, especially by Bernardo Costa, the lieutenant-governor, and Jos6 Bareiros, commanding the artillery, refused, and Colonel Cox, being un- supported, was compelled to capitulate.
It has been said that the French commander had tampered with the Portuguese officers, and that the explosion was brought about by their treason ; but this is a mistake. The only cause of the fire was neglect on the part of the garrison, who, instead of fetching the powder barrels one by one from the cellars and shutting the door behind each, had been im- prudent enough to roll a score of them at a time into the court- yard of the castle. It seems that a French shell falling on one of the barrels exploded it, and that the others forming a train
CAPTURE OF ALMEIDA 413
right up to the middle of the magazine, caused the explosion which wrecked the town and injured the fortifications. However that may be, the English brought the two Portuguese officers to trial, Costa being condemned and shot, while Bareiros succeeded in escaping. These two officers were certainly not guilty of treason ; at most they could be reproached with not having con- tinued a hopeless defence, the only result of which could have been to preserve the ruins of Almeida for a few days longer, while the English army was tranquilly encamped two leagues from the place without making any movement to aid them. After having thus got possession of Almeida, Marshal Massena, not being able to establish himself among the ruins of the town, moved his head-quarters to Fort Concepcion, on the Spanish frontier. The French x had destroyed part of the fortifications, but the buildings were sufficiently intact to afford lodging. There Massena made preparations for his expedition to Lisbon. My brother and my comrades took advantage of this interval to come and see me. Their presence increased the soothing effect which the capture of Almeida had produced on my spirits. The fever disappeared, and in a few days I was convalescent. I was eager for change of air, and, with the aid of my brother and some of my friends, I contrived to ride the short distance to Fort Concepcion. My comrades, who had feared that they would never see me again, received me most affectionately ; but the marshal, whom I had not seen since the day when I had carried him out of the range of the guns of Rodrigo, never said a word to me about my illness. After a fortnight in the fort in good air and able to rest, I recovered my full health, and was ready for the campaign in Portugal. Before relating the events of this famous and disastrous campaign I must briefly make you acquainted with what had taken place in the Peninsula since the Emperor left it in 1809.
[The next two chapters in the original are mainly compiled from Napier, book vi. chap. 5-7 and vii. chap. 1-2. They contain the account of the cap- ture of Oporto by Wellington, and bring the history up to the time of Marbot's joining the army in the Peninsula.]
1 [Napier would seem to imply that Craufurd had blown up Fort Con- cepcion before retiring to tbe Coa.]
CHAPTER LIII.
Towards the end of 1809 the Emperor had placed all the army corps in Spain under the orders of his brother Joseph ; but as he was no soldier, Napoleon only allowed him a nominal authority, and, by making Soult chief of the staff, gave him the real command of all the French troops in the south of Spain. While these were successful in capturing Seville and Cordova, and even investing Cadiz, the seat of the governing junta, General Suchet was administering Aragon and Valentia, most of the fortified towns in which he had taken by siege. Saint- Cyr and Augereau were active in Catalonia, where the warlike population was defending itself with vigour. The troops of the Young Guard were steadily keeping up an irregular warfare against the guerillas of Navarre and the northern provinces. Generals Bonnet and Drouet occupied Biscay in the Asturias ; Ney held the province of Salamanca, and Junot that of Valla- dolid. The French had evacuated Galicia, the country being too poor to maintain our troops. Such was, in brief, the position of our armies in Spain when Massena entered Portugal after taking Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida. His troops were composed as follows. The second corps of veterans from Austerlitz, who had been under Soult the previous year at Oporto, and whom General Reynier now commanded, with Merle and Heudelet as generals of division ; the sixth corps, also veterans, commanded by Ney, the divisions being under Marchand, Loison, and Mermet ; the eighth corps, composed of moderately good troops, commanded in chief by Junot, with Solignac and Clausel, the future marshal, as generals of division ; two divisions of cavalry under Montbrun, and a powerful field artillery directed by General Eble\ General Lasouski com- manded the engineers.
Deducting the garrisons left at Rodrigo, Almeida, and Sala- manca, with the sick, the total number of combatants amounted to 50,000, with sixty guns and a great quantity of ammunition chests. This was far too large a train for a rough country like Portugal, where there were scarcely any high roads. Almost
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A CONVO Y ATT A CKED 41 5
the only communications are narrow, rocky paths, often very steep, and everything is transported on mule-back. There are even districts where roads are absolutely unknown. Lastly, except in certain valleys, the soil is mostly arid, and offers insufficient resources for maintaining an army. Masse'na had therefore every reason to go through the least difficult and most productive country. He did, however, just the contrary.
Having left the neighbourhood of Almeida on September 14, 1810, the army assembled next day at Celorico, where it «aw the rich valley of the Mondego opening before it and might march on Coimbra by Sampayo and Ponte de Murcelha, over roads which, if not good, were at least tolerable. But under the influence of Major Pelet, his adviser, the marshal left the practicable country where the troops might have lived in com- fort, and went off to the right into the mountains of Viseu, where the roads are the worst in Portugal. One need only look at the map to see how unreasonable it was to go by Viseu on the way from Celorico to Coimbra ; a mistake all the greater from the fact that Viseu is separated from the Sierra d'Alcoba by high hills, which the army might have avoided by marching down the valley of the Mondego. The neighbourhood of Viseu produces no corn or vegetables, and the troops found nothing there but lemons and grapes — not very sustaining food.
Massena's expedition very nearly came to an end at Viseu through lack of foresight on the marshal's part. He made his artillery park march on the extreme right of the column outside the masses of infantry, its only escort being an Irish battalion in the French service and a company of French grenadiers. Marching in single file more than a league in length, the park was proceeding slowly and laboriously by difficult roads, when suddenly on its right flank appeared the English colonel Trant, with 4,000 or 5,000 Portuguese militia. If the enemy, profiting by his superior strength, had surrounded the convoy and made a resolute attack, all the artillery, ammunition, and provisions of the army would have been captured or destroyed. But Colonel Trant, as he himself said afterwards, could not suppose that a general of Massena's experience could have left unsup- ported a convoy so essential to the safety of his army, and supposing that a powerful escort must be close at hand, he dared to advance only with extreme caution. He confined himself, therefore, to attacking only the leading company of grenadiers, who answered by a heavy fire, killing some fifty men. The militia men recoiled in alarm, and Trant, doing what he should have done at first, overlapped a portion of the
41 6 MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DE MAR BO T
convoy. As he went forward he discovered the weakness of the escort, and sent a flag of truce to the commander, sum- moning him to surrender or he would attack him all along the line. The French officer adroitly consented to negotiate, in order to give the Irish time to come up from the rear of the convoy. They appeared at length, coming up at the double. As soon as the French officer saw them he broke off the con- ference, saying : * I cannot treat any further ; here is my general coming to my support with 8,000 men.' Each resumed his position, but Trant shortly left his and made off, thinking he had to do with the advanced guard of a strong column. Thus the artillery was saved, but the army soon learnt the danger in which it had been, and the excitement was great. Ney, Junot, Reynier, and Montbrun went straight off to Viseu and addressed strong remonstrances to General Fririon, chief of the staff. He, however, asserted that, in spite of his demands, no information of the march of the columns had been given him, everything being settled by Massena and Pelet. Horrified and indignant at this state of things, the commanders of the four corps called on Massena with a view of making well-deserved remarks on it. Ney was the speaker, and from the aide-de-camp's room we could hear him protesting ; but Massena, foreseeing that the conversation would become animated, took the generals into a more distant apartment. I do not know what was decided, but it appears that the commander-in-chief promised to change his mode of action, for in a quarter of an hour we saw Massena walking quietly in the garden, taking the arm of each of his lieutenants in turn. Unanimity seemed to be restored, but it was not for long.
As I have already said, childish reasons sometimes produce great and mischievous results. We had a striking example of it, which influenced the result of a campaign which was to have driven the English out of Portugal, but which by its failure increased their confidence in Wellington, while it seasoned the troops who did most to bring about our defeat in the fol- lowing years. All the army knew that Masse'na had brought
Mme. N to Portugal with him. This lady, having crossed
the whole of Spain in a carriage, and having remained at Sala- manca during the sieges of Rodrigo and Almeida, thought fit to follow Massena on horseback as soon as he set out to march through a country impracticable for carriages, which produced a very bad effect. The marshal, who generally took his meals alone with her, had had his table laid that day under a clump of lemon trees, the aide-de-camp's table being a hundred yards
QUARRELS 417
away in the same garden. Dinner was about to be served, when the commander-in-chief, wishing probably to cement the good relations which had just been established between him- self and his lieutenants, remarked that as each of them had several leagues to go in order to reach his head-quarters it would be best for them to dine with him before starting. All four accepted, and Mass£na, in order to prevent any further remarks on the incident of the convoy, ordered that for once the aide-de-camp's table should be set by his.
So far all went well ; but just before sitting down Masse*na
sent for Mme. N . On seeing the generals she drew back,
but he said to Ney, ' My dear marshal, kindly take Madame.' Ney turned pale, and nearly burst out ; but, restraining himself, he led the lady by the finger-tips to the table, and placed her, by Masse'na's direction, on his right. During the whole meal, however, Ney said not a word to her, but talked to Montbrun, his neighbour on the left. Mme. N , who was too quick- witted not to see how false a position she was in, was seized with a nervous attack, and fell in a faint. Then Ney, Reynier, Montbrun, and Junot left the garden, not without a vigorous and audible expression of his views on the part of Ney. Rey- nier and Montbrun also said plainly what they thought ; Junot spoke so bitterly, that I took the liberty of reminding him of
the way in which he had met Mme. N at Valladolid. He
answered, laughing, * Because an old hussar like me has his games sometimes, that is no reason for Masse'na to imitate them. Besides, I must stand by my colleagues.' From that day forward the four generals were on the worst of terms with Mass£na, who, on his side, bore them no goodwill.1
This quarrel among the chiefs could not fail to aggravate the causes making for the ill-success of the campaign. These arose mainly from an utter want of topographical knowledge of the districts in which we were fighting ; arising from the omission of the Portuguese Government — either as a defensive measure, or through indolence — to have good maps made of the kingdom. The only one in existence was as bad as could be ; so that we had, as it were, to feel our way along. There were officers in plenty who had campaigned in Portugal with Soult and Junot, but they had not been in the provinces where we were, and could be of no use as guides. On the staff we had
1 [Confirmation of these details will be found in M. Thiers's review of the causes which led to the French defeats in Portugal. (Consulat et Empire, book xl.)]
27
41 8 MEMOIRS OP THE BARON DE MAR BO T
some thirty Portuguese officers, among them two generals — the Marquis of Alorna and Count Pamplona, who had come to France in 1808 with the contingent furnished to Napoleon by the court of Lisbon. Though they had only obeyed the orders of the former Government they were proscribed by the Commission of Regency, and thus had returned to seek possession of their confiscated goods in the train of the army. Mass6na had hoped to get some useful information from these exiles; but except in the neighbourhood of Lisbon they knew nothing of their own country ; while the English, who had been going all about it for two years, knew its configuration perfectly, gaining thereby a great advantage over us.
Another cause told no less powerfully against us. Lord Wellington, being allowed a perfectly free hand by the Govern- ment, used it to compel all the people to leave their houses, destroy all provisions and mills, and retire with their cattle to Lisbon on the approach of the French, who thus were unable to obtain any information, and had to beat the country to a great distance in order to get provisions. The Spaniards had constantly refused to adopt this terrible means of resistance at the instance of the English ; but the Portuguese were more docile. We thus crossed vast districts without seeing a single inhabitant ; such an exodus had not been seen within human memory. The city of Viseu was totally deserted when we entered it, yet Masse'na halted the army there for six days. This was a second mistake added to that which he had com- mitted in leaving the valley of the Mondego. If on the mor- row of his arrival at Viseu the French general had made a rapid march and attacked the Alcoba, on which Lord Welling- ton had then very few troops, the fault might have been repaired. But our delay of six days allowed the English to ford the Mondego above Ponte de Murcelha, and to unite their army on the ridges of the Alcoba at Busaco. No mili- tary writer of any country has been able to account for Masse'na's inactivity of nearly a week at Viseu, but the marshal's staff
can testify that Mme. N 's fatigue had much to do with
delaying Masse'na and keeping him at that place. The country was in arms, and it would have been impossible to leave her behind without exposing her to the danger of being captured. Moreover, when he had made up his mind to start, Masse'na made only very short marches, halting first at Tondella. The next day, September 26, after establishing his head-quarters at Mortagoa, on the right bank of the Criz, he lost precious time in securing the lady's quarters ; and it was not till two in the
POSITION OF BUS A CO 419
afternoon that he set out with his staff for the outposts — five good leagues off, at the foot of the Alcoba.
This mountain ridge, about three leagues in length, abuts upon the Mondego to the east, and to the west is connected with detached hills of great steepness, impassable for an army. At the highest point is a convent, named Saco. The central part of the summit forms a sort of plateau, on which the English artillery was posted. It had freedom of action along the whole front of the position, and its range extended to beyond the Criz. A road passing round the ridge of Busaco afforded easy com- munication between the various portions of the enemy's army, while the slope facing towards the direction from which the French approached was, from its sharpness, well adapted for defence. The enemy's left rested on the hills above Barria ; his centres and reserves on the convent; his right on the heights, a little in rear of San Antonio de Cantara. So formid- able was the position that the English had some fear that the French commander-in-chief might not venture to attack.
When Mass^na came up on the evening of the 26th he found that the army had in his absence been posted by Ney as follows : the 6th corps on the right, at the village of Moira ; the centre facing the convent ; Reynier's corps on the left, at San Antonio; and the 8th corps, under Junot, with the artillery, marching to take up a position in reserve in rear of the centre. The cavalry, under Montbrun, was at Bienfaita.
When an army has undergone a check it is but too common to find the generals throwing the blame on each other. This happened after Busaco, and thus it is necessary to mention here the opinion expressed before the battle by Mass£na's lieu- tenants, who, having first urged him on to the commission of his greatest blunder, after the unfortunate event criticised his con- duct. I have said that on the day but one before the battle the corps under Ney and Reynier were at the foot of the Alcoba, and in presence of the enemy. While impatiently waiting for the commander-in-chief, these two generals exchanged in writing their respective views on the position of the Anglo-Portuguese army. There exists a letter,1 dated on the morning of Septem- ber 26, in which Marshal Ney says to General Reynier, * If I were in command I would attack without a moment's hesitation.' Both expressed the same feeling in their correspondence with Massena : * The position is far less formidable than it looks, and if I had not been in so subordinate a position I would have
1 [It will be found in the Appendix to Napier, vol. Hi.]
420 MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DB MARBOT
carried it without awaiting your orders.' Relying on the assur- ance of Generals Reynier and Junot that nothing could be easier, Massena made (although the contrary has since been affirmed) not the smallest attempt to reconnoitre, and, merely replying, ■ Very well, I will be back at daybreak, and we will attack,' he turned and rode back to Mortagoa. Great was the astonishment at this abrupt departure, for, seeing Massena join his troops, who were encamped within cannon-shot of the enemy, everyone supposed that he would use the remaining daylight to study the position which he had to carry, and would stay with the army. In going off thus, without seeing anything for himself, he no doubt made a great mistake ; but I do not think that, after lulling to sleep his usual vigilance and urging him to attack, his lieutenants had any right to blame him as they afterwards did. On the contrary, they might well have found fault with themselves ; for, after spending two days at the foot of the Alcoba, they advised a front attack, in spite of the steepness, and made no inquiries as to the possibility of turning it — a course, as you will presently see, offering no difficulty.
It was a misfortune for the army that General Sainte-Croix was not then with Mass6na. His instinct for war would certainly have led him, taking advantage of the marshal's con- fidence in him, to induce him to abandon the idea of attacking directly so formidable a position before making sure that it could not be turned. But he was with his brigade some leagues to the rear, escorting a convoy.
Hardly had the commander-in-chief with his staff left the army than night came on — and Massena had only one eye and was not a good horseman. Our road was strewn with large stones and pieces of rock, so we had, in the darkness, to go for more than two hours at a walk to accomplish the five leagues to Mortagoa. As we went along I meditated sadly on the probable results of the battle which we were going to fight on the morrow at such a disadvantage, and imparted my reflections in a low voice to my friend Ligniville and to General Fririon. We were all most anxious that Massena should alter his dis- positions ; but no officer save Pelet was allowed to submit any suggestions to him directly. Yet the matter appeared urgent, and we decided to employ an artifice, which we had sometimes used with success, for bringing the truth indirectly to his notice. Agreeing upon our parts, we got near the marshal, feigning not to see him in the darkness ; then we began to talk about the coming battle, and I said that I was sorry the commander-in- chief intended to assault the position in front without being
HO W TO ADMONISH A MARSHAL 42 1
certain that it could not be turned. Then General Fririon, play- ing his part as arranged, answered that Ney and Reynier had stated positively that there was no other way to get past, to which Ligniville and I replied that we could not believe that, for it was impossible that the people of Mortagoa should have lived for centuries devoid of direct communication with Boialva, and with no other way to the Oporto road than by Busaco, over the steepest part of the mountains. I added that when I had made the same remark to the aides-de-camp of Ney and Rey- nier, and asked which of them had reconnoitred the extreme left of the enemy's position, not one answered, from which I concluded that no one had visited that part. If Mass^na saw badly his hearing was extremely keen, and, as we hoped, he had not missed one word of our talk. So much struck was he, that he came up to our group, and joining in the conversation, admitted — cautious as he was — that he had assented too easily to the plan of assaulting in front. He said that he would counter-order this, and that if a way could be found of turning the position he would let the army rest next day, and on the following night would concentrate it opposite the vulnerable point and attack unawares. No doubt there would be a day's delay, but the chances of success would be better and the probable loss lighter.
So determined did the marshal appear, that when we reached Mortagoa he bade Ligniville and me try to find some inhabitant who could show us a road to Boialva without passing Busaco. It was a difficult job, for the inhabitants had all fled at the approach of the French, and the extreme darkness was against our search. At length, however, we found in a monastery an old gardener who had stayed to take care of a sick monk. He brought us to this monk, who answered our questions freely ; he had often been from Mortagoa and Boialva by a good road which branched off a short league from the place where we were. He was all the more surprised at our not knowing this, that part of our army in going from Viseu to Mortagoa had passed the turning. Guided by the old gardener, we went to verify the monk's statement, and found that an excellent road actually went in the direction of the mountains and appeared to pass round the enemy's left. Yet Marshal Ney had stayed two days at Mortagoa without exploring this road, a knowledge of which would have saved us many disasters.
Ligniville and I, delighted at our discovery, hastened to report it to the marshal ; but we had been away more than an hour, and we found him with Major Pelet, surrounded by maps
422 MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DE MARBOT
and plans. Pelet said that he had examined the mountains with a telescope by daylight and had seen in their configuration no sign of a pass to our right ; moreover, he could not believe that Marshal Ney had not explored the neighbourhood while he was at Mortagoa, and as he had not found a pass it was clear that none existed, nor could we convince him of the contrary. In vain did we offer to go round and ascend the hill which the monk assured us was less steep than that of Busaco, or even to go as far as Boialva if they would give us three battalions of the head-quarters guard. In vain did General Fririon beg the marshal to accept this offer: all was useless. Mass^na was very tired, he said that it was near midnight and that we must be off at four o'clock to reach the camp by daybreak, and with that he went to bed. Never did I pass a more melancholy night ; and my comrades were as sad as I. At last the hour came for our start, and we reached the outposts with the first morning light of September 27, an ill-omened day which was to behold one of the most terrible reverses which the French army ever suffered.
CHAPTER LIV.
On finding himself in front of the position which he had scarcely examined on the previous day Massena appeared to hesitate, and, coming up to the place where I was chatting with General Fririon, he said sadly, 'Your suggestion of yester- day was worth considering.' Our hopes rekindled by these few words, we doubled our efforts to induce the commander-in-chief to turn the mountain by Boialva, and he was already coming over to our way of thinking, when Ney, Reynier, and Pelet came up and interrupted our talk with the remark that all was ready for the attack. Massena made a few more remarks, but at length, overborne by his lieutenants, and fearing, no doubt, that he might be blamed for letting slip a victory which they declared to be certain, he gave orders towards seven o'clock to open fire.
The 2nd corps, under Reynier, attacked the enemy's right ; Ney their left and centre. The French troops were drawn up on stony ground, sloping steeply down to a great ravine which separated us from the Alcoba, which was lofty, steep, and occupied by the enemy. From their commanding position they could see all our movements, while we saw only their out- posts half-way up the hill between the convent of Busaco and the ravine, which at this point was so deep that the naked eye could hardly make out the movements of troops who were marching through it, and so narrow that the English bullets carried right across it. It might be regarded as an immense natural ditch, serving as the first line of defence to the natural fortifications formed by great rocks cut almost into a vertical wall. Besides this, our artillery, engaged in very bad roads and obliged to fire upwards, could render very little service ; while the infantry had to contend not only against a mass of obstacles and the roughest possible ascent, but also against the best marksmen in Europe. Up to this time the English were the only troops who were perfectly practised in the use of small arms, whence their firing was far more accurate than that of any other infantry.
Although you might expect that the rules of war would be (423)
424 MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DE MARBOT
alike among civilised nations, they do, as a fact, vary immensely even in identical circumstances. Thus, when the French have to defend a position they first garnish the front and flanks with skirmishers, and then crown the heights conspicuously with their main body and reserves, which has the serious incon- venience of letting the enemy know the vulnerable point of the line. The method employed in similar cases by the English seems to me far preferable, as was often demonstrated in the Peninsular War. After having, as we do, garnished their front with skirmishers, they post their principal forces in such a way as to keep them out of sight, holding them all the time suffi- ciently near to the key of the position to be able to attack the enemy at once if they come near to reaching it ; and this attack, made unexpectedly upon assailants who have lost heavily and think the victory already theirs, succeeds almost invariably. We had a melancholy experience of this at Busaco. In spite of the numerous obstacles which favoured the defence, the brave men of the 2nd corps had just succeeded, after an hour of desperate work, performed with really heroic courage, in scaling the mountain, when, as they arrived panting at the summit of the ridge, they found themselves in front of a hitherto un- perceived line of English infantry. After receiving them at fifteen paces with an admirably aimed and sustained fire which stretched more than five hundred men on the ground, this line dashed at the survivors with the bayonet. The unexpected attack, accompanied by a storm of grape on their flank, shook some of our battalions ; but they quickly rallied, and, in spite of their heavy losses, our troops, astonished but not disconcerted, charged the English line, broke it at several points, and carried six guns. But Wellington had brought up strong reserves, while ours were at the foot of the mountain, and the French, pressed on all sides, and compelled to give up the narrow ground which they occupied on the plateau, found themselves, after a long and brisk resistance, driven in a heap down the steep descent up which they had climbed. The English lines followed them half-way down, firing volleys to which our men could not reply — and murderous they were. All resistance being useless in so unfavourable a position, the officers ordered the men to take skirmishing order about the broken ground, and under a hail of bullets they reached the foot of the mountain. At this point we lost General Graindorge, two colonels, eighty officers, and seven or eight hundred men.
After such a check prudence would have forbidden to send any troops weakened by heavy losses a second time against a
DBFBA T 425
triumphant enemy with his position unaltered ; yet General Reynier ordered Foy's and Sarrut's brigades to return to the charge ; and Mass£na, who witnessed this madness, allowed the second attack. It met with the same fate as the first. While this was taking place on our left, fortune was not more favourable to the 6th corps on our right. Although it had been arranged to attack simultaneously at all points, and Massdna had repeated the order about seven o'clock at the moment of engaging, it was half-past eight before Ney set his troops in motion. He asserted afterwards that he had been delayed by the difficulty of the position on that side, and it certainly was greater than on the left. Our people had just made one great mistake in sending the 2nd corps into action before the 6th was ready ; Ney made one similar when he engaged Loison's, Marchand's, and Mermet's divisions without any cohesion. The troops attacked vigorously, and although entire files were swept away by cannon and musketry, the brigades of Ferey and Simon, with the 26th of the line, clambering up the steep rocks, flung themselves on the enemy's guns and captured three of them. The English, being reinforced, returned to the attack ; General Simon, with his jaw smashed, fell, and was taken prisoner on one of the guns which he had just captured. Almost every field officer was killed or wounded, and three volleys at close quarters completed the rout of the French masses, who returned in disorder to their starting-point. Thus ended the principal fight. The losses of the 2nd and 6th corps were immense. They amounted to more than 5,000 men, including 250 officers killed, wounded, or prisoners. General Graindorge, Colonels Monier, Amy, and Berliet killed ; two others wounded ; General Simon wounded and taken prisoner ; Generals Merle, Mancune, and Foy severely wounded, besides two colonels and thirteen majors. The enemy in their sheltered position lost far less heavily, but they admitted 2,300 men disabled. We learnt afterwards that if we had attacked the day before the English would have withdrawn without fighting, because 2,500 of their best troops were then on the other side of the Mondego, and only arrived at Busaco the night before the battle. Such was the result of the six days lost by Mass^na at Viseu, and his hurry to return on the 26th to Mortagoa instead of reconnoitring the position.
Our efforts having thus utterly failed in face of a hillside so steep that an unburdened man would have climbed it with difficulty, it surely behoved our leaders to put a stop to firing which had now become useless. Yet a brisk file-firing went on
426 MEMOIRS OB THE BARON DE MARBOT
all along the lines at the foot of the position, which our soldiers, in their excitement, were to assault anew. These small en- counters with an enemy hidden by lofty rocks were very costly to us, and there was a general feeling that they should cease, though no one gave the formal order. Just then the two armies witnessed a touching incident, forming a contrast to the scenes of slaughter all round. General Simon's valet, hearing that his master had been left badly wounded on the summit of the Alcoba, tried to make his way to him ; but the enemy, not understanding his motive for approaching their lines, fired on him repeatedly, and the faithful servant was compelled to return to the French outposts. As he was lamenting his inability to aid his master, the cantinilre of the 26th, belonging to the brigade, took the things from the valet's hands, loaded them on her donkey, and went forward, saying, ■ We will see if the English will kill a woman ' ; listening to no objections, she went up the hill, and passed coolly between the lines of skir- mishers, who, savage as they were, ceased firing till she was out of range. Presently she saw the English colonel and ex- plained what she had brought. He received her kindly, and had her taken to General Simon, with whom she stayed several days, tending him to the best of her power, and only leaving him when the valet arrived. Then, getting on her donkey, she went through the enemy's army, by that time in retreat on Lisbon, and rejoined her regiment, without having received an insult of any kind, though she was young and very pretty. On the contrary, the English made a point of treating her with great respect.1
The two armies maintained their respective positions ; it was a sad night for us ; the future appeared gloomy enough. At daybreak on the 28th, the Alcoba echoed with mighty cheer- ing and the strains of the English military bands. Wellington was reviewing his troops, who were saluting him with their hurrahs ; while the French at the foot of the mountain were in gloomy silence. Mass6na should have mounted his horse then, reviewed his army, harangued his soldiers, until they replied by their cheers to the defiant enthusiasm of the enemy. The Emperor and Marshal Lannes would certainly have acted thus. But Massdna held aloof, walking about all alone, and making no arrangements ; while his lieutenants, especially Ney and
1 [Napier also tells a story of a girl who passed unmolested through the armies ; but in this case it was a Portuguese girl who actually crossed the battlefield, in the opposite direction, down, and not up, the mountain.]
A FLANK MARCH 427
Reynier, the very men who the day before had urged him to engage, saying that they would answer for victory, were loudly accusing him of imprudence in attacking a strong position like Busaco. When, finally, they joined the commander-in-chief, it was to propose that he should advertise our failure to the army and all the world by abandoning Portugal and take the army back into Spain. Then old Mass6na, recovering a little of the energy of Rivoli, Zurich, and Genoa, and many another memo- rable occasion, rejected their proposal as unworthy of the army and of himself.
The English have called the affair of Busaco a political battle, because the British Parliament, alarmed at the enormous cost of the war, appeared resolved to withdraw the troops from the Peninsula and content itself in future with supplying arms and ammunition to the guerillas. As this plan tended to de- stroy Wellington's influence, he had resolved to prevent it from being carried out by replying with a victory to the fears of the English Parliament, and this determined him to await the French at Busaco. His plan succeeded, and Parliament voted further supplies for the war which was to be so disastrous to us.
While the marshal was discussing with his lieutenants, General Sainte-Croix came up. On seeing him everyone ex- pressed regret that he had not been present the day before to act as the marshal's good genius. Massena now understood the mistake he had made in not turning the enemy's left as we had advised him, and, on hearing the state of things from Mass6na himself, Sainte-Croix advised him to revert to that plan. With the general's assent, he galloped off, accompanied by Ligniville and me, to Mortagoa, whither he sent for his brigade of dragoons. As we passed through the village we picked up the convent gardener, who, at sight of a piece of gold, consented to act as our guide, laughing when he was asked if there really existed a road to Boialva.
While Sainte-Croix's brigade, and a regiment of infantry, led the way in this new direction, the 8th corps and Montbrun's cavalry followed close behind, and the rest of the army prepared to do the same. Urged by Sainte-Croix, Mass6na had at last spoken with authority, and imposed silence on his lieutenants when they persisted in denying the existence of a pass on the right.
In order to conceal from the English the movement of such of our troops as were at the foot of the Alcoba, they did not march until night, and then in dead silence. But information was soon given by the despairing cries of the French wounded,
428 MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DE MARBOT
whom we were under the sad necessity of abandoning. A great number of horses, and all the beasts of burden, were employed to carry the men whom there was hope of curing ; but those who had lost their legs, or were otherwise severely wounded, were left lying on the dry heath, and as the poor fellows ex- pected to have their throats cut by the peasants as soon as the armies were out of the way, their despair was terrible.
The French army had reason to fear that Wellington, seeing them execute a flank march so near him, would attack them vigorously. This might have led to the capture of Reynier's entire corps, which would be the last to leave its position, and would remain for some hours unsupported in presence of the enemy. But the English general had no time to think of turn- ing the French rear-guard, for he had just learnt that he was being himself turned by the pass of which the French com- mander-in-chief had so long denied the existence. What actu- ally happened was this. After we had marched all the night of the 28th, the gardener, going with the head of Sainte-Croix's column, brought us by a road practicable for artillery as far as Boialva, that is to say, to the extreme left flank of the English army, so that all the positions on the Alcoba had been outflanked without a blow, and Wellington, under pain of exposing his army to be taken in rear, had to abandon Busaco in haste, to regain Coimbra, and cross the Mondego there, with a view of retreating upon Lisbon, which he did with all speed. Our ad- vanced guard only met with a small detachment of Hanoverian hussars posted at Boialva, a pretty village situated at the southern issue from the mountains. The fertility of the country gave hopes that the army might find abundant subsistence there. A shout of joy went up from our ranks, and the soldiers very soon forgot the fatigues and dangers of the previous days, perhaps also the unhappy comrades whom they had left dying before Busaco.
To complete the success of our movement, a good road joined Boialva with the village of Avelans on the road from Oporto to Coimbra. Sainte-Croix occupied this, and by a further piece of luck we discovered a second road from Boialva to Sardao, another village on the high road. At last, then, we had the proof of the existence of this pass, so obstinately denied by Ney, Reynier, and Pelet. Mass£na must have reproached himself with having omitted to reconnoitre the strong position before which he had lost several thousand men, and which his army had now turned without meeting the least resistance. But Wellington was still more to blame for not having guarded
FAULTS ON BOTH SIDES 429
that point, and surveyed the road leading to it from Mortagoa. It was of no use for him to say afterwards that he did not believe the road had been practicable for artillery, and that he had besides ordered Trant to cover Boialva with 2,000 militia. Such an excuse is not permissible for experienced fighting men. It might perfectly well be answered that as to the state of the road the English commander should have reconnoitred it before the battle, and that, in the second place, it is not enough for the chief of an army to give orders, but that he should make sure that they have been executed. Boialva is only a few leagues from Busaco, and yet Wellington never ascertained that this pass, so important to the safety of his army, had been guarded according to his orders ; so that if Mass6na had been better inspired, and had, during the night of the 26th, sent an army corps to Boialva to attack the left flank of the enemy, while threatening him in front with the rest of his force, the English would certainly have suffered a sanguinary defeat. From all this we conclude that in the circumstances neither Wellington nor Masseria showed himself equal to his high reputation ; and that they deserved the blame which their contemporaries ad- dressed to them, and which history will confirm.
CHAPTER LV.
As soon as the army was clear of the defile of Boialva, Massena marched on Coimbra by way of Milheada and Tornos. At the latter point there was a cavalry engagement, in which Sainte- Croix overthrew the English rear-guard, forcing them back on Coimbra. On October I the French entered that place. De- ceived by the result of the battle of Busaco, and the assertion of English officers that the French army was retiring into Spain, the unhappy inhabitants of that city had abandoned themselves to a display of rejoicing. The festivities were not at an end, when suddenly came the news that the French had turned the mountains and were marching straight on Coimbra — that indeed they were not a day's journey distant. Indescribable panic pre- vailed ; the population of 12,000 souls simultaneously with the news of the enemy's approach received orders to leave their home forthwith. Their departure was, by the admission of English officers, a most terrible sight ; I refrain from relating the heart-breaking incidents.
Wellington's army, hampered by the mass of fugitives of every age, sex, and class, men and beasts of burden in inex- tricable confusion, retired in the greatest disorder toward Coimbra and Pombal, many perishing in the passage of the Mondego. This was good for Masse'na. He should have sent Junot's corps, which, not having fought at Busaco, was fully available, in pur- suit, and by a sudden attack he might have caused heavy loss to the English army, which, by the testimony of some of our men who had been captured at Busaco and had escaped, was in disorder beyond words. But, to our great surprise, and as if he wished to allow the enemy time to restore order to get away, the commander-in-chief billeted his army in Coimbra and the adjacent villages, and waited three clear days. His excuse for this delay was the necessity of reorganising the 2nd and 6th corps whfch had suffered at Busaco, and of establishing hospitals at Coimbra ; all which he might have done while the 8th corps was in pursuit of the enemy. But the real notion for the stay at Coimbra was, in the first place, the increasing want of confi-
(430)
ON THE MARCH TO LISBON 43 1
dence between Mass^na and his lieutenants ; and, further, his difficulty in deciding whether to leave a division in the place to cover his rear and protect the sick and wounded, or to take all his available forces for the battle which was expected to be fought outside Lisbon. Either course had its advantages and disadvantages ; but he need not have taken three days to make up his mind. Finally he decided to leave a half-company to guard the convent of Santa Clara and protect the wounded who were assembled there from the first fury of an attacking force, with orders to capitulate as soon as an officer appeared.
But no definite instructions were given ; and, under the im- pression that a division would remain, the colonels put all their infirm men, most of whom could perfectly well have marched, and desired nothing better, in the vast convent. More than three thousand were thus left behind, with two lieutenants and eighty men of the naval brigade as their sole guard.
I was surprised that Mass£na,who was sure to require sailors when he reached the Tagus, should have sacrificed a number of these valuable men, who could not easily be replaced, when he might have left some infantry of inferior value. It was clear that in less than twenty-four hours the enemy's irregular troop? would occupy the town ; and indeed in the evening of the very day, October 3,1 on which the French had left it, the Portu- guese militia entered.
Our poor wounded had barricaded themselves in the convent, having no longer any doubt that Massena had abandoned them, and were preparing to sell their lives dearly. The naval lieu- tenants behaved admirably. With the help of some infantry officers who were among the wounded, they collected all the men who still had muskets and could use them, and succeeded in holding the Portuguese in check all the night On the morn- ing of the 6th Brigadier Trant, the commander of the militia, arrived ; and the naval officers capitulated to him in writing. Hardly, however, had the wounded French surrendered the few arms which they had than the militia fell on the poor wretches, many of whom could not stand, and butchered over a thousand. The rest, sent without mercy to Oporto, perished on the road ; as soon as anyone fell out from fatigue the Portuguese killed him. Yet this militia wp^rggnised and led by English officers, commanded by an Engl|n%elerAf ; lodf] no|chfckinAthese atrocities Trant dishonored h\> Jbuntry ?nd hfc MifoM. In vain does Napier alleg<f in hi#excuse^fcat oIlj^snlFrench
1 [The statement on the last page tfiat Maskna stayed incorrect.] W •
432 MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DE MARBOT
prisoners were sacrificed; the fact is, that nearly all were murdered either in the hospital at Coimbra or on the road. Even in England the name of Trant has become infamous.1
From Coimbra Mass^na had written to the Emperor ; but the difficulty was to transmit the despatch through the insurgent population. A Frenchman would have failed, and it was neces- sary to find someone who knew the country and could speak the language. A Portuguese officer named Mascarenhas, who had entered the French service with General d'Alorna, offered to be the bearer. I saw him start disguised as a mountain- shepherd, with a little dog in his basket, in which costume he hoped to reach Almeida, where the French commandant would put him in the way of proceeding to Paris. But it was of no use for Mascarenhas, who belonged to the first nobility of Portu- gal, to attempt to conceal his distinguished bearing and manner and his refined speech. The peasants were not taken in ; he was arrested, brought to Lisbon, and condemned to death ; in spite of his appeal for the noble's privilege of decapitation, he was hanged as a spy in the public square.
The three further days wasted by the French at Coimbra allowed the English to get away, and it took us three days more to come up with their rear-guard at Pombal. Before our coming the body of the celebrated marquis of that name had lain in a magnificent tomb, erected in an immense mausoleum of wonderful architecture. This had been wrecked by the stragglers from the English army. They had broken the tomb and thrown the bones under the feet of their horses, which they had stabled in the vast building. A strange instance of the vanity of human things ! There, lying in the filth, when Mass^na and his staff visited the place, were the scanty remains of the great minister who put down the Jesuits !
From Pombal we went on to Leyria, and at 9 a.m. our advance-guard was on the banks of the Tagus, at Santarem. There we found immense stores of provisions ; but this advan- tage was almost neutralised by autumnal rains such as are not seen out of the tropics except on the southern shores of the Peninsula, and which assailed us after unbroken fine weather. Both armies suffered much from this cause ; but ours reached Alemquer, a market J:owfl at thj fo/^of the hills of Cintra,
appear to have extended to
written to Trant by three
French o^ct^fe. foctoi^B^ibnel, alR a na^l commander, thanking him,
in the nam^§f IWpriso^rs, Jbr ' the Jrouble which he had taken to alleviate
their condii
BROUGHT TO A HALT 433
which gird Lisbon at a few leagues' distance. We quite expected to have to fight a battle before entering Lisbon, but, as we knew that the town was open on the land-side, we had no doubt of success. Meantime, however, all the neighbourhood of Lisbon had been covered with fortifications. For a year and a half the English had been working at them ; but neither Ney, who had just spent a year at Salamanca, nor Masseria, who for six months had been making ready to invade Portugal, had the least inkling of these gigantic works. Reynier and Junot were equally ignorant ; most surprising of all — incredible, indeed, if the fact were not absolutely certain — the French Government itself did not know that the hills of Cintra had been fortified. It is inconceivable how the Emperor, who had agents in every country, could have omitted to send some to Lisbon. At that time thousands of American, German, Swedish, and English ships were daily bringing into the Tagus stores for Wellington's army; and it would have been perfectly easy to have introduced some spies among the numerous sailors and clerks employed on these vessels. Knowledge of all kinds can be obtained by money ; it was by this means that the Emperor kept himself informed of all that went on in England and among the great Powers of Europe. Nevertheless, he never gave Mass^na any information as to the defences of Lisbon ; and it was only on reaching Alemquer that the French general discovered that the hills were fortified and connected by lines of which the right touched the sea in rear of Torres Vedras, the centre was at Sobral, and the right rested on the Tagus, near Alhandra.
The day before our troops appeared at this point the English army had entered the lines, driving before it the population of the surrounding districts, to the number of 300,000 souls. Utter disorder prevailed ; and those among the French officers who guessed what was taking place among the enemy regretted afresh and very keenly that Mass^na had resolved a fortnight before to attack the position of Busaco in front. If that position had been turned, the enemy would have been taken in flank and have retired upon Lisbon, and our army, in full strength and ardour, would have attacked the lines on its arrival, and certainly have carried them. With the capture of the capital the English must have retreated precipitately, and the reverse would have been irreparable. But our heavy losses at Busaco had chilled the ardour of Massdna's lieutenants, and bred ill-will between them and him ; so that now all were trying to paralyse his operations, and representing every little hillock to be a new height of Busaco the capture of which would cost copious blood-
28
434 MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DE MARBOT
shed. In spite, however, of this want of loyalty, Masse*na despatched the 8th corps towards the enemy's centre, and Clausel's division carried the village of Sobral — a very im- portant point for us. Just when a simultaneous attack along the whole line was expected, General Sainte-Croix, who had urged this course, was killed by a cannon-shot in front of Villa- Franca. That excellent officer was with General Montbrun making a reconnoissance toward Alhandra, and as they passed along the Tagus, on which several Portuguese sloops were cruising, and firing on our outposts, poor Sainte-Croix was cut in two by a chain-shot. It was a grievous loss for the army, for Masse'na, and above all for me, who loved him like a brother.
After the death of the only man capable of giving him good advice the commander-in-chief fell back into his state of per- petual indecision, wavering under the clamour of his lieutenants, who, in their present faint-heartedness, represented all the hills of Cintra as bristling with cannon ready to make mince-meat of us. In order to know what he was really to think about it, Mass6na, who, since the advice which Ligniville and I had offered at the battle of Busaco, had evinced some kindness towards us, directed us to examine the front of the enemy's lines. They were undoubtedly of imposing strength, but very far from what people were pleased to say. The English entrenchments formed an immense arc round Lisbon, at least twenty French leagues in length. Every officer of the least experience knows well that a position of this extent cannot present the same difficulties everywhere and must have its weak spots. We became aware of several such by seeing officers, and even cavalry pickets, ride up quite easily; and we also became convinced that our engineer officers who had mapped the hills had figured an armed redoubt wherever they saw a little earth recently disturbed. The English, to lead us into a mistake, had on every small elevation traced works of which most had not yet got beyond the stage of planning. But even if they had been completed it seemed to us that the ground was sufficiently irregular to conceal the movements of a portion of our army, and that by employing one corps to make a feint on the front while the other two pushed real attacks on the weakest points of this long line, they would find the English troops too widely scattered, or at any rate with their reserves at a con- siderable distance from the points attacked.
The age of Louis XIV. was a period when great use was made of lines, and history shows that the greater part of those which were attacked were carried for want of the power of
INS U BO R DIN A TION 43 5
mutual support among the defenders. We thought that at some point of their vast extent it would be easy to pierce the English lines, and an opening once made, the enemy's troops, who would be in some cases a day's journey from the opening, would recognise that they had not time to come up, except in very inferior strength, and would retire, not to Lisbon, whence vessels cannot get out in all winds, but to Cascaes, where their military fleet and transports were assembled. Their retreat would have been very difficult, and might perhaps have become a rout. In any case their embarkation in presence of our army would have been a second edition of Sir John Moore's at Corunna. We have since seen English officers, among others General Hill, admit that if the French had attacked within the first ten days after their arrival they would have easily pene- trated together with the confused multitude of peasants in the midst of whom the English armies could never have disentangled themselves nor made any regular dispositions for defence.
When my comrade and I reported in this sense to Mass^na, the old soldier's eyes sparkled with martial ardour, and he at once issued marching orders to prepare for the attack which he reckoned on making the next day. However, on receiving the orders, his four lieutenants hastened to his quarters and a stormy discussion took place. Junot, who had commanded in Lisbon, and knew it well, declared that it seemed impossible to him to maintain so large a town, and expressed himself strongly for the attack. General Montbrun shared his opinion ; but Ney and Reynier hotly opposed it, adding that the loss at Busaco, together with that of the wounded who had been abandoned at Coimbra, and the numerous sick who had been for the moment disabled by the rains, had so largely diminished the number of combatants, that it was not possible to attack a strong position, and further, that their men were demoralised — an inaccurate statement, for the troops were showing great ardour in demanding to march upon Lisbon. Losing his patience, Mass^na repeated viva voce the orders he had already given in writing, and Ney declared in so many words that he would not carry them out. The commander-in-chief was minded then to remove Ney from the command of the 6th corps, as some months later he was obliged to do. But he considered that Ney was beloved by his men, whom he had commanded for seven years ; that his removal would involve that of Reynier, which would complete the discord in the army at a moment when unanimity was so eminently needed. The energetic advice of Sainte-Croix was no longer at hand to sustain him, and Masse'na
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quailed before the disobedience of his two chief lieutenants. They could not indeed decide him to leave Portugal, but they extorted from him a promise to move away from the enemy's lines, and to retire ten leagues back behind Santarem and Rio Mayor and there await fresh orders from the Emperor. I saw with regret this little retreat, which seemed to me to augur one more general and definitive, nor, as you will soon see, did my presentiment deceive me. I turned my back therefore with sorrow on the hills of Cintra, fully persuaded that if we had profited by the confusion into which the fugitives had thrown the English camp we might have forced the unfinished lines. But what was then easy was no longer so a fortnight later. Compelled to feed the vast population, which at his bidding had streamed in upon Lisbon, Wellington used the arms of 40,000 stout peasants by making them work at the completion of the fortifications with which he proposed to cover Lisbon, and thus the place became of immense strength.
CHAPTER LVI.
During our stay at Sobral I saw another artifice employed by the English, and one of sufficient importance to be worth noting. It is often said that thoroughbred horses are of no use in war, because their price is so high and they require so much care that it would be almost impossible to provide a squa- dron, much more a regiment, with them. Nor indeed do the English use them on campaign ; but they have a habit of sending single officers, mounted on fast thoroughbreds, to watch the movements of a hostile army. These officers get within the enemy's cantonments, cross his line of march, keep for days on the flanks of his columns, always just out of range, till they can form a clear idea of his number and the direction of his march. After our entry into Portugal, we frequently saw observers of this kind flitting round us. It was vain to give chase to them, even with the best-mounted horsemen. The moment the English officer saw any such approach he would set spurs to his steed, and nimbly clearing ditches, hedges, and even brooks, he would make off at such speed that our men soon lost sight of him, and perhaps saw him soon after a league farther on, note-book in hand, at the top of some hillock, continuing his observations. This practice, which I never saw anyone employ like the English, and which I tried to imitate during the Russian campaign, might perhaps have saved Napoleon at Waterloo by affording him a warning of the arrival of the Prussians. Anyhow, these English ' runners,' who were the despair of the French general from the moment we left Spain, increased in boldness and cunning as soon as we were in front of Sobral. One could see them come out of the lines and race with the speed of stags through the vines and over the rocks to inspect the positions occupied by our troops.
One day, however, when there had been a little skirmish of outposts, in which we had remained in possession of the ground, a light-infantryman, who had for some time had his eye on the best mounted and boldest of the enemy's ' runners,' and knew his ways, shammed dead, quite sure that as soon as his company was out of the way the Englishman would come back to look at the
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little battlefield. He did come, and was unpleasantly surprised to see the supposed dead man jump up, kill his horse with a musket-shot, then charge him with the bayonet, summoning him to surrender, which he had no choice but to do. The prisoner, on being presented to Massdna by his captor, turned out to be a member of the highest English nobility, a Percy, descended from one of the most illustrious Norman chiefs, to whom William the Conqueror gave the Duchy of Northumber- land, which his offspring still hold. Mr. Percy was honourably received by the French commander and taken to Sobral. Being curious to mount the clock tower, in order to observe how our army was posted, he was allowed to do so ; and from this lofty point, telescope in hand, he witnessed an amusing sight, at which, in spite of his own bad luck, he could not help laughing : the capture of another English officer. This gentleman, having returned from India after twenty years' absence, and hearing in London that his brother was serving in Portugal, had sailed for Lisbon, and hurried up on foot to the front to greet his brother, whose regiment was on duty. It was a lovely day, and the new comer diverted himself by admiring the beautiful country and studying the fortifications and the troops which occupied them. So intent was he on this that he walked past the outposts without knowing it, and was between the two armies. Just then he caught sight of some fine figs, and not having tasted European fruit for a long time, took a fancy to climb the tree. While he was quietly regaling himself, the sol- diers of a neighbouring French picket, surprised to see a red coat among the branches, came up, and seeing what it was, captured the English officer, amid the laughter of all those who witnessed the incident from afar. This Englishman, however, better ad- vised than Mr. Percy, begged his captors to keep him on the out- skirts of the French army, hoping that if he saw nothing of its internal arrangements, he might be exchanged. His foresight proved successful ; for Mass£na, having no fear of his being able to give any information as to the disposition of our troops, sent him back on parole, begging Lord Wellington to exchange against him Captain Letermillier, who had been taken at Coimbra, and afterwards became one of our best colonels. Mr. Percy, who had laughed much at his comrade, on learning that he had been exchanged, requested the same favour ; but this was refused, as he had seen too much, and might report it. The unlucky young man followed the French army as a prisoner, and shared its sufferings for six months. On our return to Spain he was transferred to France, where he passed several years.
MANNER OF PROVISIONING 439
Unable to obtain any backing from his lieutenants in his proposed attack on the lines, and being short of provisions, Massena was compelled, on November 14, to retire ten leagues back from the hills and establish his army in a corn-growing district, where positions could be found suitable for defence. He selected the country between the Rio Mayor, the Tagus, and the Zezere, establishing the 2nd corps at Santarem, the 8th at Torres Novas (where also he fixed his head-quarters), the 6th at Thomar, the artillery park at Tancos, while the cavalry were at Ourem with their outposts pushed as far as Leiria. Inferring from this movement that the French were in full retreat for Spain, the English followed, but cautiously and at a distance, fearing a trick to draw them out of their lines. When they found that we were halted behind the Rio Mayor they gave us some trouble, but were vigorously met ; and judging that want of provisions would soon drive us to leave this district, well adapted for the defensive, they contented themselves with watching us. Lord Wellington's head -quarters were fixed at Cartaxo, opposite Santarem, and from November 1810 till March 181 1 the armies faced each other, separated only by the Rio Mayor. The English, having their food supplies brought by the Tagus from Lisbon, lived in comfort ; but the provisioning of our army, having no stores, and being in a contracted space, was a serious problem. Our troops, however, worked with admirable patience and industry, each contributing, like bees in a hive, his share to the common welfare. Workshops were started in every bat- talion ; and each regiment, organising a system of raids on a large scale, sent out detachments, armed and well led, who returned driving thousands of donkeys laden with provisions of all kinds, and immense herds of sheep, pigs, and goats, the booty being proportionately divided on its arrival. As the nearer districts became exhausted, the raids had to be pushed further afield, even to the gates of Abrantes and Coimbra ; and the attacks of the infuriated peasantry, though always beaten off, caused some loss. Besides these, the foraging parties had a new form of enemy to contend with, resembling in its organi- sation the robber bands of the middle ages.
A French sergeant, wearied of the misery in which the army was living, resolved to decamp and live in comfort. To this end he persuaded about a hundred of the worst characters in the army, and going with them to the rear, took up his quarters in a vast convent deserted by the monks, but still full of furniture and provisions. He increased his store largely by
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carrying off everything in the neighbourhood that suited him ; well-furnished spits and stewpans were always at the fire, and each man helped himself as he would ; and the leader received the expressive if contemptuous name of ' Marshal Stockpot.' The scoundrel had also carried off numbers of women ; and being joined before long by the scum of the three armies, attracted by the prospect of unrestrained debauchery, he formed a band of some three hundred English, French, and Portuguese deserters, who lived as a happy family in one unbroken orgy. This brigandage had been going on for some months, when one day, a foraging detachment having gone off in pursuit of a flock as far as the convent which sheltered the so-called ' Marshal Stockpot,' our soldiers were much surprised to see him coming to meet them at the head of his bandits, with orders to respect his grounds and restore the flock which they had just taken there. On the refusal of our officers to comply with this demand, he ordered his men to fire on the detachment. The greater part of the French deserters did not venture to fire on their compatriots and former comrades, but the English and Portuguese obeyed, and our people had several men killed or wounded. Not being in sufficient numbers to resist, they were compelled to retreat, accompanied by all the French deserters, who came back with them to offer their submission. Massena pardoned them on condition that they should march at the head of the three battalions who were told off to attack the convent. That den having been carried after a brief resistance, Massena had • Marshal Stockpot ' shot, as well as the few French who had remained with him. A good many English and Portuguese shared their fate, the rest were sent off to Wellington, who did prompt justice on them.
Early in November, Massena had sent General Foy to report his position to the Emperor : three battalions being required to escort him in safety to the Spanish frontier. Mean- while, not knowing when the expected reinforcements might arrive, he feared that the English army might cross the Rio Mayor, and make an unexpected attack on our divisions at a time when every regiment had detached at least a third of its men to search for provisions. If the enemy had arrived in the middle of our cantonments while so many soldiers were away, a catastrophe would certainly have followed ; and the dispersed troops would have been liable to be beaten in detail before they could reassemble. Luckily for us, however, Lord Wellington based all his plans on lapse of time, and did not venture upon any enterprise.
BAFFLED 44 1
Meanwhile the Emperor, whose only news of Masse'na's army had so far been obtained from the London newspapers, having at length received the despatches brought by General Foy, ordered the Count of Erlon, commanding the 9th corps, cantoned near Salamanca, to march upon Portugal, and to send Gardanne's brigade forward at once with instructions to find the French army, and take it the ammunition and the draught horses of which it presumably stood in need. With all the Emperor's perspicacity it was impossible for him at Paris to judge of the numerous difficulties which would hamper Gardanne in carrying out his orders. Napoleon could never believe that the flight of Portuguese occupants at the approach of a French corps had been so universal that it was impossible to come across an inhabitant fiom whom one could receive the slightest information. This, however, was what befel Gardanne. A former page of Louis XVI., whom the Emperor had made governor to his pages, he was lacking in initiative, and only did well under the direction of an able general. Now he completely lost his bearings. Not knowing where to find Mass^na's army, he wandered in all directions, and when he at length reached Cardigos, a day's march, as his maps showed, from the Zezere, he did not realise that in war a flying column in search of a friendly force should always steer itself by rivers, forests, large towns, and mountain chains, for if the troops whom he has to reach are anywhere near, they will certainly have pickets at these important points. It is hard to understand why Gardanne forgot this rule of the craft, but he actually lost a good many men by a precipitate retreat without having seen the enemy. If he had but pushed on three leagues to the Zezere he would have seen our outposts, as it was he returned to Spain taking back reinforcements, ammunition, and horses.
Masse*na began to fear lest provisions might run short on the right bank of the Tagus, and resolved to tap a new country by throwing a portion of his army across the river, into the fertile province of Alemtejo. To this end he ordered a division to cross the Zezere and occupy Punhete, a small town at the point where that river flows into the Tagus. This seemed a good point to establish a bridge, but materials were lacking. Everything was, however, supplied by the zeal and activity of General Eble\ well supported by his subordinate artillery offi- cers. Forges and saw-mills were built ; tools, planks, beams, anchors and ropes manufactured, numerous boats were con- structed, and the work progressing as it were by magic, we conceived the hope of being able to cast a solid bridge over the
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Tagus. Lord Wellington prepared to oppose the crossing of the river, bringing troops up from Lisbon to form a camp on the left bank opposite Punhete : whence we augured that before we could establish ourselves on the further side of the great river we should have to sustain a hot engagement. All this while the French army was occupying the positions which it had taken up in November. Several English divisions were encamped on the right bank of the Rio Mayor, Lord Wellington's head-quarters being at Cartaxo. There died the celebrated General La Romana. The weather was fearful ; the roads had become torrents, and the difficulty of seeking provisions, and especially forage, was much increased. Yet our French gaiety did not desert us. In every camp societies were got up for theatricals, and the houses deserted by the inhabitants supplied us with plenty of costumes in the wardrobes which the Portuguese ladies had left behind. We found also plenty of French books; our quarters were comfortable, and we continued to pass the winter pretty well. Our reflections were, however, often sad, both as to the situation of the army, and our own position. For three months we had had no news from our families, from France, even from Spain. Would the Emperor send us reinforcements sufficient to take Lisbon, or should we be compelled to retreat before the English ? Our minds were full of these thoughts, when on December 27 it was suddenly reported that General Drouet, Count of Erlon, had just joined the army with the 9th corps, 25,000 to 30,000 strong. But our satisfaction was much reduced on finding that the Count of Erlon's army had never contained more than 12,000 men : half of whom he had left on the Spanish frontier under General Claparede, bringing with him only Cornoux's division, 6,000 strong, a reinforcement quite inadequate to meet the English and take Lisbon. Instead of going at once to the commander-in-chief at Torres Novas, the Count of Erlon stopped ten leagues short of it at Thomai", Ney's head-quarters. This was a great blow to Mass^na, and he sent me to the commander of the 9th corps to ask for an explanation of a course as much opposed to politeness as to military regulations. When he gave me this commission he had no doubt that the Count of Erlon had been placed by the Emperor under his orders, but there he was wrong. The instruc- tions given by the chief of the staff to the commander of the 9th corps were only to enter Portugal, find Massdna's army, hand over to him some hundreds of draught horses with ammunition, and then to return to Spain with his troops. It is hard to under- stand how, after the reports which the Emperor had received
A DELICATE DUTY 443
from Foy and Casabianca as to the bad plight of the army, he could have limited himself to sending such weak support.
I found that the Count of Erlon had been lodging with Ney twenty-four hours. The marshal, who was anxious to get away from Portugal, had detained his guest in order that the influence of the commander-in-chief might not induce him to put their 6,000 men at his disposal, and thus enable him to resist the proposal to retreat. The count was therefore making ready to depart next day, without visiting Massena ; to whom he begged me to make his excuses on the plea that important business called him back to the frontier.
An aide-de-camp's duties are pretty difficult, since in per- forming them he often has to convey instructions to his superiors which may wound their self-esteem. Sometimes in the interests of the service he has on his own responsibility to act as interpreter of his general's wishes by giving in his name orders which he has not dictated. This is a serious — even a dangerous matter; but the tact of the aide-de-camp must enable him to judge of the circumstances. My position was as delicate as it well could be, for Massena, not having foreseen that the commander of the gth corps might wish to leave Portugal, had put nothing in writing on the subject. Still, if he did take away his troops the operations of the army would be paralysed, and the commander-in-chief would blame the caution which had made me shrink from speaking in his name. I took, therefore, a bold resolve ; and although I had never met the Count of Erlon (Ney being present the while, and strongly opposing my arguments), I took the liberty of saying that at least he ought to give Marshal Massena time to consider the orders which he had brought from the chief of the staff, as well as time to reply to them. Finally, when the count had repeated that he could not wait, I struck my great stroke by saying: ' Since your Excellency forces me to fulfil my errand to the last word, I have to inform you that Marshal Massena, commander-in-chief of the French forces in Portugal, has directed me to convey to you both in his own name and that of the Emperor, a formal order not to move your troops, but to report yourself to him to-day at Torres Novas.' The count made no reply but ordered his horses. While they were being got ready, I wrote to Massena telling him what I had been obliged to do in his name ; and I learnt later on that he approved. (A passage relating to my mission to the Count of Erlon may be found at p. 286 of the eighth volume of General Koch's ' Memoirs of Massena ' ;
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but the scene I have mentioned is not fully reported.) The Count of Erlon was a gentle and reasonable man. As soon as he had left Ney's camp he admitted that it would not have been proper for him to leave the Army of Portugal without calling on the commander-in-chief; and all the way from Thomar to Torres Novas he treated me with much kindness, in spite of the vigour with which I had thought myself bound to appeal to him. No doubt his interview with Masse'na finally convinced him, for he agreed to remain in Portugal and his troops were sent into quarters at Leyria. Masse'na's gratitude for the firmness and readiness which I had shown was increased a few days later when he learnt that Lord Wellington had formed a plan of attacking our camp, and had been checked by the arrival of the Count of Erlon ; while, if the reinforcement had been withdrawn, the English would have marched on us, and profited by our extended line to crush us with superior numbers.
CHAPTER LVII.
We began the year 1811 at Torres Novas, and its early days were marked by an event which saddened all the staff, the death of our comrade D'Aguesseau. This excellent young man, the heir of an illustrious name and possessor of a large fortune, had been drawn by the desire of acquiring fame into the career of arms which might have been supposed to be closed to him by his delicate health. He had borne the fatigues of the Austrian campaign pretty well, but those which we had to undergo in Portugal were beyond his powers, and he died in the prime of life. We erected a monument to him in the principal church of Torres Novas.
Colonel Casabianca, whom Mass6*na had sent with des- patches to the Emperor, had returned with the Count of Erlon, bringing information that Marshal Soult, who was in command of a powerful army in Andalusia, had received orders to enter Portugal and join the commander-in-chief.
Disquieted by our preparations, and wishing to know in what condition our works were, Wellington employed a strong measure which he had often found successful. One very dark night an Englishman, dressed in officer's uniform, got into a small boat on the left bank a little above Punhete, landed in silence, passed through the French outposts, and at daybreak walked boldly towards our workshops, examining everything at his ease as if he had belonged to the staff of our army. Our artillerymen and engineers coming to their work in the morn- ing perceived the stranger, arrested him, and brought him to General Eble', to whom this scoundrel impudently declared that he was an English officer, and that, in disgust at a piece of favouritism which had been committed to his injury, he had deserted in order to take service in our Irish legion. On being taken before the commander-in-chief he not only repeated his story, but offered to give detailed information as to the posi- tions of the English troops, and point out the places where we might with most advantage cross the Tagus. You will hardly believe that Masse'na and Pelet, much as they despised
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the fellow, put faith in his tale, and wishing to profit by his advice, spent whole days over the maps with him, taking notes of what he said. We of the staff were not so much taken in, for nothing could persuade us that an English officer would have deserted, and we declared plainly that in our opinion the pretended captain was nothing but a clever spy sent by Wellington ; but nothing that we could say shook Masse'na's and Pelet's belief. Yet our conjectures were well founded, as it was soon proved, when General Junot came to head-quarters, and his aide-de-camp recognised the so-called English officer as having acted the deserter once before in 1808, when the French army was occupying Lisbon. Junot also remembered him perfectly, although he was now wearing an infantry uniform instead of the hussar uniform which he wore at Lisbon, and advised Mass6na to shoot him. But the stranger protested that he had never served in the cavalry, and to prove his identity showed a captain's commission with which Welling- ton had probably supplied him in order to enable him to pass for what he professed to be. Mass^na therefore did not like to order his arrest, but his suspicions were aroused, and he ordered the commanding gendarme to have him closely watched. The spy got an inkling of this, and the following night got down very cleverly from a third-floor window and reached the neighbourhood of Tancos, whence he probably swam across the Tagus, for some of his clothes were found on the bank. Thus it was clearly shown that he was an agent of the English general, and that Masse'na had been tricked. His wrath fell upon Pelet, and rose to fury when he discovered that the sham deserter, who had been so imprudently admitted into his study, had walked off with a small note-book in which the effective strength of each regiment was entered. Later on we learnt that this clever scamp was no officer in the English army, but a captain of Dover smugglers, who, to abundant resource and audacity, added the power of speaking several languages and of wearing every kind of disguise.
Meanwhile time passed and brought no change in our posi- tion, for although the Emperor had thrice bidden him to rein- force Mass^na, Soult, imitating the attitude of Marshal Victor towards himself in 1809, had stopped on the way about the end of January to besiege Badajos. We could hear the firing distinctly, and Mass£na regretted much that his colleague should be wasting precious time on a siege instead of marching towards him just when we were about to be compelled by scarcity of provisions to abandon Portugal. Even after the capture of
• RETREAT 447
Badajos, the Emperor blamed Marshal Soult's disobedience and said, ' He captured me a town, and lost me a kingdom.'
On February 5 Foy rejoined the army, bringing up a rein- forcement of 2,000 men. He came from Paris, where he had held long conferences with the Emperor, and announced afresh ihat Soult was soon coming to join us. But as the whole of Feb- ruary went by and he did not appear, the Count of Erlon, whom by an inexplicable blunder the Emperor had not placed under Massdna's orders, declared that his troops could not live any longer at Leyria, and that he was going to march back to Spain. Marshal Ney and General Reynier seized this opportunity to set forth again the misery of their cause in a country which was completely ruined, and the commander-in-chief was obliged at last, after several months of obstinate resistance, to consent to a retreat towards the frontier, hoping to find there the means of supporting his army without entirely abandoning Portugal, and to invade again as soon as the reinforcements arrived. Our retreat began on March 6. General Ebl^ had with much regret employed the previous days in destroying the barges which he had taken so much trouble to build, but in the hope that part of his preparations might one day be of use to a French army he had all the iron-work secretly buried in the presence of twelve artillery officers, and drew up a report which must be in the Ministry of War, showing the place where this precious depository is to be found. Its position will probably remain unknown for many centuries. The preparations were kept sc secret and executed during the night of March 5 in such good order, that the English, whose outposts were only separated from ours by the little stream of the Rio Mayor, did not discovei our movement till the morning of the next day, by which time General Reynier' s troops were five leagues away. Lord Wel- lington, in his uncertainty whether the object of our movement was to cross the Tagus atPunhete or really to retire towards Spain, lost twelve hours in hesitation ; and by the time he resolved to follow, which he did without energy and at some distance, the French army had gained a march upon him. Meanwhile, General Junot, having gone prancing imprudently in front of the English hussars, was struck on the nose by a bullet ; but the wound did not hinder him from retaining the command of the 8th corps during the rest of the campaign. * The army
1 [According to Napier, the date of Junot's wound was some weeks earlier, and it did disable him, though, of course, he may have retained the nominal command.]
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moved in several columns on Pombal, Marshal Ney with the 6th corps forming the rear-guard, and valiantly defending his ground foot by foot. As for Massdna, roused at length from his torpor, he gained between the 5th and 9th of March three days on the enemy, and completely organised his retreat — one of the most difficult operations of war. Contrary to his usual custom, also, he was so cheerful as to surprise us all.
The French army, continuing its retreat with regularity and in compact order, was leaving Pombal when the rear-guard was briskly attacked by the advanced guard of the enemy. Marshal Ney drove them back; and in order to bar their passage com- pletely and save our baggage wagons, he set fire to the town. The English historians ' have cried out against this as a cruel action — as if a general's first consideration should not be the safety of his army. Pombal and its neighbourhood forming a long and narrow defile through which the enemy must pass, the best way to stop them was to burn the town. It was an extreme measure, but one which in similar cases the most civilised nations have been compelled to take, and the English them- selves have often acted in the same manner.
On March 12 there was a smart engagement before Redinha. Marshal Ney, having found a defensible position, decided to halt there, and Lord Wellington, taking this as a challenge, sent forward a strong body. After a hot action Ney repulsed the enemy, and continued his retreat briskly, but with the loss of two or three hundred men. The enemy lost more than a thousand,2 our artillery having played on his masses for some time, while he had only two light guns in position. This en- gagement was of as little use to the English as to us. Why should Wellington, knowing that Ney had orders to retire, and that the French were in declared retreat, be in such a hurry to attack merely in order to make Ney resume his march a little sooner than he would otherwise have done ? I was present at this affair, and deplored the false pride of the two generals which cost so many brave men their lives with no result.
The main French army took up a position between Condeixa and Cardaxo. The critical moment of our retreat had arrived. Mass^na, not wishing to leave Portugal, had resolved to cross
1 [Not including Napier, apparently. In fact, in his account of the fight- ing at Pombal he does not mention that the place was burnt, while he excuses the burning of Redinha and other places on the ground that it served to cover Mass6na's movements.]
8 [Twelve officers and two hundred men (Napier).]
SURPRISED AT DINNER 449
the Mondego at Coimbra, and await orders and reinforcements from the Emperor in the fertile district between that town and Oporto ; but Trant had cut the bridge of Coimbra, and the Mondego was so much swollen as to be unfordable. The only course open was, therefore, to reach Puente de Murcelha, and there cross the rapid torrent of the Alva. Accordingly, on the 13th the head-quarters started in that direction. We ought to have reached Miranda de Corvo the same day; but for some unknown reason the marshal established himself at Fuente- Cuberta, where, believing himself covered by the divisions which he had ordered Ney to post at Cardaxo and Condeixa, he had with him only a guard of thirty grenadiers and twenty- five dragoons. But Ney, under plea of an attack by superior forces, had abandoned these points ; giving notice to Massdna so late that he did not get the letter till some hours after the execution of the movement, and might have been captured with all his staff. In fact, believing that he was under the safeguard of several French divisions, and finding the place agreeable and the weather fine, he had ordered his dinner to be served in the open air. We were sitting quietly at table under the trees near the entrance of the village, when suddenly there appeared a detachment of fifty English hussars, less than a hundred yards Away. The grenadiers surrounded Masse'na, while the aides- de-camp and the dragoons mounted and rode towards the enemy. As they fled at once, we supposed they were some stragglers, seeking to rejoin their army ; but we soon saw an entire regi- ment, and perceived that the neighbouring hillsides were covered with English troops who had almost completely surrounded Fuente-Cuberta. The imminent danger in which the head- quarters were placed was due to a mistake on the part of Ney. Thinking that the commander-in-chief had had his letter, he ordered all his divisions to evacute Cardaxo and Condeixa, thus uncovering Fuente-Cuberta. The enemy had come up in silence, and you may judge of our astonishment ; but luckily night was at hand, and a thick fog rising. The English, never dreaming that the French commander would be thus separated from his army, took our group for a rear-guard, which they did not venture to attack ; but it is certain that if the hussars had made a resolute charge, they would have carried off Massdna and all who were with him. Naturally when the English heard of Mass6na's nar- row escape they made the most of it ; and Napier avers that he only escaped their hussars by taking the feathers out of his hat. Unfortunately for this story, marshals did not wear plumes. That evening the head-quarters left Fuente-Cuberta very
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450 MEMOIRS OF THE BARON DE MARBOT
quietly, though several regiments of the enemy were close by ; one posted on some rising ground which our road crossed. To get it out of the way, the marshal employed an artifice of which the enemy, to whom French was familiar, often made use against us. Knowing that my brother spoke English well, he gave him instructions ; and Adolphe, advancing towards the foot of the hill and keeping in the shadow, called out to the commanding officer that Lord Wellington ordered him to bear to the right, and take up a position which he indicated, in another direction than that which we were following. The colonel, unable to see my brother's uniform, took him for an English aide-de-camp, and obeyed. When he was out of the way, we passed on quickly, glad to escape a new danger, and joined the 6th corps before daylight.
During this long and toilsome march, Masse*na's attention
was much occupied with the danger to which Mme. N was
exposed. Several times her horse fell over fragments of rock invisible in the darkness, but although cruelly bruised, the brave woman picked herself up. After several of these falls, however, she could neither remount her horse nor walk on foot and had to be carried by grenadiers. What would have happened to her if we had been attacked, I do not know. The marshal, imploring us all the time not to abandon her, said repeatedly : ■ What a mistake I made in bringing a woman to the warl' However, we got out of the critical situation into which Ney had brought us.
On the following day, March 14, after beating back a smart attack upon his rear-guard, Massena posted the mass of his troops in a strong position in front of Miranda de Corvo, in order to give the artillery and baggage wagons time to pass the defile beyond the town. Seeing the French army halted, Lord Wellington brought up a strong force, and everything promised a serious engagement when Massena summoned his lieutenants to receive his instructions. All but Ney came at once, and as he did not arrive the commander-in-chief ordered Major Pelet and me to go and ask him to come quickly. This errand, which seemed an easy one to discharge, nearly cost me my life.
The French army was drawn up on ground descending gently in the form of an amphitheatre towards a large brook, lying between two broad hills, over the summits of which passed country roads, leading to Miranda. At the moment when Pelet and I galloped off to execute the marshal's order, the English skirmishers appeared in the distance, coming up to attack the two hills. In order to be more certain of rinding
AN UNEQUAL FIGHT 45 1
Marshal Ney, my companion and I separated. Pelet took the road on the left, I that on the right, passing through a wide clearing, in which were our outposts. Hearing that Marshal Ney had passed by, less than a quarter of an hour before, I felt bound to hasten to meet him, and just as I hoped to come up with him, I heard several shots, and bullets whistled past my ears. I was no great distance from the enemy's skirmishers, posted in the woods surrounding the clearing. Although I knew that Marshal Ney had a strong escort, I was uneasy on his account, fearing that